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Abstract
This thesis explores the causes and consequences of resource misallocation and energy
efficiency in the context of firm heterogeneity in Indian manufacturing. In the first chapter,
I quantify misallocation in the Indian cast iron sector. I develop a method to disentangle
distortions that capture input misallocation from fundamental demand heterogeneity across
firms. In the second chapter I explore why material inputs are misallocated in the cast iron
sector, focusing on differences in access to suppliers through the transportation network.
In the third chapter I estimate the causal relationship between industrial electricity prices
and electricity productivity for a large panel of Indian plants.
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Preface
This thesis explores the causes and consequences of resource misallocation and energy
efficiency in the context of firm heterogeneity in Indian manufacturing. It has been widely
documented that firms are heterogeneous within sectors. With firm heterogeneity, the
allocation of resources between firms matters for aggregate outcomes. How efficient is the
allocation of production inputs across plants? In the first chapter, I quantify misallocation
in the Indian cast iron sector. I develop a method to disentangle fundamental heterogeneity
between firms in terms of demand or production from input distortions that capture
misallocation. In the second chapter I ask why material inputs are misallocated focusing
on differences in access to suppliers through the transportation network. In the third
chapter I use the heterogeneity between firms in terms of electricity prices and electricity
productivity to estimate their causal relationship.
Estimating the costs of misallocation is challenging, despite its growing popularity
to explain aggregate income differences around the world. We need models to define
efficient allocations and to discipline data to quantify the costs of distortions that represent
misallocation. When we ignore firm heterogeneity in technology and demand in these
models, we infer misallocation costs that are upwards or downwards biased. The first chapter
develops and estimates a structural model that addresses this problem by disentangling
input misallocation distortions from fundamental heterogeneity. The model accounts for
endogenous variable markups and I explore counterfactual comparisons of oligopolistic
equilibria with and without misallocation. I can distinguish between welfare losses on the
consumer and the producer side, as well as losses in aggregate productivities.
Using data on quantities and prices on the output and inputs side of Indian cast
iron plants, I quantify the costs of input misallocation. Total welfare losses are large and
equivalent to 31% of sales. The consumers bear a higher share of the misallocation incidence
than the producers. In contrast, aggregate input productivities are hardly affected by
misallocation. I can realign this result with the large impacts on aggregate productivity
typically found in the literature. This means that while there are welfare losses, more
efficient allocation in this sector would not contribute to improving sectoral material
efficiency, which is receiving growing interest from an environmental policy perspective.
Perhaps surprisingly, I find that welfare losses due to misallocation of input materials are
90% larger than those from misallocation of labour.
12
In the second chapter, I ask what the underlying drivers of these costly input material
distortions are. The steel industry relies on shipping of heavy and bulky material inputs,
particularly through railroads. Indian freight transportation is plagued by breakdowns due
to outdated infrastructure, congestion from sharing tracks with passenger trains or state
border checkpoints due to different tax systems. These issues generate indirect costs of
trade such as uncertainty and delays. I account for shipping fees with observed factory gate
input prices, but the misallocation distortions would capture differences in these indirect
trade costs across plants. The indirect costs are likely to go up with longer routes from
suppliers. Using detailed geo-located data on the Indian rail and road infrastructure, I
construct a measure of supplier access and test whether differences in supplier access are
systematically related to material input distortions. I find that a one standard deviation
increase in supplier access reduces the costly input distortion by almost a third of its
standard deviation. Placebo tests show supplier access is not significantly related to the
labour input distortions, and that access to irrelevant suppliers or access to markets on
the output side cannot explain the distortions on the input side.
The third chapter starts by documenting a secular increase in aggregate industrial
energy efficiency and aggregate electricity productivity in India from around 2000. During
the same period, industrial electricity prices almost halved. Using a large panel of Indian
manufacturing plants over 16 years with information on electricity quantity and prices at
the plant level, I estimate the impact of electricity prices on electricity productivity. Based
on two different instruments, I recover causal estimates at the micro level that can explain
these aggregate trends. While higher electricity prices reduce electricity consumption, they
disproportionally decrease output, and therefore reduce electricity productivity. The causal
estimates have the opposite sign of the OLS estimates. I explore mechanisms and find
that higher electricity prices reduce firm size, investment, productivity and markups. This
is consistent with a complementarity between electricity and modern high performance
production techniques. I estimate pass-through rates and calculate that the incidence share
on consumers of this large industrial electricity prices reduction was two thirds. The causal
effects of industrial coal prices are of opposite sign, which has important implications for
climate policy and industrial development.
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Chapter I
Endogenous markups and input misallocation
I.1 Introduction
Misallocation of production factors between firms can result in large losses of aggregate
income. In their seminal paper, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) estimate aggregate TFP losses of
40%-60% in Indian manufacturing. Distortions such as preferential access to credit, labour
regulations that depend on firm size, or political connections have been identified, amongst
others, as causes for input misallocation in this emerging literature.1
In this chapter, I address a problem of ignored heterogeneity across firms when calcu-
lating misallocation losses. In the growing misallocation literature following Hsieh and
Klenow (2009), ignored heterogeneity across plants in terms of production or demand is
conflated with misallocation distortions in a non-trivial way. As a result, inferred welfare
costs from input misallocation can be upwards or downwards biased. In the application of
this chapter, ignoring heterogeneity in markups would understate the true costs of input
misallocation by up to 27%. The main contribution of this chapter is that I disentangle
plant level demand and production heterogeneity from input distortions.
I focus on input misallocation between cast iron producers in India.2 India’s manufac-
turing sector is an interesting case for studying misallocation considering debates3 in the
literature about the contribution of reforms to resource allocation. Misallocation could
have also played a role in India’s slow structural transformation compared to China and
other East Asian nations despite its deep economic reforms in the early 90s (Bhagwati and
Panagariya, 2014).
1See e.g. Gopinath et al. (2017) or Midrigan and Xu (2014), Garicano et al. (2016), and Akcigit
et al. (2018) respectively. See Restuccia and Rogerson (2017) or Hopenhayn (2014a) for recent surveys.
Appendix I.A presents a brief overview of additional related literature.
2Cast iron is an important product in India’s manufacturing sector. It has one of the highest shares of
any single product in manufacturing output. India’s steel sector has a 15% share in total manufacturing
value added which is one of the highest in the world (UNIDO, 2016b).
3See e.g. Bollard et al. (2013); Harrison et al. (2013) vs. Nishida et al. (2014, 2015).
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While the aggregate consequences of misallocation are usually expressed in aggregate
TFP losses, we have not been able to say much about other margins. India has created
a Resource Efficiency Panel in 2015 and sectoral material productivity is more generally
receiving growing attention from an industrial competitiveness and environmental agenda
(e.g. OECD, 2015; European Comission, 2013). The substantial emissions of the steel
sector are in part determined by its aggregate material productivity. Most research focuses
on how innovation and technology diffusion can improve sectoral material productivity,
but there is little evidence on potential allocative gains. With the methodology in this
chapter, I can recover the effects of misallocation on a rich set of outcomes at any level of
aggregation. I can distinguish between the effects of misallocation on welfare and aggregate
input productivities. I can further distinguish between the effects on consumer welfare
and producer profits, which allows for an analysis of incidence of the input misallocation
distortions.
It is worth to briefly conceptualise the misallocation distortions and to motivate why
we need to do disentangle those from fundamental heterogeneity in the first place, before I
introduce the nature of the counterfactuals. The input distortions (or “wedges”) are usually
measured by the plant level gaps between the marginal revenue product (MRP) of an input
and the input price. Distortions can rationalise the existence of these gaps and represent
additional unobserved costs for a particular plant from using that particular input. These
additional cost could arise through policies like taxes and subsidies, information frictions,
transaction costs, corruption, extortion, or other input constraints that vary across firms.
The bundle of all these potential input distortions represent the gap between the MRP
and input prices. In the absence of these distortions the MRP should be equal to the input
price. In the presence of the distortions there is misallocation. Intuitively, moving a unit of
an input from a low gap and low MRP plant to a plant with a larger gap and higher MRP
increases aggregate output through a more efficient allocation. In the privately optimal
equilibrium, plants that face larger distortions underutilise the input compared to the
socially optimal outcome.
The reason why we should disentangle the distortions from fundamental heterogeneity
is because the MRP and these gaps are not directly observed.4 The distortions (or the
gaps) are determined by the demand elasticities (or markups), output elasticities and
the revenue share of an input.5 Even if we were correct on average and some distortions
4There has been some debate on the role of data management and measurement error. See Rotemberg
and White (2017) and Bils et al. (2017) respectively.
5To organise thoughts, take the variance of MRP which is often used as a statistic of misallocation
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are over- while others underestimated, I show that mismeasurment still impacts welfare
conclusions. It matters which plants face which distortions, for example whether it is the
more productive plants facing the more severe distortions.6 Any deviations of the assumed
demand or output elasticities from the real ones are captured by the input distortions, while
they in fact are differences in demand or production technique.7 The literature following
Hsieh and Klenow (2009), for example, assumes constant production elasticities within
4-digit sectors, and constant demand elasticities dictated by CES. There is, however, a
large body of evidence that markups can vary across firms even within narrow industries.8
Depending on the relationship between the true markups, true output elasticities and
the true input distortions, the variation of input distortions across plants can increase or
decrease when it is mismeasured. As a result, ignoring heterogeneity biases the inferred
costs from misallocation upwards or downwards.
One might argue that capturing ignored heterogeneity in the inferred input distortions
could be desirable, at least when it comes to heterogeneity in markups. We would capture
the bundle of distortions on the input and demand side that represent deviations from a
CES framework, such as excess market power. Along the lines of the theory of the second
best, we only care about the joint effect of all distortions. If the firm with the additional
benefits on inputs (overusing input) also has more market power (under-producing), then
these distortions could offset each other in a second best world. However, when we capture
ignored demand heterogeneity in input distortions, we preclude any economic evaluation
and welfare analysis of the distortions. This is because a model that is based on constant
demand elasticities, such as CES, cannot be used to evaluate welfare losses if we believe
that we capture variable demand elasticities. We would have to change the primitives of
along the rationale described above, assuming constant input prices. Consider a simple profit maximisation
problem PQ−vX, where either prices P depend on quantity Q or quantity on prices, and maximising with
respect to input X. Without parametric functional form assumptions, we can write the first order condition
in terms of the variance of the logged MRP of an input. It is equal to the variance of a combination of
the inverse demand elasticity η, the output elasticity α and data on inputs and revenues:
Var
[
logMRP
]
= Var
[
log(1 + η) + log(α) + log(
PQ
X
)
]
Typically, the first two terms are assumed constant (within a sector). If, in reality, demand elasticities
(or markups) or output elasticities are not constant, variation in measured MRP no longer imply input
distortions, but could capture demand or production heterogeneity. Vice versa, a constant MRP does not
imply the absence of input distortions or misallocation. Once we account for heterogeneity, the variance in
MRP can go up or down, depending on the correlation between the terms.
6Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) show that the correlation between firm TFP and distortion matters.
7This is also illustrated by the fact that the equation for input distortions in Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
is the same as the equation for markups in the popular De Loecker and Warzynski (2012).
8See e.g. Nevo (2001), De Loecker et al. (2016) or Hottman et al. (2016).
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the model as well. On the contrary, with the approach in this chapter, where I isolate the
input distortions from variation in demand elasticities, we learn about whether the theory
of the second best applies. In a second best world, removing only the input distortions for
the counterfactual would lead to a decrease in welfare, a clear prediction that I can test
and will reject.
The way that I disentangle misallocation from fundamental heterogeneity is through a
combination of product level focus on the production side and estimating flexible endogenous
demand elasticity, facilitated by using detailed quantity and price data on both outputs
and inputs for a panel of plants. This is the first paper to estimate structural demand and
production systems to combine it into a welfare framework to disentangle input distortions
from endogenous markups.9
On the production side, I estimate production functions for a single product (cast
iron), which is much narrower than the usual production functions that are assumed to be
identical for all plants within 4- or 2-digit sectors.10 The resulting product level output
elasticities are much less likely to ignore production heterogeneity. Importantly, I am
also able to address output and input price bias by estimating gross output production
functions using observed quantities of outputs and inputs.11 I recover plant level total factor
productivities (TFPQ) based on the proxy method (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Wooldridge,
2009).
On the demand and output side, I observe heterogeneity across plants in the data –
even for this single cast iron product category. There is significant variation in output
prices, both in gross prices and prices net of sales tax, excise duty and other distributional
and transport fees. This suggests a setting with differentiated products and different
9Some recent work incorporate separate but exogenous markup variation, e.g. Ho and Ruzic (2017) for
different sectors, or Lenzu and Manaresi (2018), Tortarolo and Zarate (2018), Haltiwanger et al. (2018)
and Eslava and Haltiwanger (2019) at the firm level. Haltiwanger et al. (2018) also show that some
assumptions of the Hsieh and Klenow (2009) model do not hold using more detailed data from the US
and argue that sharper estimates of distortions that are isolated from heterogeneity on the demand and
production side indeed hold more informative signals. Related are also Bayer et al. (2018) and Liang
(2017). Peters (2013) and Edmond et al. (2018) on the other hand focus on endogenous markups, but
are not separating it from input distortions empirically. Baqaee and Farhi (2017) study misallocation
in general equilibrium focusing on markups. Also related is De Loecker and Scott (2016), who estimate
markups from the production and the demand side to compare them.
10I estimate production functions for single product plants in a single 7-digit product category. Boehm
and Oberfield (2018) argue that there is significant production heterogeneity even within narrowly defined
4- or 2-digit sectors in India.
11When using deflated revenue, we conflate markups with physical output, stressed e.g. by Gandhi et al.
(2016); Marin and Voigtländer (Forthcoming); Foster et al. (2008). When using deflated input expenditures
instead of observed input quantities, we are likely to conflate quality with quantity, see Katayama et al.
(2009); De Loecker (2014) and also Kugler and Verhoogen (2012).
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demand conditions. I build on the Berry et al. (1995, 1999) random utility mixed model
framework embedded in an oligopolistic setting, where I identify the demand parameters
using production cost shifters as instruments. The estimated demand elasticities (and
markups) are flexible and endogenous.12
Having a clean measure of input distortions is only a first step, as it does not tell us
anything about the welfare costs of misallocation, which requires a counterfactual analysis.
What is an appropriate counterfactual? This naturally depends on the question being
asked. I construct counterfactuals, where I remove input distortions such that there are no
gaps between MRP and input prices, and search for an equilibrium where all firms are best
responding to each other. The estimated welfare gains can be interpreted as the gains from
removing misallocation distortions that would be obtained under an oligopolistic market
environment, as opposed to comparing it to a socially planned allocation for example
(Behrens et al., 2018). The counterfactuals and the misallocation losses are determined
by the change in the estimated distortions and by the endogenous changes in prices and
quantities of all plants.
There are five further features of the counterfactual analysis worth highlighting that
set this study apart from most of the input misallocation literature. First, demand
elasticities, markups and marginal cost pass-through are endogenous, as they depend on
the prices of all plants and demand and production fundamentals. The counterfactuals are
significant changes to prices and the economy, and restricting markups to exogenous factual
levels biases misallocation estimates.13 Second, aggregate inputs are allowed to adjust
endogenously in all equilibria. Allocative efficiency gains not only tend to increase total
output, but may also affect total input use.14 Third, I can account for observed input price
differences, due to local labour markets, or input quality difference, for example.15 Fourth,
all comparative statics are at the plant level, which permits a rich analysis of outcomes at
12The demand elasticities are more flexible than in the Kimball (1995) model, used e.g. in Klenow and
Willis (2016) or Edmond et al. (2018), where they are strictly decreasing (i.e. less elastic) in output share.
13Markup adjustment turn out to be important. I find markups adjust in the counterfactual for individual
plants to a degree that is comparable with the original deviations of plant markups from the average
markup.
14Recent work by Catherine et al. (2018) on collateral constraints and investment shows that the
aggregate input changes are important to such an analysis. Yet, the key literature restricts aggregate
inputs to be constant. I account for aggregate input changes and assume that inputs are elastically supplied
given that I analyse a small industry.
15The size of the misallocation losses are also determined by input prices. Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
need to assume constant factor prices across firms for their counterfactual analysis. Conceptually, the
input distortions are separate from input prices in the literature, otherwise they would show up in input
expenditures. I am able to reduce bias stemming from this source by using observed input prices. See
Cheng and Morrow (2018), for example on factor price differences due to local labour markets in China.
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any level of aggregation. Fifth, I can recover standard errors of all estimated distortions,
welfare losses and other comparative statics, which is novel to the input misallocation
literature. This is because I avoid calibration, and instead estimate the model and every
parameter directly.16 In addition, I am able to show which fundamental parameters are
driving the uncertainty in estimated misallocation losses. It turns out that the estimated
returns to scale are a main driver of the size of the misallocation losses, which underscores
the importance of estimating it as well as providing estimates of uncertainty.
There is a trade-off between focusing on a single industry which delivers less biased
misallocation costs and analysing misallocation for the entire manufacturing sector. While
the focus in the literature has been on the latter, this chapter emphasises the former
to maximise the signal in the distortions. Not only could the misallocation costs vary
substantially across sectors, but the potential bias when ignoring heterogeneity makes it
difficult to draw meaningful conclusions. Ultimately, with increasing availability of quantity
(and price) data on inputs and outputs, we can get a better grip on misallocation costs for
growing parts of the economy.17
The estimated welfare costs from labour and material input misallocation are substantial
and equivalent to around 31% of the sales from the plants in the sample.18 This is also
evidence that the economy with variable markups and input distortion does not constitute
a second best. The estimated counterfactual gains in compensating variation for consumers
are larger than the gains in firm profits, driven by price decreases from cost pass-through.
To get a sense of the bias in welfare costs from ignoring demand heterogeneity, I pretend
that demand elasticities are constant, infer the wrong distortions, and use my model
to calculate the bias. I find that the estimated welfare cost is between 13% to 27%
lower (depending on the counterfactual) when ignoring variable markups, so we would
underestimate misallocation costs in this case.
Surprisingly, aggregate input productivities are hardly affected from misallocation.
Even when defining a standard Cobb Douglas aggregate production function, there are no
16By bootstrapping from the estimated parameters’ covariance structures I can provide confidence
intervals around misallocation distortions or any other outcome.
17There can be spillovers into other sectors. Jones (2011, 2013) studies complementarities between
sectors through input-output links. Behrens et al. (2018) construct a general equilibrium model and show
that distortions in one sector can impact distortions in other sectors.
18For the counterfactual analysis I remove misallocation distortions in input materials, labour or both,
but any distortions in capital use from the factual are preserved in the counterfactual. This is because a
large fraction of static capital distortions might actually be inherent adjustment costs (time-to-build) to
changes in the capital stock. As Asker et al. (2014) show capital could be much more optimally allocated in
a dynamic sense. David and Venkateswaran (2017) address this by explicitly modelling capital dynamically
with adjustment costs.
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aggregate TFP gains. This seems at first unexpected because of the large literature on
TFP gains. However, I show that we can realign the results with the literature when their
TFP gains are not interpreted as pure production side productivity gains, but instead as
welfare gains consistent with their implicit underlying demand model. Those TFP (i.e.
welfare) results are comparable with the welfare results in this chapter.19
The total welfare costs of misallocation of materials are around 90% larger than from
misallocation of labour, and the difference is statistically significant. This is a surprising
result, given that we usually think of materials as a more flexible input than labour and
therefore associated with fewer distortions. While the literature often abstracts from
intermediates entirely with value added production functions, distortions in materials
markets appear to be important and costly, at least for the cast iron industry in India. In
Chapter II of this thesis, I explore what is driving these costly material input distortions.
The rest of the chapter begins by setting up the model and estimation strategy in
Section I.2. First I set up the firm problem and how they interact. This allows me to
derive an expression for the input distortions which depends on production and demand
parameters. I then present the production function estimation, demand estimation and
welfare framework before I describe the counterfactual equilibria used for comparative
statics. Section I.3 presents the data along with some descriptive statistics. Section I.4
briefly discusses the results for the production and demand estimation as well as descriptive
statistics on the estimated input distortions. Section I.5 analyses misallocation losses from
the counterfactual exercise before Section I.6 concludes.
I.2 Model and estimation strategy
This section sets up the model in order to identify the misallocation distortions, estimate
the structural production and demand side parameters, and calculate the counterfactuals.
With a slight abuse of terminology, I use the term firms and plants interchangeably. To fix
ideas, we should think of single plant and single product firms, which reflects the data I
use.
19Furthermore, note that the counterfactual gains in this chapter incorporate the full effects of misal-
location including changes in aggregate inputs. When holding aggregate inputs fixed, any output gains
would be necessarily attributed to aggregate TFP.
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I.2.1 Firm behaviour and input misallocation
Market structure
Suppose that firms interact in a market where each firm j ∈ J is a single product firm
and is selling a differentiated product j.20 The firms compete strategically on prices in a
Bertrand-Nash fashion to maximise profits in each market (period) t separately. In the
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, all firms are individually profit maximising and best responding
to each other.
Due to product differentiation, as well as heterogeneous cost structures, firms charge
different prices with different markups in equilibrium. Product differentiation is consistent
with the data in the application of this chapter, where prices vary across cast iron plants
and are only weakly correlated with quantities. This requires differentiation, for example in
terms of quality or geography. The elasticity of one firm’s demand to another firms’ prices
varies by firm-pair. Therefore, firms with a unique high quality product can behave like a
monopolist in a high quality segment. Similarly, this framework also allows for regional
oligopolies where outsider firms’ prices have little impact on local demand. These features
will be captured by endogenous demand (cross-) elasticities as described in Section I.2.3.
Firm profit maximisation
Firms maximise profits according to:
max
Pjt
PjtQjt(Pt)− C(Qjt(Pt), cjt)
where Pjt is the output price of firm j at time t, and Qjt is the output quantity which
depends on the vector of output prices of all firms Pt.21 The equilibrium output prices and
quantities are not necessarily equal to realised prices and quantities. This is because we
introduce an unforeseeable zero mean shock to production later, which pins down realised
quantities. The equilibrium strategies of the (risk-neutral) firms do not depend on the
shock, which occurs after all choices have been made. The cost function C(.) depends on
output quantity and the vector of firm-time specific cost parameters and shifters cjt. The
20In the application, we can include multi-product firms that produce this differentiated product for the
demand estimation.
21Both output prices and input prices are at the factory gate. That is output prices are net of taxes,
excise duties and shipping fees. On the input side, shipping fees are captured by the price of material
inputs.
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first order condition for the firm’s profit maximisation problem is:
Qjt(Pt) +
∂Qjt(Pt)
∂Pjt
(
Pjt −MCjt
(
Qjt(Pt), cjt
))
= 0;
where I use the standard definition of the marginal costs MCjt which is allowed to change
with output quantity. We can rewrite this as:
1
1 + ηjt(Pt)
=
Pjt
MCjt
(
Qjt(Pt), cjt
) (I.1)
where the inverse demand elasticity is defined as ηjt ≡ ∂Pjt∂Qjt(Pt)
Qjt(Pt)
Pjt
, which is allowed to
be firm and time specific and is endogenous depending on the prices of all firms. Equation
(I.1) is the familiar relationship between the price elasticity of demand and the markup
of prices over marginal costs used in the Learner index and reflects market power. The
degree of market power falls with more elastic demand.
Input cost minimisation and input distortions τ
The input distortions enter in the cost minimisation problem. Before defining the firms
problem, I highlight two assumptions. First, I follow recent literature (e.g. De Loecker et al.,
2016) and frame the input cost minimisation problem as a short term cost minimisation
of achieving the firm’s required output Qjt by choosing labour Ljt and materials Mjt
conditional on installed capital Kjt. This avoids specifying a dynamic condition for capital
optimisation, but it also precludes analysing distortions in capital inputs, as there is no
capital demand condition to derive capital distortions from. As Asker et al. (2014) show,
using a static condition for capital, a dynamic input, can be misleading when inferring
distortions. Hence I only analyse misallocation in material and labour markets and preserve
the mix of capital misallocation and adjustment costs contained in the unobserved rental
rate across factual and counterfactual scenarios.22
Second, inputs are elastically supplied. That is, firms are assumed to be price takers
on the input side, consistent with a setting where they are relatively small players in
the labour market and material input market. Appendix I.B discusses this assumption.
Importantly, I show that input market power (monopsony power) would be captured by
the input distortions. I present evidence that input market power is not likely in this
22From a meta perspective, I believe we could interpret such adjustment costs as misallocation if they
are not an inherent feature of production. That is if they are possible to change. Adjustment costs for
materials, if they exist, are likely to be small and reducible, as the period of analysis are years.
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setting, in favour of the assumption of elastic input supply. The firms minimise short run
costs according to:
min
Ljt,Mjt
rjtKjt + τ
L
jtwjtLjt + τ
M
jt P
M
jt Mjt
s.t. F (Kjt, Ljt,Mjt)Ωjt ≥ Qjt
where the input prices are the rental rate rjt, wages wjt and materials price PMjt . Variation
in input prices across firms can arise through using inputs of different quality, like more
expensive materials or higher skilled workers.23 The production function F (.) is assumed
to have the same structure for all firms, since all firms produce the same 7-digit product,
which is substantially narrower than a 4-digit sector. If a firm uses higher quality inputs, it
does not produce more outputs, but higher quality outputs (with higher prices), such that
the physical relationship of the weight of outputs and inputs is the same for high and low
quality products. Differences in this relationship across firms are captured by firm specific
Hicks-neutral total factor productivities Ωjt.
Finally, the τLjt and τMjt are material and labour cost multipliers, that differ across firms
and capture input misallocation. I follow the key literature in modelling this as a wedge
that captures a range of distortions, as in Chari et al. (2007), Restuccia and Rogerson
(2008) or Hsieh and Klenow (2009). Essentially, firms are assumed to behave optimally
given their individual environment, constraints and distortions, which will enable us to
infer the distortions τ . I next discuss the interpretation of these distortions.
Interpretation and identification of input distortions τ
Firms that face a higher τMjt have higher additional costs associated with purchasing input
materials, which drives wedges into the efficient allocation of inputs. What are these
input distortions? The τ can be interpreted as plant specific “taxes” or “subsidies” on
the particular input. They can be actual taxes due to e.g. firm size dependent policies
regarding labour taxation24, input subsidies for a subset of goods, or land and property
rights regulation that affects firms differently25. They can also be advantages and windfalls
23As described in Section I.5.1, since I measure labour Ljt in worked hours, I perform a robustness
check where labour is measured as wage bill to capture skills, which can increase output quantity Qjt not
just sales price. More expensive high quality materials (per tonne) on the other hand should not increase
output quantity, but rather the sales price.
24See Garicano et al. (2016) for a study of such policies in France.
25E.g. Duranton et al. (2015). In the agricultural context see Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014a);
Chari et al. (2017); Chen et al. (2017).
23
through political connections (Faccio, 2006; Akcigit et al., 2018), resulting in firms spending
more than optimal amounts on certain inputs, i.e. a low τ . Other elements contained in τ
are differential overhead costs (e.g. legal and administration costs) associated with the
input, market or informational frictions (David et al., 2016; Bloom et al., 2013; Allen, 2014),
enforcement frictions (Boehm and Oberfield, 2018) and further plant specific barriers or
advantages of using the input. Similarly, a model with constrained input access results in
the same first order conditions.26 In Chapter II, I present evidence that the material input
distortions capture indirect trade costs such as delays and uncertainty from differences
in access to suppliers. Anything that incentivises or constrains the use of the input away
from the optimum is captured in τ .
Using the definitions of the material and labour elasticities of output, αMjt ≡ ∂Qjt∂Mjt
Mjt
Qjt
and αLjt ≡ ∂Qjt∂Ljt
Ljt
Qjt
, and that the Lagrange multiplier of the minimisation problem is the
marginal cost of production MCjt, the cost-minimising conditions for labour and materials
X ∈ {L,M} are:
τXjt P
X
jt −MCjtαXjt
Qjt
Xjt
= 0 (I.2)
Combining both first order conditions (I.1) and (I.2) yields the expression for τMjt and
τLjt, which are identified if the parameters on the right hand side are identified:
τMjt = (ηjt + 1)α
M
jt
PjtQjt
PMjt Mjt
τLjt = (ηjt + 1)α
L
jt
PjtQjt
wjtLjt
(I.3)
In standard imperfect competition models where τMjt = 1 (and analogously τLjt = 1),
the markup adjusted output elasticity is equal to the expenditure share of the input,
i.e. (ηjt + 1)αMjt =
PMjt Mjt
PjtQjt
, or the marginal revenue product of material is equal to the
input price, so MRPMjt ≡ (ηjt + 1)αMjt PjtQjt/Mjt = PMjt . We can rationalise measured
gaps between the MRPMjt and input price PMjt with the distortions τMjt . The τMjt are
associated with misallocation. Intuitively, reallocating inputs from a low τMjt firm to a
high τMjt firm increases aggregate sales with the same amount of inputs used, because of
26That is suppose the constrained cost minimisation is:
min
Ljt,Mjt
rjtKjt + wjtLjt + P
M
jt Mjt s.t. Mjt ≤ M¯jt with multiplier (τMjt − 1)
with the corresponding constraints for labour. See Peters (2013) for example.
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the higher adjusted MRPMjt of the latter firm. By turning this logic around, we can
infer the wedges τMjt through the variation in the ratio of the estimated MRPMjt and
observed material prices PMjt . Once we have recovered the τMjt , we can ask how costly
they are. This is the point of the counterfactual, where I remove the τMjt (or τLjt). Finally,
Equation (I.3) demonstrates that any ignored heterogeneity in output elasticities αMjt
or markups 1/(ηjt + 1) would be shifted to the left hand side and be captured by the
input distortions. The misattribution problem has raised doubts in the recent review by
Restuccia and Rogerson (2017) amongst others. This chapter aims to disentangle this
fundamental heterogeneity from input distortions.
Markup variation, misallocation and theory of the second best
I analyse misallocation from input distortions. That is, markups are allowed to vary in
both the factual observed world and the counterfactual scenarios, and are determined by
the estimated demand fundamentals and all prices and quantities. There is an alternative
literature, that views variable markups as distortions compared to a CES world. This
literature, predominately in trade, often analyses variation and changes in markups and
market share reallocation in response to trade shocks.27 One might argue that lumping
the bundle of market power and input distortion together could be interesting along the
lines of the theory of the second best: demand elasticities and input distortions could
(partially) offset each other, such that we only care about the joint bundle. It might be
tempting to conclude that the literature applying a Hsieh and Klenow (2009) approach
does exactly that, as a constant markup is assumed and the inferred distortions implicitly
capture the bundle of input distortions and idiosyncratic markups.28 However, their CES
demand framework is inconsistent with variable markups, so we cannot calculate welfare
(or TFP) losses if we believe that the inferred distortions also capture variable markups,
as it would necessarily change other parts of the model.
27For so-called “pro-competitive” effects of trade, see e.g. Edmond et al. (2015); Arkolakis et al. (2018).
Typically the question is whether trade shrinks the variation in markups across firms due to increased
output market competition. In models with CES demand, markups are constant. Models with variable
demand elasticities introduce markups that vary across firms. When taking the stance that the variation
in markups (i.e. demand elasticities) is not socially optimal, then we can also think of markup variation as
additional misallocation of market shares. As in Dhingra and Morrow (Forthcoming), private markups
are then not equal to socially optimal constant markups. See also Behrens et al. (2018) who quantify
the welfare gap between equilibrium and the optimum allocation under monopolistic competition with
heterogeneous sectors and firms.
28To see that, take the well-known contributions of both Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and De Loecker and
Warzynski (2012) that infer input wedges and markups respectively from the same first order condition
equation. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) assume ηjt to be a constant scalar, while De Loecker and Warzynski
(2012) implicitly assume τMjt = τLjt or simply an absent τ .
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On the contrary, in this chapter, we learn whether the theory of the second best applies
by isolating the input distortions. In the counterfactual that removes all input distortions
but allows variation in demand elasticities, welfare gains include any effects from previously
offsetting distortions. If the theory of the second best applied, welfare would go down when
input distortions are eliminated as they would have previously offset variation in demand
elasticities.29 I find welfare gains from removing input distortions, thus the joint presence
of input distortions and variable markups does not constitute a second best outcome.
Before I describe how I perform the counterfactual estimation and the implications for
welfare, I explain how I identify and estimate the output elasticities in the next section,
and the demand elasticities thereafter. The demand framework also pins down the welfare
framework used for counterfactual analysis.
I.2.2 Estimating production elasticities and output shocks
We can rewrite the production function in the cost minimisation problem in logarithmic
form where lower case variables indicate logarithms.
qjt = f(kjt, ljt,mjt) + ωjt
Unexpected output shock and functional form assumption
I incorporate an additional error term  into the entire structural model, so that the
estimation is consistent with firm behaviour and the Bertrand competition framework
throughout. I provide the details in Appendix I.C.1. During or after production, once
input choices have been made, an unanticipated multiplicative shock to expected firm
output occurs (exp(jt)) and defines realised, observed output Qrjt based on anticipated
equilibrium output Qjt:
Qrjt = Qjt exp(jt) (I.4)
For the baseline estimation and counterfactual analysis, I follow the standard in the
literature and assume a Cobb-Douglas production function:
qrjt = β0 + βkkjt + βlljt + βmmjt + ωjt + jt (I.5)
29Note that there is only one output, so one demand elasticity per firm, while there are multiple inputs,
so multiple input distortions. If input distortions differ by input, then a single demand elasticity cannot
offset all input distortions.
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The advantage of Cobb-Douglas production functions is that we can derive a simple
closed form analytical solution for the conditional input demand functions which dramat-
ically eases the search for equilibria. In Appendix I.C.3, I use a more flexible translog
production function instead. The average production elasticities for this specification are
reassuringly close to the Cobb-Douglas estimates.
Control function approach for identification
There are two well-known challenges with estimating production functions. They stem
from unobserved productivity ωjt and generate a simultaneity bias and a selection bias,
as explained in more detail in Appendix I.C.1. In order to estimate the production
function consistently and address these concerns, I make a set of assumptions that was
first introduced by Olley and Pakes (1996), and later refined by Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003), Wooldridge (2009) and Ackerberg et al. (2015), and commonly referred to as the
proxy method or control function approach. The strategy is to use a control function for
unobserved productivity to recover it, instead of for example, simply instrumenting for
input choices.
A detailed description of my adaptation of this approach and the required assumptions
are carefully explained in Appendix I.C.1. The population moment equations used for
identification, where Θ is the vector of all structural parameters, are:
E
 jt(Θ) | Γjt(
jt + ζjt
)
(Θ) | Γjt−1
 = 0
where jt is the unforeseen production shock, which is uncorrelated with the current
period choices and information set Γjt. ζjt is the innovation in the Markov productivity
process in ωjt and uncorrelated to past input choices Γjt−1. I use a joint estimation
approach similar to Wooldridge (2009) to exploit these moment conditions.
This approach yields estimates for the structural output elasticities as well as the plant
level productivity ωjt and production shocks jt.
An alternative for robustness checks: system GMM
To check the robustness of the estimated output elasticities from the control function
approach to the invertibility condition, I also implement a dynamic panel system GMM
approach following Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000). Details are reported in Appendix
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I.C.2.
I.2.3 Demand structure and estimation
Dual role of the demand model
The demand model satisfies two roles. First, it allows us to estimate the elasticities of
demand needed for the identification of τjt. I want to allow for flexible heterogeneous
demand elasticities across (i) producers and (ii) counterfactuals by endogenising them.
This avoids attributing uncaptured demand heterogeneity to the input distortions τjt.30
As described in Section I.2.1, even though producers compete with the same product, such
demand heterogeneity can arise because producers cover different geographical regions.
Alternatively, product quality or brand loyalty differences introduce different price sensitiv-
ities among consumer groups or downstream firms. The second role of the demand model
is to provide a structure for quantitative welfare analysis.
Heterogeneous consumers: mixed logit random utility model
The buyers of output in the application of this chapter – cast iron – are likely to be
downstream firms, not consumers directly. However, to focus on the analysis of the cast
iron sector, I abstract from modelling downstream sectors. Downstream firms are assumed
to transform the outputs by segment into final products in a way that preserves product
characteristics such that e.g. a high quality final product requires a high quality output.
The downstream firms are assumed to operate with constant returns to scale and complete
pass-through such that utility to consumers can be modelled as if they are buying the
product directly. Schmalensee (1976), for example, shows that in competitive markets
with constant returns to scale, consumer surplus can be estimated from the market of
intermediate goods (i.e. the output of the cast-iron firms) instead of the final goods. What
matters is that the demand elasticities are well estimated using the variation in output
prices and quantities of all firms. I will therefore model consumers as if they are buying
directly from the cast iron firms.31
Heterogeneous consumers face a discrete choice problem from which firm j to buy
30In the literature following Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009), studies have
typically employed a simple CES model of demand with an assumed instead of estimated demand elasticity.
This allows for some welfare analysis, but confounds heterogeneity in demand with input distortions. The
literature estimating heterogeneous markups following De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) does not assume
any demand model, which prevents welfare analysis.
31As mentioned in Section I.2.1, transport costs on the output side are not contained in the prices and
implicitly captured by the estimated demand (cross-) elasticities and unobserved product characteristics.
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to maximise their utility. Consumer heterogeneity in terms of price sensitivities and
preferences over characteristics can be gauged by a random coefficient utility model. The
seminal contribution of Berry et al. (1995), henceforth BLP, develops a random utility
mixed logit approach which (i) has more realistic properties regarding demand (cross-)
elasticities than either a basic logit model (independence of irrelevant alternatives) or a
Kimball (1995) model (where elasticities depend only on output shares), and (ii) addresses
price endogeneity. The framework is also well suited for welfare analysis. The downside is
that it is not trivial to estimate this system and that algorithms for counterfactual analysis
can be time-intensive to converge. Crucially, the price elasticity of demand and the markup
depend on the structural parameters and distortions and prices and quantities of all firms.
They are thus endogenous and vary across factual and counterfactual scenarios.
Specifying the utility function and demand elasticities
Consumers are indexed by i and choose between products j to maximise their utility:
Uijt = (yit − P rjt)θpit + xjtθxit + ξj + ξt + ∆ξjt + µijt ≡ Vijt + µijt (I.6)
where yit is consumer income, P rjt are realised prices (which are associated with realised
quantities – these are the ones that are relevant for the consumers), xjt a vector of product
characteristics and a constant, ξj average utility from unobserved time-constant product
characteristics, ξt average unobserved market-specific utility, and ∆ξjt the unobserved
deviation from a particular product in a particular market from the unobserved averages.
The unobserved ξj can contain the quality and the location of a product and will be
absorbed by fixed effects dummies.32 For the baseline results I only include a constant
in xjt as there are few time variant product characteristics (since the time invariant
characteristics are absorbed in ξj). The parameters θpit and θxit are the random coefficients
that determine the heterogeneity in preferences across consumers and are allowed to vary
both by consumer and by market33. The set up in Equation (I.6) allows for heterogeneous
marginal utility of income (and prices) across consumers.34 The non-random utility can be
summarised by Vijt. The random utility component is µijt, which follows an i.i.d. Type I
32See Nevo (2001) for a discussion of the benefits of such brand dummies. The dimensionality increases
with J , and not with J2 as in an AIDS model (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980).
33We can interpret this as different consumers in different markets (periods). This precludes dynamic
demand considerations.
34The consumer specific marginal utility of income is, however, constant with the level of income, which
facilitates welfare calculation, and follows from risk-neutrality.
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extreme value distribution.35
Appendix I.D.1 describes how the parameters in the utility function are identified and
estimated. The algorithm involves an inner loop the minimises the distance between the
observed market shares and the theoretically derived market shares from the utility max-
imisation. The outer loop addresses prices endogeneity and forms the moment conditions.
The price elasticity of demand is:
1
ηjt
≡ ∂Qjt
∂Pjt
Pjt
Qjt
=
∂(sjtYt)
∂Pjt
Pjt
sjtYt
=
∂sjt
∂Pjt
Pjt
sjt
=
Pjt
sjt
1
N
∑
i
(θpitsijt(1− sijt)) (I.7)
where sjt is the market share of product j, Yt the market size and sijt consumer i’s
expected expenditure share in product j (see Appendix I.D.1). I omit the notation with
r for realised output (or market share) here, since the elasticities can be derived from
any prices and quantities (so in the realised as well as in the counterfactual equilibria)
conditional on the estimated parameters. Cross-elasticities can be calculated similarly and
vary by firm-pair in each market.
I.2.4 Factual and counterfactual equilibria and welfare
With the estimated structural parameters, I can recover the matrix of input distortions τ
and solve for counterfactual allocations. I first discuss what the relevant counterfactual is,
before I describe how I solve for it.
Misallocation costs: counterfactual distortions as weighted geometric average
What is the relevant counterfactual to evaluate the size of misallocation losses? The
relevant “no misallocation” counterfactual for this chapter is the state of the economy when
the distortions are removed. This would be the allocation that would occur in the same
oligopolistic setting, but without input distortions. Note that this is not necessarily the
optimum that a social planner might choose, which is the counterfactual in Behrens et al.
(2018), for example. The counterfactual in this chapter can be interpreted as what we
could achieve, if we managed to address input distortions in a market economy.
In the counterfactual, the distribution of τ is degenerate, such that it is constant
across plants. In principle, any constant τ˜ would equalise marginal revenue products of
inputs across plants, adjusted for input prices (recall τMjt ≡ MRPMjtPMjt ). A natural candidate
35This is a standard assumption in the literature because it facilitates inversion of market shares and
exact welfare analysis. Note that the distributional assumption is not required for identification, but the
instruments are key to identification (Berry and Haile, 2014).
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is setting τ˜ to unity. However, with measurement error in the deflator for output and
input prices, unity is no longer the appropriate counterfactual as we would artificially
inflate or deflate input costs per unit across the board. Note that this would not affect
production parameter estimation (quantities) or demand estimation (year fixed effects) as
the measurement error is common to all firms. The measurement error multiplies prices
and in- or deflates all τ by the same proportion within each cross section.36 Consider
a simple example. Suppose that the error in the input price deflator is a change in the
unit of the input price (PMjt ) from dollars into cents for one period. Since the measured
MRPMjt ≡ (ηjt + 1)αMjt PjtQjt/Mjt remains unchanged, all measured τMjt are scaled down
by a factor of 100. As a result, the counterfactual τ˜Mjt needs to be scaled down by a 100 as
well.37
I take the stance that allocative inefficiencies between plants should be attributed to
differences in distortions across plants alone while preserving an average of the distortions
(which could be the measurement error). We can get the correct counterfactual even for
τ that are polluted with measurement error, if we assume that across the economy the
true τ true are on average neither favourable nor adverse per input used (i.e. unity). The
correct counterfactual is unity multiplied by the measurement error. This is equivalent
to setting the counterfactual τ˜ to each period’s weighted geometric average τ , where the
weights are plant expenditure on that input (i.e. materials or labour).38 The weighted
geometric average is taken because of the nonlinear scale of τ (the geometric average is
just the exponentiated arithmetic average of log(τ )). Weights are used to account for
different plant sizes such that we retrieve the average distortion per input used, not the
simple average across plants.
All welfare results are robust to and qualitatively the same when using a counterfactual
36The Hsieh and Klenow (2009) method implicitly addresses this by defining an aggregate production
function with the same structure as for the plant level and then taking ratios of plant level quantities to
aggregate quantities.
37As another example, suppose that all true τMjt are already unity, i.e. there is no misallocation. Again,
wrong price deflators would scale the measured distortions and we would wrongly infer misallocation losses
since the measured distortions are not unity but some other constant.
38If measurement error DEFt multiplicatively enters the input price deflator, then we work with
τM,truejt 
DEF
t P
M
jt in the firm’s costs, where τMjt = τ
M,true
jt 
DEF . This in turn means all true τM,truejt are
multiplicatively shifted by the same DEFt in each period. The relevant non-misallocation counterfactual
is not τ˜Mjt = 1 but τ˜
M,true
jt = 1, so τ˜
M
jt = 
DEF
t . With the weighted geometric average as counterfactual
we achieve this under measurement error, as long as it holds that the weighted geometric average of the
true τM,truejt are unity (i.e. exp
∑
j ln(τ
M,true
jt ) ∗ weightjt = 1). The counterfactual τ˜ is each period’s
weighted geometric average τ : τ˜t = exp
∑
j ln(τ
M
jt ) ∗ weightjt = exp
∑
j ln(τ
M,true
jt ∗ DEFt ) ∗ weightjt =
exp
∑
j ln(τ
M,true
jt ) ∗ weightjt ∗ DEFt = 1 ∗ DEFt . When presenting statistics on distortions in the rest of
the chapter I therefore use annually demeaned distortions.
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of unity, but inflated due to τ˜ being above unity in most cases.39
Equilibria with endogenous marginal costs, markups and aggregate inputs
The counterfactuals τ˜ change the cost structure of firms, which in turn implies different best
response prices and quantities in the counterfactual Bertrand Nash equilibrium conditions,
along with changes in the endogenous markups. Both the factual and counterfactual
equilibria are defined as the following set of equations and inequality constraints:
Definition of equilibrium: An (internal) equilibrium satisfies profit maximisation of all
plants. This consists of intersecting their best response functions, which yields the set of
first order conditions (FOC), and a set of inequality constraints (SOC) for sufficiency of
profit maximisation, conditional on all structural parameters and the distortions τ :
Pjt
MCjt
(
Qjt(Pt), cjt(τ )
) − 1
1 + ηjt(Pt)
= 0 (FOC)
2
∂Qjt
∂Pjt
+ (Pjt −MCjt) ∂
2Qjt
(∂Pjt)2
− ∂MCjt
∂Qjt
(
∂Qjt
∂Pjt
)2
≤ 0 (SOC)
I provide detailed derivations for the terms in Appendix I.E.40
We are thus comparing well defined equilibria when analysing misallocation losses in
an attempt to gauge the full costs of misallocation. This includes potential expansion or
contraction in aggregate input use. This approach provides the advantage of explicitly
endogenising the key variables (prices, quantities, input use, demand elasticities, pass-
through) while preserving the estimated structural parameters (production elasticities,
preferences, plant TFPQ (Ωjt), etc.).41 So far, counterfactual analyses in the input misal-
location literature have assumed exogenous markups that do not change in counterfactual
equilibria.
Next I briefly describe how I obtain the factual equilibrium from realised prices and
quantities, and how I obtain the counterfactual.
39Results available upon request.
40Existence is proved by finding an equilibrium. Uniqueness is not proved. Even if there were multiple
equilibria, we do not know which one would be reached. I could not find any numerical evidence on
multiple equilibria, as a set of genetic algorithms as well as multiple starting points converged to the same
equilibrium.
41Often, counterfactual analyses using the BLP approach do not estimate the production side, and
marginal costs are simply assumed to be constant with respect to output (Berry et al., 1999; Nevo, 2000a;
Petrin, 2002). Since I explicitly incorporate and estimate a structural model of production, I can relax this
assumption and allow marginal costs to vary with output quantities according to estimated production
functions.
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From realised prices to (factual) equilibrium prices
First we need to recognise that we do not observe the factual equilibrium directly. Due
to the unanticipated shock to production jt, we observe realised prices and quantities in
the data which are different to the equilibrium quantities and prices that firms expected
and chose. Yet, the stage where prices and inputs are chosen (i.e. before the shock) is
the relevant stage for inferring the input distortions τ as described in Section I.2.1. Since
firms are risk neutral and the shock entirely unanticipated (and mean zero), it does not
influence their production input decisions, as described in Section I.2.2. I assume that
firms choose the next best (realised) prices that clear their shock adjusted produced output
and therefore the market.
The equilibrium quantities can be easily calculated from realised quantities, Qjt =
Qrjt
exp(jt)
from (I.4), and equilibrium market shares are sˆjt =
sˆrjt
exp(jt)
from (I.30). Given the
equilibrium quantities, I search for the equilibrium prices that solve the necessary and
sufficient conditions of the Bertrand Nash framework. This timing assumption harmonises
the production and demand estimation with equilibrium behaviour to derive the distortions
τ from Equation (I.3). See Appendix I.E for more details on finding the factual equilibrium.
Counterfactual equilibria
Once we have obtained the factual equilibrium and τ , we can set any counterfactual
τ˜ , search for the new equilibria and perform comparative statics between the factual
equilibrium and a version of the counterfactual equilibria. The three main counterfactuals
that I construct either eliminate the variation in distortions in material inputs to τ˜Mjt , in
labour to τ˜Ljt, or both simultaneously. The counterfactual equilibrium is pinned down by a
vector of (output) prices alone, given the structural parameters. All of the comparative
statics are alongside the intensive margin. Some plants can operate near or at zero output
in the counterfactuals, resembling firm exit, but I do not explicitly model the extensive
margin of exit and entry of new firms. For the counterfactual analysis, I use a Cobb-Douglas
production function, since cost and marginal cost functions as well as conditional factor
demands can be derived analytically, which makes solving for equilibrium prices more
tractable. Again, Appendix I.E provides the details.
We need to assume how much capital firms choose in the counterfactual. The simplest
solution is to assume that optimal installed capital follows a static optimisation condition
(i.e. the same as for labour and materials). This leaves us with the unknown distribution
of the rental rate for capital. While I could assume a range of values or distribution for this
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rental rate, I back it out from a static optimisation condition in the factual equilibrium. The
median value of this inferred rental rate is 29%. As Asker et al. (2014) show, attributing
all rental rate differences to misallocation could be misleading, as capital is mainly a
dynamically optimised input. The rental rate contains a mix of capital distortions and
capital adjustment costs. I preserve the plant specific rental rate across factual and
counterfactual equilibria, i.e. I preserve the degree of capital misallocation.42
How noisy are misallocation losses? A parametric bootstrap.
A feature of this chapter’s approach that is novel to the input misallocation literature is
that I am able to derive confidence bands for any of the comparative statics.43 I draw a set
of parameter estimates (Θ,Σ) from their joint asymptotic normal distribution using the
estimated covariance matrices and for each draw, find the factual equilibrium (since  is
different for each draw), calculate τ , find the counterfactuals and perform the comparative
statics analysis.44 This channels the information about the uncertainty in the structural
parameters, such as plant productivities from the underlying Markov process, output
elasticities, preference parameters and markups into the final comparative static of interest.
Calculating profit gains and average expected compensating variation
Instead of relying on the usual aggregate production functions, I calculate aggregate firm
profits, compensating variation and aggregate input productivities for comparative statics.
Profits as well as material and labour productivities are straightforward to aggregate, as I
solve for the factual and counterfactual equilibrium prices, quantities and inputs for each
plant. I use exact welfare measures for the demand side by calculating expected consumer
42Alternatively, I could specify a more complicated dynamic optimisation problem modelling adjustment
costs such as David and Venkateswaran (2017) and use the residual variation of this as capital distortions.
My approach is more conservative in terms of total misallocation losses by maintaining any capital
distortions (and adjustment costs) across counterfactual equilibria.
43At the time of writing I am not aware of a paper that provides estimates of uncertainty around
estimated input misallocation losses without calibration. The structural approach based on microdata
to generate estimates of uncertainty around gains may also be useful in related counterfactual analysis
studies e.g. on spatial misallocation of housing (Hsieh and Moretti, 2019) or infrastructure (Fajgelbaum
and Schaal, 2017), or misallocation losses from within-country trade distortions (Costinot and Donaldson,
2016). Adao et al. (2017) for example develop a structural “mixed-CES” approach for trade models based
on perfectly competitive goods and factor markets that allows for bootstrapped confidence intervals around
welfare gains.
44I draw from the production side parameters Θ and demand side parameters Σ, and assuming
independence between them. On the production side, jt is a function of the drawn parameters Θ and
data. On the demand side, I can solve for the linear parameters (θp, θx, δjt, ξ) by using the draws from
Σ, the contraction mapping and the linear IV regression. I repeat the draws and analysis 330 times for
all outcomes and then take the desired quantiles of the outcomes in order to get consistent confidence
intervals.
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compensating variation CVit from moving from the factual equilibrium prices Pt to the
counterfactual equilibrium prices P˜t. It is an expected welfare measure because of the
random utility component µijt. For each consumer, the CVit solves:
max
j
Uijt(yit − Pjt, xjt, µijt; θpit, θxit, ξ, ) = max
j
Uijt(yit − P˜jt − CVit, xjt, µjit; θpit, θxit, ξ) (I.8)
Due to (i) additive (ii) GEV random utility disturbances, and (iii) constant marginal utility
of income, I can conveniently use the Small and Rosen (1981) close form expression for
CVit:
CVit =
ln(
∑
j exp(V˜ijt))− ln(
∑
j exp(Vijt))
−θpit
where V˜ijt and Vijt are the counterfactual and factual utility components defined in (I.6).
We can take the average over consumers to get average expected compensating variation
for each period (market) per unit. That is CVt = 1N
∑
iCVit. Multiplying this figure by
the total quantity of output yields total expected compensating variation.
I.3 Data and descriptives
I.3.1 Plant and product level data
I use annual plant level panel data from the Indian Annual Survey of Industries (ASI)
from 2000 to 2012. Since the Collection of Statistics Act in 1953, detailed plant level data
is collected by the Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation (MoSPI) of India,
and most medium and large firms are familiar with the reporting. The mandatory nature
as well as the long history of the survey makes it an arguably established and reliably
data source in the developing context.45 For the purpose of this study, the most important
features of the dataset are that the output and input information is provided by product
codes, both in revenue (or expenditures) and in physical quantities, which allows me to
disentangle quantities from price effects. The ASI was traditionally a repeated cross-section,
which researchers matched throughout the years (Bollard et al., 2013; Harrison et al.,
2013). Recently it has been released in panel form, which latest research has started to use
(Martin et al., 2017; Rotemberg, 2014; Allcott et al., 2016; Akcigit et al., 2016).
45The data is an annual census of plants with ≥ 100 employees (until 2004 ≥ 200) and a sample (around
20%) of all plants with ≥ 10 employees with electricity and all plants with ≥ 20 employees without
electricity from a 4 digit sector-state strata.
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A general shortcoming of the ASI data is that it covers only the formal manufacturing
sector defined in its 1948 Factories Act, while a large share of manufacturing employment
is in the informal sector (around 80% (Hsieh and Klenow, 2014)). However, since larger
firms tend to be formal, the formal sector accounts for around two-thirds of output in
manufacturing (Allcott et al., 2016). Informality is less of a concern for the cast iron
industry. It is highly likely that output is even more skewed towards formal firms in this
sector compared to e.g. the textiles industry in India.
I study single product cast iron plants. The aim is to compare plants that are as
homogeneous as possible in their production technology to disentangle distortions from
production heterogeneity within sectors. Cast iron is a 7-digit product, and to give a
sense of the level of detail, the number of 2-digit sectors in the ASI manufacturing section
(NIC08) are 24, the number of 4-digit sectors is 137, whereas the number of 7-digit product
categories (NPCMS11) that are also manufactured in India is 5476. On average there are
40 different product categories within a 4-digit sector.
Finally, I use single product plants, because the ASI reports plant level outputs by
product, but not inputs by product line. While there are ways to deal with multiproduct
plants46, they are likely to introduce further misattribution of unknown input allocations
to the estimated distortions.47
I.3.2 Cast iron production in India
Cast iron is an iron-carbon alloy with high carbon content produced in different grades
(e.g. hardness) by varying carbon, silicon and other components and processes.48 It is
used in many machines, automobile parts (such as gearboxes and cylinders), pipes and
historically in construction. Cast iron is made from melting pig iron (which in turn is
produced from smelting iron ore with coke and limestone in a blast furnace), coke, limestone
and scrap steel, and small quantities of other metals into a desired grade and primary
casting. It can be placed in the production chain between the rawer pig iron upstream
46See either the simpler method in De Loecker (2011) or the more advanced method De Loecker et al.
(2016), for example.
47For the demand side, I can included products that are produced by multi-product firms to increase
the coverage of the sample and improve precision of the demand elasticities.
48The product codes of cast iron in the ASI data are 4111102 (NPCMS11) and 71112 (ASICC). Cast
iron has at least 2% carbon content (till around 3.5%-4%), while steel has less than 2% carbon content.
Sometimes cast iron is loosely included in the term steelmaking. Steel on the other hand is used in
construction and infrastructure, heavy machinery, white goods and tools. The advantage of cast iron over
steel is a lower melting point (and costs, as well as better machinability, i.e. cutability), but tends to be
brittle and have less tensile and compressive strength than steel.
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and semi-finished and finished sheets, cables, pipes, blades or tins (which might be turned
into tools, doorframes etc) downstream. Depending on the final use, the downstream
production chain can be shorter or longer.
How significant is cast iron production in the Indian iron and steel sector? As Figure
I.13 in Appendix I.F shows, a declining but considerable share of plants that produce
some product in the broader classification of iron alloys of primary form (ASICC 711 or
NPCMS 411) produce also cast iron (from 35% of plants in 1999 down to 20% of plants
in 2009). Sales of cast iron account for a slightly more stable 25% of primary iron alloys
until the financial crisis of 2008. Figure I.14 in Appendix I.F shows that around 60% of
firms producing cast iron are single product firms. However, the physical output quantity
produced by single product firms is typically slightly lower, as multiproduct firms tend
to be larger. There is limited industry concentration amongst the cast iron plants in the
sample as Figure I.15 in Appendix I.F shows. Appendix I.F provides a more detailed
account of India’s iron and steel sector. It also gives more detailed environmental context
to this sector. The substantial carbon emissions in this sector are in part determined by
aggregate material productivities. One contribution of this chapter is to study whether
misallocation has an effect on these aggregate material productivities.
I.3.3 Descriptive statistics of key variables
All output and input prices as well as book values of capital (at the start of the accounting
period) are deflated with industry specific and capital deflators respectively from the Office
of the Economic Adviser (2019). I use output prices net of plant level subsidies, taxes or
distribution costs. Labour includes workers employed through subcontractors as well as
informal labourers.49 Wages include the salaries as well as bonuses and welfare expenses.
For input materials, I use the sum of the weight of input materials, and the materials price
is the corresponding average price, including shipping fees. I recover the input price by
dividing total expenditure on material inputs by the total weight of material inputs. Table
I.1 provides some descriptive statistics on the sample of plants, after trimming the plants
which are in the bottom and top 1 percentiles of either output prices, the physical output
to material or labour ratio, or sales to installed capital ratio. I only keep plants that are
present for at least two consecutive years in the data. The total number of plants varies
by year, from around 60 to 110.
49In Appendix I.G.10 I measure labour as expenditure on labour instead of man-days. This provides a
sensitivity analysis towards measuring skill in labour, if skill is correlated with pay. Results are qualitatively
robust to this.
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Figure I.1: Plant output quantities.
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Figure I.2: Plant output prices.
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Figure I.3: Plant material input prices.
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Table I.1: Descriptive statistics
Mean SD p10 p90
Output quantity 3929 6345 140 10099
Output price 43.9 31.6 20.9 70.1
Materials quantity 5024 8932 154 12657
Materials price 15.7 11.4 8.8 23.0
Man-days (th.) 54.3 77.0 2.4 151
Employees 175 248 9.0 469
Daily wage (|) 203 120 92.3 341
Capital (mil. |) 54.7 161 0.5 116
Observations 1001
Notes: Quantities are in tonnes, prices in rupees per kg. All prices are deflated by 3-digit industry deflators.
Wholesale price deflators are from the Office of the Economic Adviser from the Government of India.
There is considerable variation in the scale in which plants operate, as shown in the
plant output quantities in Figure I.1. The ratio of the 75th percentile to the 25th percentile
of output quantity is 15.4. The prices for output and inputs are plotted in Figure I.2 and
Figure I.3 respectively. Output prices are mostly within the range of 20 to 70 Rupees per
kg with a mean of 44, which roughly matches global average steel prices over this period.50
This suggests a setting with differentiated products. In a typical monopolistic competition
framework, quantities are negatively correlated with prices in the cross section. I find no
statistically significant relationship in the cross section. This suggest that there is quality
differentiation. Figure I.17 in Appendix I.G.1 supports this story. It plots the output
prices against the input prices and shows that they are positively correlated, consistent
with quality differentiation where higher priced outputs require higher priced inputs.
50Figure I.2 also reveals that there is much less dispersion in output prices in 2004 and 2010 (also before
any trimming), which is a feature of the underlying raw data, perhaps simply due to sample variability over
the years. As I calculate annual misallocation losses, it is easy to see in Appendix I.G.8 that if anything,
the misallocation losses for these two years are slightly smaller.
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Average materials input prices are 16 rupees per kg and 80% are between 9 and 23
rupees per kg. Table I.1 converts labour Ljt in man-days into the number of employees
(on average) with a mean of 175 across plant years. The wage rate is 203 rupees per
day on average, which corresponds to around 4.5 USD per day. The 10th percentile at
around half this figure. Despite an increase in wages from 3.3 to 5.2 USD per day over
the sample period, they are still low and reflect the persistent poverty despite industrial
growth described in Bhagwati and Panagariya (2014).
I.4 Results for demand, production and distortions
I.4.1 Results from demand estimation
To address the price endogeneity in the demand estimation, I use the average plant level
wage wjt, and the average plant level price of a tonne of material inputs PMjt as instruments
for output price Pjt, which tend to perform well in BLP style estimations (Armstrong, 2016).
A theory guided justification for the choice of these instruments, along with first stage
tests, estimation results for the structural parameters and results from using alternative
instruments is provided in Appendix I.G.2.
Estimated demand elasticities and decreasing markups over time
A more familiar parameter than the random coefficients in the utility equation are the
demand elasticities ( 1
ηjt
), which are determined by the estimated parameters and data as
shown in Equation (I.7).51 The estimated plant-year level demand elasticities are shown in
Figure I.4, where the 90% bands are the percentiles of the distribution of the elasticities
across plants within a year. We can use the equilibrium optimality condition (I.1) to
express the demand elasticities as price over marginal cost markups. The median as well
as the 90% bands of the cross section of markups is plotted in Figure I.5.
There is considerable variation in markups across plants within the given years. Across
years, different plants are sampled, so there is natural sample variation. The years 2004
and 2010, for which I found little price variation in the raw data (Figure I.2), reassuringly
also have less variation in demand elasticities and markups. The median elasticity and
51For the rest of the analysis, I ignore the 1% of observations where I estimate a demand elasticity
larger than −1. With the standard oligopolistic models, we cannot calculate a markup or marginal costs
for these observations. I do not drop these observations, but exclude them for calculating distortions τ
and when comparing the factual to the counterfactuals. The 9 observations where this is the case have a
median market share of 0.0004 and a maximum market share of 0.007, and their market share remains
this small in all the counterfactuals.
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Figure I.4: Demand elasticities
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Notes: The figures plot the estimated plant level demand elasticities (left) and markups (right). Plotted
are the 5th, 50th and 95th percentile across plants within each year.
markup across all years are -4.82 and 1.26 respectively. De Loecker et al. (2016) find that
in the Indian Prowess data during 1989–2003 the median markup for manufacturing firms
is 1.34 and for basic metals firms 1.20 using the production side method of De Loecker
and Warzynski (2012).
The markups decreased slightly over time. A linear regression of logged markups on
years shows that markups decreased by 0.6% and 0.4% each year on average, in a pooled
and a within-plant fixed effect regression respectively, significant with SE clustered at the
plant. This is consistent with a story of increasing competition, particularly from large
foreign low price producers form neighbouring China. I find that markups and plant total
factor productivity are positively correlated. This correlation is driven by productivity
pushing down marginal costs, as productivity and prices are also negatively correlated
(see Appendix I.G.2). Markups and prices are negatively correlated, consistent with more
elastic demand at higher price points as in Atkin and Donaldson (2015).52
I.4.2 Results from production estimation
The results from estimating the Cobb-Douglas production function are reported in Table
I.2. Column (1) shows the baseline results with standard errors clustered at the plant
level.53 The direction of the bias in the OLS coefficients is as expected from the discussion
in Appendix I.C.1. The material elasticity is upward biased from the simultaneity problem,
52The correlation between markups and prices, and markups and market share varies across periods,
and is of opposite sign in some periods. This degree of flexibility is not possible with elasticities from
Kimball (1995).
53The Hansen overidentification J-test for valid instruments is not rejected at the 5% level in any of the
specifications. There is no standard rank test for instrument strength here as there are cross equation
restrictions.
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Table I.2: Estimates from a Cobb-Douglas production function
Type of correction Comparison to literature
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Simultaneity
& Selectivity
None:
OLS
De Loecker et al.
(2016)
Collard-Wexler and
De Loecker (2014)
αK
.06*** .04*** .01 .08***
(.02) (.01) (.06) (.02)
αL
.22*** .14*** .14 .27***
(.05) (.02) (.09) (.02)
αM
.64*** .80*** .77 .68***
(.05) (.03) (.11) (.02)
RTS .92*** .99*** .92 1.03***(.03) (.01)
N 443 1001 949 1498
Notes: The first two columns show the output elasticities and returns to scale with corrections for
simultaneity and selectivity and without (OLS). The second two columns show results from related studies
for comparison.
and the capital coefficient is (slightly) downward biased from the selectivity problem.
I perform several robustness checks regarding these estimates and the underlying
invertibility condition, as discussed in Appendix I.G.3. I also use a translog production
function (see Table I.7 in Appendix I.G.4) where elasticities vary by plant and year. The
mean elasticities are very similar to the estimates from the Cobb-Douglas production
function, with returns to scale close to unity.
Comparison to estimates from related studies
We can compare these results to other production function estimates from the relevant
literature. In particular, De Loecker et al. (2016) estimate a translog production function for
India for the period 1989-2003, however for the entire 2-digit basic metals sector, capturing
other technologies. Collard-Wexler and De Loecker (2014) estimate a Cobb-Douglas
production function for steel producers in the US between 1962-2002. The last two columns
in Table I.2 compares my estimates to their estimates. De Loecker et al. (2016) estimate
higher material elasticities and lower capital and labour elasticities, but the estimates
of Collard-Wexler and De Loecker (2014) are remarkably close to my Cobb-Douglas
and translog estimates. Arguably, the narrow technological focus of Collard-Wexler and
De Loecker (2014) on steel producers in the US is more relevant for comparing elasticities
than the geographic commonality but higher technological difference in De Loecker et al.
(2016). Since their study in the US captures multiple decades, and not only cutting-edge
technology, the production technologies are likely to be standard and similar to Indian
producers in my data.
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Analysis of estimated total factor productivity
Since I use output and input quantities as well as a gross output function, the control
function approach estimates physical total factor productivity Ωjt (also denoted TFPQ).
Total revenue factor productivity TFPR is simply defined as Pjt ·TFPQjt. Do to the large
and growing interest in TFPQ and TFPR in the literature, it is worth to briefly analyse
these estimates. A more detailed analysis is in Appendix I.G.5.
The main points are as follows. First, there is evidence that more productive firms
grew faster, based on comparisons of weighted and unweighted TFPQ. Second, TFPR grew
by more than TFPQ, consistent with increasing prices. Together with decreasing markups,
this implies that marginal costs have increased.54 Third, the dispersion in TFPQ is smaller
than in other studies, most likely due to the much narrower industry definition in this
chapter. Fourth, the dispersion in TFPR is greater than the dispersion in TFPQ. This is
in contrast to Hsieh and Klenow (2009). Prices and TFPQ are negatively correlated, but
prices are much more dispersed than TFPQ, leading to a higher dispersion in TFPR than
in TFPQ.
I.4.3 Results for the factual equilibrium and distortions
Descriptives on estimated input distortions τ : misleading SD
I calculate the τMjt and τLjt according to Equation (I.3), using the expected prices and
quantities, the input expenditure, and the estimated output and demand elasticities.55
For comparability, I also demean the τ , by dividing each by the within-year geometric
weighted mean, where the weights are the input expenditures (see Section I.2.4), and take
logs to transform it into a linear scale. The annual empirical density of these variables is
plotted for τMjt and τLjt in Figure I.20 and Figure I.21 respectively for each year in Appendix
I.G.7, whereas Figure I.6 pools the demeaned distortions across years.
There is pronounced dispersion in both labour and material distortions, and some
54Material input prices have been rising at around 3% per year, consistent with the global price increases
in raw metals commodity prices (see e.g. IMF). Increasing marginal costs could also be due to changes in
τ .
55In order to infer τ I first estimate the expected quantities Qjt and prices Pjt as described in Section
I.2.4 by using Qjt =
Qrjt
exp(jt)
and solving for the prices. The estimated shocks exp(ˆjt) over the entire
sample have a mean of 1.017 and the 90% range of estimates is [0.55,1.45]: on the extremes of this interval
the plants have an estimated shock that decreased and increased output by 45% and 45% respectively.
The log of the expected prices are plotted against the log of realised prices (i.e. after production shock )
across all years in Figure I.19 in Appendix I.G.6 and shows that they are similar. The ratio of realised
to expected prices (P
r
jt
Pjt
) has mean 1.01 and the 90% range of estimates is [0.91,1.15], much tighter than
quantity ratio, which is consistent with a convex elastic downward-sloping demand curve.
42
Figure I.6: Dispersion in markups, τMjt and τ
L
jt across all years
-2 -1 0 1 2
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Notes: Plotted are the kernel densities of the logged markup, ln(τMjt ) and ln(τLjt) divided by the respective
weighted means, where the weights are plant materials and labour expenditure. Used kernel is epanechnikov
with bandwidth 0.2.
annual densities are multi-peaked. There is no clear trend in the degree of dispersion over
time, but some years appear to exhibit less dispersion than others, in part influenced by
sampling variability over time. A range of [-0.5,0.5] on the axis corresponds to a τ of
[0.6,1.65]. Such values for τ imply that the plant faces a distortion “as if” it had to pay
only 60% of the input price or pay a 65% tax on the input respectively.56
The standard deviations of the distortions, or alternatively the standard deviation of
the marginal revenue product of an input, is often used as a statistic for misallocation (e.g.
Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Asker et al., 2014).57 This chapter shows that, while being popular,
this statistic can be misleading. The standard deviation of log(τLjt) is 0.60 compared to
0.40 for log(τMjt ). The equality of variances is rejected in the robust Levene (1960) and
Brown and Forsythe (1974) tests.58 This might suggest that misallocation of labour is
56Recall also that the dispersion in τ is separate and in addition to any dispersion in plant input prices
and wages disparities. Input prices are likely to reflect quality. The dispersion in material input prices is
slightly smaller than the dispersion in τ , and the dispersion in wages is larger.
57Recall τXjt = MRPXjt/PXjt . Often, the variation in TFPR is used as a summary of the MRPX of all
inputs.
58I can only conduct the test for the unweighted densities, since statistical significance is non-trivial to
expand to weighted samples here. Figure I.22 in Appendix I.G.7, which plots the standard deviations
corresponding to the plotted densities, shows that for some years, the standard deviation is greater in
τMjt than in τLjt, but insignificantly so. For most years, the standard deviation is statistically significantly
larger for τLjt, where the statistical significance is obtained for the unweighted samples. Insignificant are
the differences in the years 2001, 2002, 2006 and 2009. The hypothesis of equal distributions in the
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test is strongly rejected.
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more costly than misallocation of materials in this industry. However, as the next section
shows, the opposite is the case in terms of welfare losses. Importantly, this implies that
the pure variation in τ is not a sufficient statistic to rank welfare losses, at least not across
inputs. The size of the welfare losses depend on which plants face the distortions and
how it affects other plants through the market structure, which cannot be captured in the
variation of τ or the marginal revenue products alone.
Statistical significance of estimated distortions
Since I can also derive confidence intervals for all individual τjt, I can test whether
differences in τjt across plants are also statistically significant. I use two groups of plants,
those with a τjt smaller than the 30th and those with a τjt larger than the 70th percentile.
No plant is categorised in the opposite group in any of the bootstrapped versions of the
τjt. Furthermore, for around 90% of all plants, the positive or negative logged demeaned
distortion is significantly different from zero at the 10% level.
Adjusting distortions for markups and correlation between distortions
Figure I.6 also depicts the density of the logged demeaned markup. There is no mass
below zero since this corresponds to a markup of less than zero percent. The dispersion
of markups is significantly smaller, and the tests for equal variances and distributions
are strongly rejected. We can also compare the distribution of ln(τMjt ) and ln(τLjt) with a
version for each with constant markups (i.e. a “naive” version), as shown in Figure I.23
and I.24 in Appendix I.G.7. While the “naive” and correct distortions appear similar, there
are significant differences in the inferred welfare losses as discussed in Section I.5.4.59
Finally, it is interesting to ask whether the inferred distortions are correlated. Figure
I.25 in Appendix I.G.7 plots the distortions against each other and the correlation is nearly
zero and insignificant. Ex-ante we might expect that a firm that is constrained in one
input is likely to be constrained in other inputs as well. While it is the case for some firms,
59If they looked very different, then we would likely obtain welfare losses from correcting the (wrong)
distortions. Pooled across years, the standard deviation drops from 0.40 to 0.37 for ln(τMjt ) in the naive
version, but stays roughly constant at 0.60 for τLjt. The decrease in the variation in the former is because the
naive ln(τMjt ) is negatively correlated with the estimated markup (-0.33***). This translates into a positive
correlation with the inverse of the markup, so there is variation added to the naive ln(τMjt ) (See Equation
(I.3)), increasing the standard deviation to 0.40 in the correct ln(τMjt ). Since the correlation between the
naive ln(τLjt) and the markup is low (0.05), there is hardly any change in the standard deviation. Despite
similar pooled standard deviations, the consequences of mismeasured distortions in terms of welfare are
more substantial as shown in Section I.5.4. For the same degree of dispersion, individual distortions can
still be severely mismeasured. It matters which plants face which distortions for the size of the welfare
losses.
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the opposite is the case for other firms, being constrained in one input and having an
advantage in the other input. One reason for not observing a stronger correlation between
distortions could be that firms that are severely disadvantaged in both inputs are likely to
be not competitive and exit or do not enter the market. The fact that the input distortions
are uncorrelated also provides evidence against potential concerns that there is a distortion
on the output side instead of the input side, as that would predict a perfect correlation
between the input distortions.
I.5 Results from the counterfactual analysis
I begin this section by analysing the welfare consequences of input misallocation for
consumers and producers. Then I discuss the effects on aggregate input productivities,
before I compare the welfare losses to a version with constant markups. I end this section
by showing the effects of misallocation on the size distribution of plants.
I.5.1 Welfare and profits
The gains from removing misallocation distortions are shown in Figure I.7. The first
panel shows expected total compensating variation, the second aggregate profits and the
third the total welfare gains, all in billions of rupees. For each panel, the gains from
removing material or labour misallocation distortions individually are also reported.60 The
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are shown around the point estimates and derived
as described in Section I.2.4. These figures are the total across all sample years. Table
I.9 in Appendix I.G.8 shows the gains for each year individually. There is some variation
in the gains across years, but without census data we cannot reliably interpret these as
changes in misallocation.61
60Removing both input distortions can be slightly larger or smaller than the sum of gains, because the
full interdependencies are taken into account through the model. The sum of the gains from removing
either labour or material distortions is close to removing them jointly. This suggests that removing
distortions from one input does not affect the gains from removing distortions in the other input.
61Almost all of the compensating variation, profits and total welfare estimates are positive and significant
with few exceptions. The variation in the point estimates across years arise from three confounded factors,
however. First, the sample size is different for each year, as some firms enter and some firms drop out of
the sample, responsible for scale effects in aggregate compensating variation and profits. Second, due to
the unbalanced sample, the composition of firms changes, and in some periods more dispersed τ firms may
be sampled than in others, leading to higher estimated misallocation losses. Third, the actual degree of
misallocation could have improved or worsened throughout the years.
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Figure I.7: Welfare gains from removing misallocation distortions
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Notes: Plotted are the respective welfare gains from eliminating material distortions (τ˜Mjt ), labour
distortions (τ˜Ljt) or both, summing across all 13 years of the sample. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals
are shown around the point estimates.
Higher consumer than producer incidence
Who gains from removing misallocation – producers or consumers? The incidence of the
changes in distortions depends on the pass-through rate of marginal costs to prices, the
demand elasticities, market power and interdependencies between all plants. These are
in turn determined endogenously by the estimated fundamental demand and production
parameters. For all three counterfactuals, the compensating variation is around double the
size of the profit gains, and the bootstrapped difference statistically significant.62
While individual plants experience increases or decreases in their marginal costs,
depending on their initial level of τ , there is a more efficient allocation of inputs across
plants, which benefits consumers through (average) price reductions. Indeed, the drop in
average price per sold output quantity is 6%, 7% and 14% for the three counterfactuals
respectively. While there are winners and losers on the firm side, the winners win more
than the losers lose. Average profits are increasing despite average price declines, driven by
62I calculate the compensating variation only arising from the output produced by plants in the sample,
and do not extrapolate to the whole market size, as for example in Nevo (2000a), in order to have
comparable numbers for the consumer and producer gains.
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the allocative efficiency gains.63
Higher misallocation in materials than labour inputs
A surprising result is that the welfare losses from misallocation of input materials are higher
than those from misallocation of labour. As the right panel in Figure I.7 shows, the point
estimate is 89% higher at almost 34 billion rupees vs. 18 billion rupees. The difference is
statistically significant with a bootstrapped p-value of 0.03**.64 This comes at a surprise
for a prior that labour is a less flexible input with higher potential for misallocation,
particularly in the Indian context.
There is hardly any evidence in the literature comparing misallocation of materials and
labour directly.65 But perhaps, differences in access to materials plays a bigger role than
labour market distortions in this industry, as materials are an important production input
with a high estimated output elasticity. For example, the political connectedness of firms
(e.g. Faccio, 2006; Akcigit et al., 2018) could be more relevant for distorted spending on
material inputs than on labour inputs. In Chapter II, I show that differences in geographic
access to suppliers can partially explain these costly input material distortions.
The result that material misallocation costs are substantial is important for policy
making for two reasons. First, targeting the allocative barriers in the material market
could be easier, both politically and practically. As described in Hasan and Jandoc (2014)
or Dougherty (2009) many Indian states have stricter labour firing laws for firms above
a certain employee threshold. This could be a source of variation in τLjt, but removing
such polices could be politically challenging, due to valid concerns of employee protection.
From a practical point of view, improving workforce mobility is challenging (Bryan et al.,
2014) despite widespread regional structural mismatches in the labour market (Bryan and
Morten, Forthcoming; Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2016).
Second, the (unmodelled) short term costs associated with reallocation in the materials
market are likely to be much smaller than in the labour market, simply due to the fact
that goods are reallocated and not people. Reallocation of labour involves hiring and
63Section I.G.14 shows that the variation in markups also decreases in the counterfactual for misallocation
in materials.
64Comparing the difference in all bootstrapped runs is the appropriate way to test the difference to
account for interdependencies, rather than comparing the individual confidence intervals.
65Hsieh and Klenow (2009) conclude that the misallocation in capital markets is higher than in labour
markets in their study based on value added production functions. Dias et al. (2016) use the Hsieh and
Klenow (2009) model for gross output with material inputs, and also find that capital misallocation is
higher than labour misallocation. Slightly altering their model also sheds light on comparing labour and
material misallocation in a Hsieh and Klenow (2009) style model. I analyse this in section I.G.15.
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firing, and even if the new equilibrium features higher employment, there are undoubtedly
transitional costs for the labourers, which may be large (e.g. Walker, 2013). Of course,
addressing the variation in τMjt also reallocates market share among firms, which necessarily
also involves labour reallocation. But intuitively as well as empirically66, the degree of
layoffs (and hiring) is larger when removing labour markets distortions.
There are possible concerns that the losses from material misallocation are larger than
for labour. First, in terms of external validity, other industries, particularly those that
primarily rely on labour, are likely to have higher misallocation losses from labour. Second,
I measure labour inputs as the number of total man-days, which does not account for the
impact of skill on output in the production function. Misallocation of talent can play a
role (Hsieh et al., Forthcoming). I construct a robustness test that accounts for skills by
measuring labour as the total wage bill instead of man-days. If skills are paid a premium,
the wage bill captures skills as well. As Appendix I.G.10 shows, the gap between losses
from material and labour misallocation increases, if anything.67 Third, wage disparities
(which are slightly larger than material input price disparities) may be interpreted as
misallocation themselves, and reducing those could offer additional gains. I keep plant level
material input prices as well as wages constant throughout the counterfactuals, because I
assume that firms are price takers on the input side. While this is an arguably realistic
assumption for materials, given that there are much fewer and larger upstream firms (see
Appendix I.B), it might not be the case for labour.
Accounting for changes in tax revenues
The interpretation of the misallocation distortions τ is broad and could pick up any form
of barriers and implicit costs. For the extreme case, that all of the τ are only plant level
input tax differences, I also calculate the implied impact on government tax income. I add
the difference in tax income between the counterfactual and factual equilibrium to total
welfare, as reported in Appendix I.G.11. Across the whole period, including government
tax income changes in the calculation slightly increases the welfare gains from removing
misallocation distortions.
66The counterfactual τ˜Ljt involves more layoffs and more hiring than the counterfactual τ˜Mjt , despite the
lower welfare gains.
67Note that I do not construct an analogous robustness check for materials. This is because output
is measured in quantity. Higher material quality (i.e. expenditure) is likely to increase the quality and
the price of output, not necessarily its quantity. Higher skilled labourers, on the other hand, more likely
increase the quantity and the price of output.
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Figure I.8: Correlation between returns to scale, welfare and material productivity gains
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Notes: Plotted are the respective outcomes from the bootstrapped runs, where the returns to scale is a
function of the bootstrapped underlying structural parameters.
Correlation of distortions and TFPQ
As Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) show, the correlation between distortions τjt and
plant level productivity (TFPQ = Ωjt) matters significantly for welfare losses.68 In the
counterfactual, previously high τ plants (constrained) tend to grow while low τ plants
shrink.69 If the constrained high τjt plants are also the more productive plants (high Ωjt)
the aggregate welfare effects are larger. In Appendix I.G.12, I show that the estimated
correlations between τjt and Ωjt are low, and that a higher correlation would have implied
even higher welfare effects.
Insights from bootstraps: returns to scale are important
An advantage of the estimated structural model in this chapter is that we can examine the
sensitivity of the welfare gains with respect to specific underlying parameters that vary
across bootstraps. Figure I.8 (left panel) plots the total welfare gains in each bootstrapped
run against the returns to scale, which are a function of the underlying bootstrapped
68Of course plant size also matters, so we should think of it as correlation weighted by size to be precise,
see also Hopenhayn (2014b) for a theoretical exploration.
69Whether firms shrink or grow also depends on the (estimated) interdependencies between firms.
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Table I.3: Total welfare gains and statistics from factual equilibrium across bootstraps
(1) (2)
Returns to scale 0.90*** 1.04***[31.4] [19.8]
SD(Ωjt)
0.21***
[4.1]
SD( 1
ηjt
) 0.19***
[7.5]
Corr(Ωjt, τMjt )
0.15***
[3.2]
Corr(Ωjt, τLjt)
0.18***
[4.0]
Corr( 1
1+ηjt
, τMjt )
-0.17***
[-4.8]
Corr( 1
1+ηjt
, τLjt)
-0.08***
[-2.7]
Corr(τMjt , τ
L
jt)
0.02
[0.9]
R2 0.80 0.88
Notes: The table shows the estimates from an OLS regressions of total welfare gains (from both material and labour
distortions) on statistics in the factual equilibrium. There are 330 bootstrapped runs, and each run is equivalent to one
observation for this regression. Coefficients are standardized and t-statistics in square brackets based on robust standard
errors.
structural production side parameters. The returns to scale are a significant driver of the
size of the estimated welfare losses from misallocation. The 95% confidence interval means
that returns to scale of 0.97 vs 0.86 are associated with around 40% higher welfare losses
of 65 vs. 45 billion rupees. Table I.3 shows a regression of the total welfare gains on the
bootstrapped returns to scale. The R2 is high – almost 80% of the welfare variations across
bootstraps can be explained by the variation in estimated returns to scale alone. The
second column includes additional statistics from the factual equilibrium. As expected,
the variation in plant level productivity Ωjt as well as its correlation with plant level
distortions are positively and significantly associated with welfare losses from misallocation,
as discussed in the previous paragraph.
The size of the standardized coefficient on the returns to scale is much larger than of
any of the other coefficients. Hopenhayn (2014b) shows that the original Hsieh and Klenow
(2009) model is in theory highly sensitive to their constant returns to scale assumption.
Indeed, when I use their model with data on the entire manufacturing sector or just my
sample, and assume returns to scale of 0.92, all gains in their model are eliminated and
some even turn negative, as Section I.5.3 shows. This corroborates the theoretical insights
from Hopenhayn (2014b) empirically. There are two important messages emerging from
this. First, the model and estimations of misallocation losses presented in this chapter
– even though sensitive to the returns to scale – are much less sensitive than coarser
approaches following Hsieh and Klenow (2009). Second, the uncertainty in the welfare
gains is primarily driven by the uncertainty around the returns to scale. It is therefore
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Figure I.9: Interpretation of the size of welfare gains
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Notes: Plotted are the respective welfare gains from eliminating material distortions (τ˜Mjt ), labour distortions
(τ˜Ljt) or both, summing across all 13 years of the sample. The left panel expresses the compensating
variation per unit purchased as a share of the unit price (i.e. as share of expenditure on the products in
the sample). Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are shown around the point estimates.
critical to accurately estimate the returns to scale for different sectors to have reasonably
unbiased welfare estimates, and if possible, construct confidence intervals around them.
Large size of misallocation losses
Finally, it is left to discuss whether the reported welfare gains of 34, 18 and 53 billion
rupees in the respective counterfactuals for τ˜Mjt , τ˜Ljt and both, are large. Since I only cover
the cast iron industry, it is most appropriate to set the gains into perspective of the size of
this industry. Total sales are 171.5 billion rupees, so the total welfare gains are 20%, 11%
and 31% of total sales of the plants in the sample.
I plot the relative levels of total compensating variation and profits in Figure I.9
(for annual figures see Table I.8 in Appendix I.G.8). I express the expected average
compensating variation per unit purchased as share of the (factual) weighted average unit
price.70 I express the profit ratio as total profits in the counterfactual over total profits
in the factual equilibrium. Removing misallocation in materials and labour increases
consumer welfare equivalent to a price drop of 21%, while profits grow by 42%. Considering
70This is a useful statistic since each simulated consumer purchases one unit (see Equation (I.8).
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Figure I.10: Aggregate input productivity gains from removing misallocation distortions
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Notes: Plotted are the respective input productivity ratios (counterfactual to factual equilibria) from
eliminating material distortions (τ˜Mjt ), labour distortions (τ˜Ljt) or both, pooling across all 13 years of the
sample. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are shown around the point estimates.
that these comparative statics do not entail any technological innovation or diffusion,
nor change the inherent factor price differences between plants and regions, the welfare
gains from reallocation in material input and labour markets are sizeable. While general
equilibrium effects across sectors are beyond the scope of this chapter, we know that under
complementarity between sectors, misallocation in one sector can have large indirect effects
on the economy through an input output structure (Jones, 2011, 2013).
I.5.2 Input productivities
Figure I.10 reports the changes in aggregate physical material productivity (physical
output/physical materials input) and aggregate physical labour productivity (physical
output/worker) expressed as a ratio of counterfactual to factual input productivity. The
figures are pooled across all years, i.e. taking the sum of the quantities across years before
calculating the ratios.71
71Table I.10 in Appendix I.G.9 reports the annual ratios as well as pure aggregate physical output
changes. Table I.11 in Appendix I.G.9 reports the outcomes in terms of aggregate revenue productivities.
The changes in physical input productivities are the more relevant metric to discuss as we do not need to
deal with deflation (see Appendix I.G.9).
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Distortions increase aggregate input productivity of same input
The first result is that material productivity decreases when material distortions are
removed, and increases if labour distortions are removed. The same holds analogously for
labour productivity. This might be initially surprising but has an intuitive explanation.
When the distortions in the material market are lifted, plants with previous constraints use
relatively more materials and plants with previous preferential access use relatively fewer
materials. But due to the allocative efficiency improvements, the former plants expand
their material use more than the latter plants reduce their use. On aggregate, the removal
of frictions amounts to higher aggregate incentives to use that input relative to other
inputs. This means that improving material misallocation can actually decrease aggregate
material productivity through increased incentives to use that input. This result appears
much like Jevon’s paradox (Jevons, 1865), where increases in energy efficiency increase
aggregate energy intensity due to a rebound effect, because energy is cheaper to use.
No misallocation losses in aggregate input productivities
When both input distortions are removed, aggregate input productivities slightly decrease
(in the case of labour productivity insignificantly). This is because both aggregate outputs
and inputs grow in the counterfactual.72 The aggregate analysis masks high heterogeneity
in changes of input productivities across plants, which are discussed in Appendix I.G.13.
As for the welfare gains, the returns to scale in production matter significantly for the
size of the gains in input productivities as seen in the right panel of Figure I.8. The
results suggests that improvements in sectoral material efficiency require innovation and
technology adoption, at least in this sector, as there is a limited role of improving allocative
input distortions. Yet, with the introduction of new technologies, reallocation can still play
an important part in the dynamics of the industry, as documented by Collard-Wexler and
De Loecker (2014) for the US steel industry.
Emissions per welfare dollar higher from misallocation
One way we could include the environmental externalities of production (see Appendix
I.F) into the welfare calculation is to compare the increase in emissions with the increase
72One immediate concern is that the distortions in capital have been preserved across factual and
counterfactuals. I reran the entire analysis where I also remove any differences in the inferred rental rates
(i.e.“τK”) in the same way as the labour and materials distortions, and calculate counterfactuals. The
conclusions hardly change: the point estimates for the ratio in physical material productivity and labour
productivity are slightly below one. Full results including welfare analysis with capital distortions available
on request.
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in welfare in a back of the envelope calculation. We know that materials use increases
in the counterfactuals, as well as profits and consumer welfare. Since we do not have
a baseline of consumer welfare, but only the compensating variation, we could just add
it, in an admittedly simplistic way, to the profit increase. If we take the percentage
increase of emissions as the percentage increase of material inputs,73 and compare it to the
welfare increase, we find that welfare grows 39% more than emissions. Therefore, while
pure quantity input intensities are slightly increasing, the emission intensity of welfare
is decreasing in the counterfactual. This is driven by the comparatively larger gains in
welfare than in emissions from removing misallocation distortions.
I.5.3 Comparison to aggregate TFP results in the literature
The aggregate input productivity results may be somewhat surprising. Perhaps most
prominently, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) found that aggregate TFP would increase by 40-60%
in India if it equalised its marginal products to US levels. If sectoral TFP increased by such
an extent, we would also expect the input productivities to increase in a similar fashion
(with a near constant returns to scale). I can define an analogous standard aggregate
Cobb Douglas production function to examine the impact on “aggregate TFP”. Using my
estimated elasticities from the plant level, I find that aggregate TFP is roughly the same
in the factual and counterfactual equilibria. Why is there this apparent difference in this
chapter to some of the key literature? There are three explanations that can realign these
results.
The first is of interpretive nature. The TFP results of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) can be
regarded as welfare results, as they are equivalent to gains in the utility of a representative
consumer with CES demand as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) or Melitz (2003). Appendix
I.G.15 shows this explicitly. When their results are interpreted as gains in utility rather
than gains in physical productivity, they are consistent with the welfare gains in this
chapter.
Second, the analysis of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) assumes that aggregate inputs do
not change when removing distortions. They construct a statistic that summarises the
loss from misallocation into a TFP measure, keeping aggregate inputs constant. When I
use the plant level estimates of TFPQ (Ω) to calculate their efficient benchmark TFP ∗s
73Of course there might be non-linear relationships, both in the mapping from inputs to emissions as
well as from emissions to welfare
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74, I obtain gains in TFP ∗s that are roughly 100-200% larger than the baseline aggregate
Cobb-Douglas TFP. This is similar to their 127% TFP gain estimate for India in the
90s. However, this requires aggregate inputs to remain constant.75 When distortions are
removed, there is little reason why aggregate input demand should remain constant in the
counterfactual equilibrium.76 In this chapter, I can distinguish between TFP and welfare
while comparing equilibria where the optimising behaviour of all plants, and potential
aggregate input growth is taken into account. The results suggest that it is not aggregate
physical TFP that increases, but welfare, which is a subtle but important distinction.
Third, there is a set of methodological and empirical differences to keep in mind when
comparing the divergent TFP findings. For example, I observe plant specific input prices,
use gross output instead of value added production functions, estimate all elasticities
and returns to scale, allow for endogenous plant varying markups, and don’t restrict the
correlation between TFPQ and input distortions. Appendix I.G.15 provides more details
and replicates the Hsieh and Klenow (2009) model and shows how the TFP results respond
to changes to the above mentioned elements.77 The returns to scale, in particular, affect
TFP gains in their model substantially and can even turn them negative.
I.5.4 Markup changes and ignoring markups
In this chapter, I have accounted for markups that are endogenous and variable. This
section first briefly examines how much the markups change endogenously. I then use a
measure of distortions that ignores variation in markups to calculate counterfactual gains
from mismeasured “naive” distortions.
74TFP ∗s =
[∑
i TFPQ
σ−1
si
] 1
σ−1
, the value depends on σ, here between 3 and 6.
75This is best seen when considering their equation for TFP losses, where the inputs only drop out if
they remain constant across the inefficient and efficient equilibria (see Appendix I.G.15 for more details):
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76When attempting to find a counterfactual equilibrium where I constrain aggregate inputs to factual
levels, a set of algorithms with a range of starting points fail to converge to a point where firm first
order conditions would be satisfied. This suggests that – at least in our case – there is no counterfactual
equilibrium with the same level of aggregate inputs.
77I cannot fully nest their approach in my approach due to the substantial difference in both demand
models. Ho and Ruzic (2017) nest a model allowing for non-constant returns to scale, and the difference
in inferred misallocation losses are substantial for the US. In recent work, Haltiwanger et al. (2018) reject
some of the key assumptions of the Hsieh and Klenow (2009) model using more detailed data. With my
data, I can reject the same tests of the validity of the necessary assumptions in Hsieh and Klenow (2009).
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Table I.4: Bias from constant markups
Compensating Variation Profits Total welfare
τ˜Mjt τ˜
L
jt both τ˜
M
jt τ˜
L
jt both τ˜
M
jt τ˜
L
jt both
Welfare losses baseline (bil. Rs.) 21.8 12.1 33.9 12.2 6.1 18.3 34.1 19.2 53.3
Bias with constant markups -23% -30% -14% -18% -22% -12% -21% -27% -13%
Notes: The first row shows the baseline welfare losses from misallocation in inputs, where τ˜Mjt refers to the counterfactual
with removed material distortions, τ˜Ljt with removed labour distortions and both to both removed. The bias in welfare losses
is calculated from a counterfactual, where “naive” distortions are removed using this chapter’s model. Naive distortions are
inferred from ignoring the variation in markups.
Markup variation across counterfactuals
On average, the endogenous markup changes by 5% for each plant between the factual
and counterfactual equilibrium.78 This is large compared to the 7% average deviation of
markups from the average markup in the factual equilibrium. This suggest that accounting
for the endogeneity of markups is important. With exogenous markups, we would be over-
or undercounting input misallocation losses.
Mismeasuring distortions with constant markups generates bias
I obtain “naive” τ by setting the demand elasticities ηjt (and therefore markups) constant
when calculating this version of τ from Equation (I.3).79 I solve for the new counterfactuals,
where I remove these naive τ instead. The markups are still allowed to adjust endogenously
in the counterfactual. That is, I mismeasure the τ but still use the same model with the
same primitives that allows for variable markups in counterfactual equilibria. As Table
I.4 shows, the inferred welfare costs from misallocation are substantially lower than in
the baseline version.80 Mismeasuring distortions can considerably bias welfare conclusions.
Disentangling distortions from fundamental heterogeneity can thus be important to avoid
detecting allocative inefficiencies where there are in fact none, or failing to detect them
where they in fact exist.
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Figure I.11: The effect of misallocation distortions on the size distribution of plants
<100 101-300 301-500 501-1000 >1000
Groups: employment size category.  Individual bars: type of counterfactual
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Notes: The vertical axis is the share in total employment by the plants belonging to a category. The
categories from left to right are the size category in terms of plant employment: <100, 101-300, 301-
500, 501-1000 and >1000. The left bar in each grouping is the factual equilibrium, the second bar the
counterfactual with removed material distortions τ˜Mjt , the third bar the counterfactual with removed labour
distortions τ˜Ljt and the fourth bar the counterfactual where both distortions are removed.
I.5.5 The effect of misallocation on the size distribution of plants
Before I conclude this chapter, I briefly discuss the effects of the input distortions on the
size distribution of firms. Hasan and Jandoc (2014) show that on average, 84% of India’s
manufacturing workers are in small firms, but 50% of China’s workers are in large firms.
They hypothesise that this is one of the proximate reasons for lower growth in India, as
small firms tend to be less productive.81 Figure I.11 shows that input misallocation is part
of the reason for skewed firm distributions. In the counterfactuals, a much larger share
of workers is in large firms. This can be viewed as complementary microlevel evidence
to Bento and Restuccia (2017) who document a positive relationship between average
78Appendix I.G.14 reports further statistics.
79They are displayed in Figures I.23 and I.24 and briefly described in Section I.4.3. Despite the
resemblance of the standard deviation of the naive and the baseline distortions, the welfare bias is still
considerable, as it matters which distortions are measured for which plants.
80Ho and Ruzic (2017) present evidence that the Hsieh and Klenow (2009) model understates misalloca-
tion losses for the US manufacturing sector when markups are industry specific instead of common to all
industries. Their markups are constant within industries.
81Kothari (2014) argues that developing countries typically have a thick left tail in the firm size
distribution, in part driven by lower demand for high quality products predominately produced in larger
firms, with some evidence for India. See more recent discussions on firm size distributions in the developing
context e.g. in Cirera et al. (2018).
57
productivity and average firm size across countries, and show that distortions keep average
firm size small.82
I.6 Conclusion
This chapter develops an approach that disentangles input misallocation distortions from
fundamental heterogeneity in demand and markups across plants. I can distinguish between
effects on producers and consumers, and effects on aggregate productivities. This provides
a nuanced picture for the Indian cast iron industry. Removing input distortions in one
input decreases the aggregate input productivity of the same input while improving the
aggregate input productivity of the other input. This is in part driven by substitution to
the input that is becoming more efficiently allocated. I find no evidence that removing
misallocation distortions in both inputs would lead to improvements in input productivities.
Since aggregate input productivities are determined by aggregate outputs and inputs,
I allow aggregate inputs to adjust in counterfactual equilibria, which is in contrast to
previous studies in this literature. This result is relevant for policies aimed at improving
aggregate material efficiency. At least for the Indian cast iron industry, the results suggest
that there are no allocative gains, and that within-firm innovations and technology diffusion
are a more promising way to improve aggregate material efficiency.
I find that input misallocation significantly affects the size distribution of plants, keeping
plants artificially smaller. There are also significant welfare losses from misallocation. The
welfare losses are higher for consumers than for producers, driven by the price effects of
input misallocation. The welfare losses from misallocation of materials are larger than
those from labour. Even though I ignore any direct welfare costs on the employee side,
this is a surprising result. While misallocation in material input markets has received little
attention in the literature, the results suggest that these distortions could play a bigger role
in explaining differences in performance of materials dependent sectors across countries.
The chapter provides methodological novelties to the literature. By combining produc-
tion and demand into a full structural model I disentangle endogenous markups from input
distortions. In the case of the Indian cast iron industry, ignoring variation in markups
82In line with Hsieh and Klenow (2014), I find that larger plants are more negatively affected from the
input distortions. In terms of age, older plants are more adversely affected from material input distortions
but benefit from labour distortions. The results on distortions and size distribution are also consistent
with the finding of Martin et al. (2017). They show that dismantling small scale reservations by removing
restrictions on firm size (India’s SSI policy) led to output growth driven by the expansion of previously
size constrained firms. See also Alfaro and Chari (2014) who analyse the firm size distribution in India
following the end of the licence Raj.
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biases the estimated welfare costs from misallocation downwards. I can provide confidence
intervals around welfare cost and any other outcome, as I estimate all parameters in the
model. This, for the first time in this literature, provides measures of uncertainty around
aggregate misallocation losses. The developed approach can be applied to products and
countries where quantity and price data on outputs and inputs is available. While there
are disadvantages such as higher data requirements and computationally more intensive
procedures, the benefits are detailed insights that admit a rich set of outcomes, which
hopefully can be useful both for tailoring further research on misallocation as well as
informing policy. Shortcomings are that I focus on misallocation in a static sense without
dynamic considerations, ignore general equilibrium implications, and focus on the intensive
margin ignoring firm entry. These provide interesting avenues for future research.
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Appendix to Chapter I
I.A Further underlying and related literature
This chapter is related to four different types of literature. The theoretical and empirical
misallocation literature in economic growth and development, the production and demand
estimation literature from industrial organisation, a more policy oriented environmen-
tal material efficiency literature and the literature on Indian economic development of
manufacturing industries.
In their surveys, Restuccia and Rogerson (2013, 2017) categorise the recent input
misallocation literature into indirect and direct approaches.83 Indirect approaches use
wedges that capture a bundle of distortions, and typically aim to answer the question of
how severe misallocation is (using data) or could be (using simulation). Direct approaches
typically model or evaluate a particular distortion, often borrowing constraints, to analyse
a particular cause of misallocation. This chapter relates more to the former literature.
Two of the most influential papers in this literature have been the theoretical analysis by
Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), and Hsieh and Klenow (2009) using micro data. Restuccia
and Rogerson (2017) argue that the literature attributes a significant role to misallocation
from a variety of sources. Much of the focus in the literature is on misallocation in a static
sense, but a few papers, such as Peters (2013); Da-Rocha et al. (2017) also emphasise
the dynamic consequences of such static misallocation. For more detailed surveys of this
literature, the reader is referred to the dedicated surveys by Syverson (2011); Hopenhayn
(2014a); Restuccia and Rogerson (2013, 2017). There is a literature that decompose
aggregate productivity changes into within-firm and across-firm components based on Olley
and Pakes (1996) or Petrin and Levinsohn (2012), for example.84 The nuanced difference
in this literature is that these approaches only identify realised reallocation gains over the
years, but not the level of misallocation compared to an optimum.
83One of the earliest articles on resource misallocation dates back to the study of monopoly power in
the US by Harberger (1954). The more recent literature is based on new trade theory models with an
emphasis on heterogeneous firms. Most papers analyse the manufacturing sector, some the agricultural
sector (e.g. Adamopoulos and Restuccia, 2014b; Restuccia and Santaeulalia-Llopis, 2017; Adamopoulos
et al., 2017), and few the service/retail sector (e.g. Vries, 2014).
84See also decompositions by Baily et al. (1992), Foster et al. (2001), Griliches and Regev (1995) or
Baqaee and Farhi (2017).
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Second, this chapter is related to an empirical industrial organisation literature to
identify parameters while distinguishing different margins of heterogeneity. On the side of
estimating production functions, this chapter follows the control function approach.85 The
literature on this topic dates back to Marschak and Andrews (1944) and is summarised in
Griliches and Mairesse (1999) or Eberhardt et al. (2010). On the demand side, I implement
a discrete choice random utility mixed model approach of Berry et al. (1995), which is
based on the characteristics of products in order to address the representative consumer
restriction and dimensionality problem of more traditional demand systems (e.g. AIDS
by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)), and allows for more realistic cross elasticities than
more basic random utility logit models. For a survey, see e.g. Ackerberg et al. (2007).86
Combining these two approaches on the production and demand side are novel to the
misallocation literature.87 This chapter is also related to price cost markup estimation.
While there is literature to estimate markups from the demand side88 and the production
side89, this chapter combines both.90 I take the estimated markups from the demand system
and use the identifying equation from the production side to disentangle the markups from
input distortions that drive input misallocation.
This chapter is also relevant for the literature on material efficiency. In the policy
sphere, there has been growing attention for sustainable material use due to environmental
and economic considerations, see e.g. OECD (2015); European Comission (2013) or the
creation of the dedicated Indian Resource Panel in late 2015. While emphasis is often
on within-firm innovation, there is little evidence on whether across-firm misallocation
could complement efforts in this respect. Baptist and Hepburn (2013) offer descriptive
evidence that higher intermediate input intensity is correlated with lower TFP, which
could point towards misallocation. This chapter is a first rigorous analysis of the impact of
85This approach has been introduced by Olley and Pakes (1996) and further developed by Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003); Wooldridge (2009); Ackerberg et al. (2015). See also De Loecker et al. (2016) for a
recent implementation with some innovations and Gandhi et al. (2016) or Forlani et al. (2016) for some
criticism and alternative suggestions.
86Adao et al. (2017) for example apply a Berry et al. (1995) inspired demand system to a gravity trade
model to depart from CES.
87Hsieh and Klenow (2009) for example assume values for the parameters on a demand side CES model,
and take production side parameters from US ratios of aggregate data.
88See e.g. Stone (1954),Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), Goldberg (1995) and Berry et al. (1999).
89See e.g. Hall (1986, 1988), Roeger (1995) or De Loecker and Warzynski (2012)
90Forlani et al. (2016) unravel productivity and markup variation, but not input distortions. Pozzi
and Schivardi (2016) or De Loecker and Scott (2016) also estimate supply and demand parameters, but
no input distortions. In the bounding exercise of David and Venkateswaran (2017) to separate capital
distortions from markups, the upper bounds ignore materials input distortions, as they are assumed to be
absent for estimation.
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misallocation on aggregate material resource efficiency.
Fourth, this chapter contributes to the literature on misallocation in manufacturing
sectors in India. Bollard et al. (2013) and Harrison et al. (2013) find little changes in
misallocation in India’s manufacturing sector over time. This is a counterintuitive result
as many economists and policy makers thought that the Indian reforms would impact
allocative efficiency substantially. However, Nishida et al. (2014) and Nishida et al. (2015)
show that these previous approach may be misleading and the method based on Petrin
and Levinsohn (2012) yields opposite results. All these studies also use the Indian Annual
Survey of Industries data.
I.B Input distortions and monopsony power
If inputs are not elastically supplied, i.e. plants are not price takers and have some
monopsony power, the cost minimisation problem changes to:
min
Ljt,Mjt
rjtKjt + τ
Ladj
jt wjt(Ljt)Ljt + τ
Madj
jt P
M
jt (Mjt)Mjt
s.t. F (Kjt, Ljt,Mjt)Ωjt ≥ Qjt
where τMadj is the new input distortion adjusted for monopsony power, and the input
prices are some functions of the input quantities. The first order condition with respect to
materials (and the analogue can be derived for labour) is:
τ
Madj
jt (ψjt + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡τMjt
= (ηjt + 1)α
M
jt
PjtQjt
PMjt Mjt
(I.9)
where ψjt ≡ ∂P
M
jt Mjt
∂MjtPMjt
is the inverse input price elasticity of input demand. Note that if we
ignore τMadjjt , and use that MRPM ≡ (ηjt + 1)αMjt PjtQjtMjt , we can write (ψjt + 1) = MRPMPMjt .
That is (ψjt + 1) is the ability to pay an input a lower price than its marginal revenue
product, a common definition of market power on the input side, or monopsony power.
The measured input distortion τMjt captures input market power as well as other input
distortions τMadj .91
How likely is it that the measured input distortion τMjt represent monopsony power in
this case? First, if plants that are close to each other and operate in the same input market
have similar monopsony power, and τMjt is primarily driven by monopsony power, then the
91See also Morlacco (2019), who studies monopsony power based on similar first order conditions.
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Figure I.12: Histogram of estimated input market power (ψjt + 1)
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Notes: The figure plots the histogram of monopsony power (ψjt + 1). A ratio larger than one suggest that
the input price is below the marginal revenue product for that input.
τMjt should vary more across states then within states. Using a variance decomposition
as in Davis et al. (2013), I find that on average, the variance between states is 31% and
39% of the total variance for the logged τLjt and τMjt respectively, so most of the variance
is within states. Second, for material inputs, monopsony power is likely higher if there
are many upstream suppliers and few cast iron plants using that particular input. One
of the main inputs is pig iron. We can compare the number of plants using pig iron as
an input and the number of plants producing pig iron in the raw data. The number of
plants producing pig iron is between 24 and 60 throughout the years. The number of
plants using pig iron is between 280 and 800 throughout the years. It is unlikely that the
comparatively large number of smaller plants can exert input market power over the few
large plants. Third if monopsony power is plant specific and applies to both inputs, labour
and materials, then the τLjt and τMjt should be correlated. Figure I.25 in Appendix I.G.7
shows that they are not correlated, however.
Fourth, I construct two, admittedly heuristic, plant specific proxies for monopsony
power. If relatively larger plants can exert more market power on the input side as well,
a larger market share of a plant in a given state can proxy for monopsony power. The
correlations between the market share within a state and the material or labour distortions
are small (<0.02) and statistically insignificant. The second proxy for monopsony power is
based on a direct estimate of ∂P
M
jt Mjt
∂MjtPMjt
. I recover those heuristically by regressing logged
input prices on a second order polynomial in input quantities controlling for district and
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time fixed effects:
log(PMjt ) = f(log(Mjt)) + λd + κt + υjt (I.10)
Based on the coefficients, I can compute ψjt. I plot the histogram of input market power
(ψjt+1) in Figure I.12. The majority of plants has a negative elasticity ψjt and therefore an
input market power (ψjt + 1) below one. A negative ψjt means that input prices decrease
for larger quantities, which can be related to quantity discounts instead of input market
power. The correlation between log(ψjt + 1) and log(τLjt) and log(τMjt ) is (-0.12 and -0.19)
respectively, which is inconsistent with distortions capturing monopsony power.
I.C Estimation details for the production side
I.C.1 Control function approach to production side estimation
The production side identification problem
The fundamental problem is that we do no observe total factor productivity ωjt, which is
likely correlated with inputs and causes endogeneity problems.92 Furthermore, we need to
pin down plant total factor productivities for the counterfactual analysis.
Unexpected output shock
In order to avoid adding an ad-hoc error term just for the estimation, I incorporate an
additional error term  into the entire structural model, so that it is consistent with firm
behaviour and the Nash competition framework throughout, as detailed below. Splitting
up the combined error term into a so-called transmitted (to inputs) component ωjt and
untransmitted component jt is common in the productivity literature (Griliches and
Mairesse, 1999). The way we can interpret this in the context of the conduct model in
this chapter is that the equilibrium prices and output are treated as expected prices and
output. Firms maximise profits by choosing the expected prices in line with Bertrand-Nash
competition. They base their production input decision on achieving the desired expected
92In traditional production function estimation total factor productivity ωjt has often been treated as
regression error term. This has been recognised as problematic for a long time (Marschak and Andrews,
1944), as it is very likely correlated with the input choices. Researchers often resorted to using an index
number approach, essentially retrieving the output elasticities from the mean or median of the first order
condition (I.3). If we assume that on the mean or median, the associated τ and (η + 1) are unity, then we
could use this approach, at least for constant production elasticities. In the estimation strategy I use, the
mean or median τ and (η + 1) vary by year and are not always close to unity, which would bias the index
number estimates.
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output by minimising costs. During or after production, an unanticipated multiplicative
shock to expected firm output occurs (exp(jt)) and defines realised, observed output Qrjt:
Qrjt = Qjt exp(jt) (I.11)
I assume that the input decisions have been made by the time this shock materialises and
that this shock is entirely unpredictable by the firm. It could likewise also be interpreted
as measurement error in the output variable. The firm productivity ωjt on the other hand
fully enters into the decision of the input variables. The realised, observed plant output in
logs is therefore:
qrjt = f(kjt, ljt,mjt) + ωjt + jt (I.12)
This is the basic equation I want to estimate but in order to implement it I need to make
further identifying and functional assumptions.
Functional form assumption
For the baseline estimation and counterfactual analysis, I follow the key literature and
assume a Cobb-Douglas production function:
qrjt = β0 + βkkjt + βlljt + βmmjt + ωjt + jt (I.13)
With Cobb-Douglas, as opposed to a translog production function for example, we can
derive a closed form analytical solution for the conditional input demand functions which
dramatically eases the search for equilibria. However, in Appendix I.C.3, I make a second
order Taylor approximation around the unknown production function which results in a
translog specification and can be viewed as a generalised approximation to a CES production
function. The production estimates from this more flexible translog approximation are
reported in the results as well, and are on average reassuringly close to the Cobb-Douglas
estimates.93
93Essentially the Cobb-Douglas is a simplification of the translog specification by enforcing some
parameter restrictions.
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Simultaneity and selection biases
The main identification challenge is that we are unlikely to get consistent estimates when
running OLS on Equation (I.13) since we do not observe productivity ωjt. While the shock
jt is assumed to be unexpected and unknown to the firm, and therefore uncorrelated with
input choices, the productivity ωjt is known to the firm, and highly likely to influence input
choices. If a firm experiences a positive productivity shock, it is likely to use more variable
inputs, creating a positive bias in the coefficient. This problem is commonly referred to in
the productivity literature as simultaneity or transmission bias (Marschak and Andrews,
1944; Griliches and Mairesse, 1999).
A second identification issue comes from sample selection. Similar to Heckman’s
selection problem, we only observe firms that are in production. Firms’ survival is positively
correlated with productivity. But firms’ decisions to exit are negatively correlated with
installed capital, conditional on unobserved productivity. As Ericson and Pakes (1995)
argue, capital serves as buffer to shocks. Therefore, surviving firms have an expected
productivity that is decreasing in installed capital. This creates a downward bias in the
capital coefficients in an OLS regression omitting productivity. Moreover, since I only
use single-product firms for estimating the production function, there is an additional
self-selection problem of single-product firms turning multi-product which is positively
related to productivity. Conditional on productivity, firms with higher installed capital
(or labour) are more likely to introduce a second product, as in the model of Mayer et al.
(2014). Again, “surviving” single product firms (i.e. those not turning multiproduct) have
an expected productivity that is decreasing in installed capital (and perhaps labour).
Note that in the selection problem the bias arises in the more persistent variable (capital),
becoming more severe with more dynamics, whereas in the simultaneity problem, the bias
arises in the flexible inputs (material), becoming more severe with higher flexibility.94 Both
can cause inconsistent and biased estimates of all coefficients, so we should address both.
Addressing simultaneity and selectivity
I assume that material inputs are a function of several observed variables and a scalar
unobserved variable, productivity:
mjt = m(kjt, ljt, zjt, ωjt) (I.14)
94This is one reason why value added production functions have traditionally often been used in the
literature, to avoid highly flexible materials as input in the estimation.
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where zjt are additional variables which I discuss below. Additional to this scalar un-
observable assumption, it is assumed that this function is (conditionally) monotonically
increasing in productivity ωjt.95 Therefore, the material demand function can be inverted
for productivity, which we can later flexibly include in the estimating equation:
ωjt = h(kjt, ljt, zjt,mjt) (I.15)
where h(.) is an unknown function, which we can approximate with polynomials or
semi-parametrically. The choice of variables in zjt could be important, but was omitted in
the pioneering applications (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003). Gandhi
et al. (2016) argue that having no additional variables in zjt leaves the production function
non-parametrically non-identified.96 The second reason why zjt may be important is that
we need to be comfortable with the assumption that productivity is the only unobservable
driving material demand, which is more likely if we control for factors such as input prices.
For robustness checks, I include in zijt:
zjt = (p
M
jt , IMPjt, ηjt, pjt, sjt,Gt)
that is log material input prices pmjt , import status of material goods IMPjt, the inverse
demand elasticity ηjt, log output prices pjt, market share sjt and firm location dummies
Gt.97. The last three variables have also been used in the proxy equation in De Loecker
et al. (2016). However, they have neither observed input prices nor a measure of the
demand elasticity. As Forlani et al. (2016) argue, variations in demand elasticity or market
power are likely to drive material demand and thus are important to include. Note that
the framework of De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) retrieves markups after production
side estimation and can therefore not included markups in the estimation. The advantage
of the approach in this chapter is that we can recover demand elasticities from independent
demand side estimations.
A central concern is that the misallocation wedges τjt are likely to influence material
demand. Since they are identified from the input prices, demand elasticity, output prices
and market shares (Equation I.3)), it is sensible to include them in zjt. The monotonicity
95Only relatively mild conditions are necessary that the marginal product of materials is increasing in
ωjt (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) . This is easier to prove in the case where investment acts as the proxy
variable (Pakes, 1996).
96As otherwise only the shock in productivity from Equation I.17 identifies it, which is unobserved and
later assumed to be orthogonal to all input choice lags.
97As indicated in the results, I use a full zjt for robustness checks, but not for the baseline results
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assumption needs to hold only conditional on zjt. Figure I.18 plots the relationship between
material inputs and productivity and shows a monotonic relationship. For concerns that
the τjt still violate the scalar unobservable assumption, I furthermore implement a Blundell-
Bond system-GMM estimator for the production function as a robustness check, as detailed
further below.
In practice, I address the self-selection problem of firms from being single-product into
exit and into multi-product firms by following and augmenting the strategies of Olley
and Pakes (1996) and De Loecker et al. (2016). Essentially, I estimate the probability of
being in the sample Probjt with a discrete model, and the predicted probability from this
estimation will be included in the final estimation.98
98In more detail: In Ericson and Pakes (1995), productivity follows a Markov process and the exit
decision depends on a threshold value of productivity ωjt. A draw below this threshold value makes it
more profitable to sell the firm since its sell-off value is higher than discounted net profits based on the
current productivity draw. However, the productivity threshold also depends on installed capital, and
is decreasing in it since discounted profits are higher for higher capitalised firms. The sell-off value is
assumed to increase less in capital than discounted profits increase in capital. In short, the firm exits
if ωjt < ωjt(kjt). In the model of Mayer et al. (2014), the number of products is increasing (as a step
function) in productivity draws. The multiproduct threshold productivity ωjt is again decreasing in capital,
since bigger firms are more likely to be able to set up new product lines. In short, the firm becomes
multi-product if ωjt > ωjt(kjt). Putting these elements together, the conditional probability of being in
the single-product sample, indicated by spjt = 1 is:
Pr
[
spjt = 1 | ωjt(kjt), ωjt(kjt), ωjt−1
]
=Pr
[
ωjt(kjt) < ωjt < ωjt(kjt) | ωjt(kjt), ωjt(kjt, ljt), ωjt−1
]
=g˜
(
d˜
(
ωjt(kjt), ωjt(kjt)
)
, ωjt−1
)
=g
(
kjt−1, ijt−1, ljt−1, zjt−1,mjt−1
)
≡ Probjt (I.16)
where ijt−1 is investment. Conditionally on knowing the thresholds and previous period productivity,
the probability that current productivity lies within the thresholds can be written as an unknown function
of these elements. The reason why I use the notation of a function d˜ to summarise both thresholds
will become apparent below. Since capital is a function of previous period capital and previous period
investment, and productivity a function of given variables from the invertibility condition, we can write the
survival probability as an unknown function of these previous period variables. I estimate this probability
with a discrete model, and the predicted probability ˆProbjt will be included in the final estimation. In this
estimation I include whether the plant belongs to the census or the sampled sector, as this is additional
critical information whether the plant is contained in the sample. I do not empirically restrict the threshold
productivities to be decreasing in its arguments, but estimate the function g(.) flexibly.
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Markov productivity process
A common convenient99 assumption in the production function and productivity literature,
including the proxy approach, is that productivity follows a first order Markov process
(see influential early papers of Hopenhayn (1992); Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993)):
ωjt = E
(
ωjt | ωjt−1, IMPjt−1, spjt = 1
)
+ ζjt
= Ψ
(
ωjt−1, IMPjt−1, d˜
(
ωjt, ωjt
))
+ ζjt
= Ψ
(
h(kjt−1, ljt−1, zjt−1,mjt−1), IMPjt−1, g−1(ωjt−1, P robjt)
)
+ ζjt
= Ψ˜
(
h(kjt−1, ljt−1, zjt−1,mjt−1), IMPjt−1, P robjt
)
+ ζjt (I.17)
The productivity process is not completely exogenous100, but is allowed to depend
on the firm’s import status, because of potential international technology spillovers and
depends on the firm being in the sample and single product (spjt = 1) which ultimately
depends on its survival probability from (I.16). Therefore the productivity is an unknown
function of the elements in the last equation and the shock to productivity ζjt.101
The Markov assumption implies that the CDF of ωjt is a decreasing function of ωjt−1,
i.e. that high ωjt−1 firms stochastically dominate low ωjt−1 firms. By construction:
E[ζjt | ωjt−1, IMPjt−1, d˜
(
ωjt, ωjt
)
, spjt = 1] = 0 (I.18)
Note that the Markov assumption implies that ζjt is not only uncorrelated with all
lagged variables in the function h(.), but through the capital accumulation equation also
with current capital kjt, if current capital is only a function of previous period capital
and previous period investment and depreciation, which have all been realised before the
99It is convenient, as with higher order Markov processes, we need a longer history of the data and
effectively lose observations.
100It can also be allowed to depend additionally on R&D expenditures as in Doraszelski and Jaumandreu
(2013), but I have no data on this.
101The second equality states that the conditional expectation is a function of its conditioning vari-
ables including the function of the productivity thresholds since they define the range for spjt = 1 if
ωjt(kjt) < ωjt < ωjt(kjt, ljt), where ωjt−1 enters the function Ψ(.) twice. For the third equality, I use the
control function for productivity, and inverting the unknown function g˜(.) from Equation (I.16) to write
d˜
(
ωjt(kjt), ωjt(kjt, ljt)
)
= g˜−1(ωjt−1, P robjt). I assume that this inversion exists. A sufficient condition
would be that there is indeed a function d˜(.) in which g˜(.) is monotonous, despite g˜(.) being increasing
in ωjt and decreasing ωjt individually, so e.g. the gap d˜(.) = ωjt − ωjt . For more discussion on the
assumptions on an inversion involving one threshold, see Olley and Pakes (1996). The last equation shows
that I address the selection problem in the productivity process by conditioning on the probability or
propensity of being in the sample, i.e. between the thresholds.
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productivity shock ζjt is incurred, a common assumption in the literature. Similarly, if
labour hiring and firing takes enough adjustment time, ζjt could also be uncorrelated
with current labour inputs. I check my results for either assumption on labour timing.
These orthogonality assumptions in the productivity Markov process are crucial for the
identification of the production function parameters.
Estimated equations and moments
Following Wooldridge (2009), we can write down two equations for the production function,
where we substitute in for ωit from Equation (I.15) and from Equation (I.17):102
qrjt = β0 + βkkjt + βlljt + βmmjt + h(kjt, ljt, zjt,mjt) + jt (I.19)
qrjt = β0 + βkkjt + βlljt + βmmjt+
+ Ψ˜
(
h(kjt−1, ljt−1, zjt−1,mjt−1), IMPjt−1, P robjt
)
+ ζjt + jt (I.20)
For estimation we need to specify the unknown functions h(.) and Ψ˜(.). For h(.) I use
a third order polynomial with all interactions in its arguments.103 For the Markov process
in productivity I use an AR(1) process, so Ψ˜(.) becomes a linear function.104
For consistent estimates, we need to specify the instrument matrix for each of the two
equations, which requires assumptions on timing. For the first Equation (I.19), the shock
to production jt is unexpected and incurred during or after production and therefore not
linked to current (or past) firm input choices. We can use the full set of current and past
variables as instruments for themselves, which I denote as the information set Γjt.
However, for the second Equation (I.20), the joint error term contains ζjt, which is part
of ωjt, which the firm is assumed to know before the beginning of production. So clearly,
this is correlated with current input choices. Since ζjt is the non-anticipated innovation
in the Markov productivity process, it is not correlated with past input choices, however.
It depends on the assumption of the flexibility of inputs, which current input choices are
problematic from an econometric point of view. If we believe that current capital is set
in the last period (last period investment, depreciation and capital stock), then current
period capital is not correlated with ζit. I follow the literature in assuming this. For labour,
102See Appendix I.C.3 for the translog version.
103As in De Loecker et al. (2016) for example. I also check the results with higher-order polynomials.
One can alternatively use non-parametric methods as in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), at the expense of a
much more complicated estimation procedure.
104Similar to the assumption in Forlani et al. (2016). I also check the results’ robustness with higher
order polynomials.
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it depends how flexibly hiring and firing takes place. Most likely it is partially dynamic,
so there is not complete digression on the size of the labour force each period (multi-year
contracts). I allow current labour choices to be correlated with current productivity, but
also check robustness with a version where it is fully dynamic, i.e. determined in the
previous period. I denote the set of instruments for the second Equation (I.20) as the
information set Γjt−1, where kjt is contained since it is determined in the previous period,
and depending on the labour assumption, ljt is contained or only ljt−1.
By rearranging the equations we can formulate the set of population moment equations,
where the errors are a function of all parameters Θ:
E
 jt(Θ) | Γjt(
jt + ζjt
)
(Θ) | Γjt−1
 = 0
We can form the analogous stacked sample moments and write the criterion function
Q˜(Θ) to be minimised:
Define: rjt(Θ) ≡
 jt(Θ)(
jt + ζjt
)
(Θ)
 and Γ˜jt ≡
 Γjt 0
0 Γjt−1

Set of sample moment conditions:
1
JT
∑
j
∑
t
[Γ˜
′
jtrˆjt(Θ)] = 0
Θˆ = min
Θ
Q˜(Θ) =
1
JT
[∑
j
∑
t
[Γ˜
′
jtrˆjt(Θ)]
′W
∑
j
∑
t
[Γ˜
′
jtrˆjt(Θ)]
]
where the weighting matrix W is clustered on plants accounting for non-identically
distributed and autocorrelated errors.
Production elasticities
Having estimated the vector of parameters Θˆ, I simply use the residual of the first stage
Equation (I.19) to get the estimate ˆit. I recover productivities ωˆjt by subtracting the
production function with plugged in estimates Θˆ from the predicted values qˆjt in the first
stage equation. The estimate for the production elasticity of inputs αjt is simply the
corresponding coefficient, for example for materials:105
αˆMjt = βˆm
105For the translog it varies by plant: αˆMjt = βˆm + βˆlmljt + βˆkmkjt + βˆmmmijt, see Appendix I.C.3.
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I.C.2 An alternative for production function estimation: dynamic panel sys-
tem GMM
As an alternative to the proxy approach, I also implement a quasi-differenced dynamic
panel system GMM approach (Blundell and Bond, 2000). This serves as a robustness check,
as the material demand equation depends on τ , which we do not observe. Everything else
equal, firms with higher τ demand less materials. I include the factors that drive τ in zjt
(such as input prices or demand elasticity), but the system GMM approach serves as a test
whether this is enough for the scalar unobservable and invertibility condition required for
the proxy approach. Shenoy (2015) uses a dynamic panel method in his analysis of input
misallocation for Thai rice farmers due to a similar concern. He also develops a test for
the scalar unobservable assumption, and argues that with input constraints, the dynamic
panel approach tends to perform better in his setting (Shenoy, 2016).
I maintain the first order Markov assumption for the productivity process, which
I further specify into an AR(1) process. But I allow for a firm specific time-invariant
component of productivity νj:
ωjt = ρωjt−1 + νj + ζjt
Analogous to Equation I.17, we could condition the productivity process on sample se-
lection and import status, or R&D expenditures. Quasi-first differencing the log production
function (I.12) by ρ eliminates unobserved ωjt:
qrjt = −ρqrjt−1 + f(kjt, ljt,mjt)− ρf(kjt−1, ljt−1,mjt−1) + νj + ζjt + jt − ρjt−1
By first differencing this equation, I can implement an Arellano and Bond (1991) estima-
tor by using lagged independent variables as instrument. I use a more efficient Blundell and
Bond (2000) system GMM estimator, where I use lagged differenced independent variables
as instruments for the level equation in addition.106 This estimator is implemented for
both the Cobb-Douglas and the translog versions.
106The appropriate instruments need to take into account that qrjt−1 is correlated with jt−1, and ljt−1
and mjt−1 and kjt with ζjt−1.
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I.C.3 Estimation with translog production function
I also provide the production function estimates for a more flexible translog specification.
To repeat, the realised, observed output in logs by firm is:
qrjt = f(kjt, ljt,mjt) + ωjt + jt (I.21)
Since we don’t know the functional form of the production function we can form a
second order Taylor approximation107 with approximation error νjt around the point X = 1
(so x = 0):
qrjt = f(0) +
∂f
∂kjt |x=0
kjt +
∂f
∂ljt |x=0
ljt +
∂f
∂mjt |x=0
mjt
+
1
2
∂f 2
(∂kjt)2 |x=0
k2jt +
1
2
∂f 2
(∂ljt)2 |x=0
l2jt +
1
2
∂f 2
(∂mjt)2 |x=0
m2jt
+
∂f 2
∂kjt∂ljt |x=0
kjtljt +
∂f 2
∂kjt∂mjt |x=0
kjtmjt +
∂f 2
∂ljt∂mjt |x=0
ljtmjt
+ ωjt + jt + νjt
Since the derivatives evaluated at x = 0 are constant across time and firms within the
same product category, we can interpret them as the regression coefficients,108 which yields
a second order translog109 production function:
qrjt = β0 + βkkjt + βlljt + βmmjt + βkkk
2
jt + βlll
2
jt + βmmm
2
jt (I.22)
+ βklkjtljt + βkmkijtmjt + βlmljtmjt + ωjt + jt (I.23)
In this equation, the additional error term νijt which comes from approximation is
assumed to be zero and omitted. We cannot identify this term (which can in principle
be “transmitted” to inputs) separately to the shock jt, so assume it is zero and the
approximation is perfect. This is of course a silent assumption in all of the production
estimation literature. Compared to Cobb-Douglas or CES functional form assumptions,
the translog specification is more flexible allowing for significant amount of curvature, and
is thus less likely to suffer from functional form assumption or approximation bias.
107And Young’s theorem of equal cross-partials.
108The factor of a half is incorporated in the coefficient for the quadratic terms.
109The transcendental logarithmic function was introduced by Christensen et al. (1971, 1973); Berndt
and Christensen (1973). See also Griliches and Ringstad (1971) who propose a similar generalisation of
the approximation for estimating CES functions by Kmenta (1967).
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Analogous to the main text, we can write down two equations for the production
function, where I substitute in for ωit from Equation I.15 and from Equation I.17:
qrjt = β0 + βkkjt + βlljt + βmmjt + βkkk
2
jt + βlll
2
jt + βmmm
2
jt
+ βklkjtljt + βkmkjtmjt + βlmljtmjt + h(kjt, ljt, zjt,mjt) + jt (I.24)
qrjt = β0 + βkkjt + βlljt + βmmjt + βkkk
2
jt + βlll
2
jt + βmmm
2
jt
+ βklkjtljt + βkmkjtmjt + βlmljtmjt
+ Ψ˜
(
h(kjt−1, ljt−1, zjt−1,mjt−1), IMPjt−1, P robjt
)
+ ζjt + jt (I.25)
The estimate for the production elasticity of material inputs is, for example:
αˆMjt = βˆm + βˆlmljt + βˆkmkjt + βˆmmmijt
For the Cobb-Douglas version, we apply the parameter restrictions that βlm = βkm =
βmm = 0, so that αˆMjt = βˆm.
I.D Estimation details for the demand side
I.D.1 Estimation of the demand model
To repeat for convenience, consumers are indexed by i and need to decide to buy from a
firm j to maximise their utility from using product j:
Uijt = (yit − P rjt)θpit + xjtθxit + ξj + ξt + ∆ξjt + µijt ≡ Vijt + µijt (I.26)
where yit is consumer income, P rjt realised prices (which are associated with realised
quantities – these are the ones that are relevant for the consumers), xjt a vector of product
characteristics and a constant, ξj average utility from unobserved time-constant product
characteristics, ξt average unobserved market-specific utility, and ∆ξjt the unobserved
deviations from a particular product in a particular market from the unobserved averages.
The unobserved ξj can contain the quality and the location of a product and ξj and
ξt will be absorbed by fixed effects dummies. For the baseline results I only include
a constant in xjt as there are few time variant product characteristics (since the time
invariant characteristics are absorbed in ξj). The non-random utility can be summarised
by Vijt. The random utility component is µijt, which follows an i.i.d. Type I extreme value
distribution.
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We can further specify the random parameters into a mean and variance component:θpit
θxit
 =
θp
θx
+
σp 0
0 σx
νpit
νxit
 , νit ∼ P (ν)
where νit are draws from a multivariate normal distribution. Therefore the consumer
heterogeneity has three dimensions, the random utility shock µijt as well as the two νit
draws. I estimate the means
θp
θx
 and the variances Σ ≡
σp 0
0 σx
 of the random
coefficients. We can rewrite the utility function with a mean (≡ δjt) and individual
consumer part, which simplifies the estimation algorithm:
Uijt = θ
p
ityit−θpP rjt + θxxjt + ξj + ξt + ∆ξjt︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡δjt
−σpνpitP rjt + σxνxitxjt + µijt
Derived theoretical market shares
Consumer i purchases from firm j if it yields the highest utility, compared to the products
from all other firms or the outside option j = 0. The outside good also serves to normalise
the utility by setting the mean and individual components in the outside good utility to
zero.110 Define as set Ajt the set of consumers which strictly prefer product j.111 The
integral over the consumers that belong to this set is the theoretical (realised) market
share srjt of firm j in period t:
srjt =
∫
Ajt
dP (ν,µ) =
∫
Ajt
dP (µ | ν)dP (ν) =
∫
Ajt
dP (µ)dP (ν)
=
∫
Ajt
exp(θpityit) exp(δjt − σpνpitP rjt + σxνxitxjt)
exp(θpityit)
[
exp(δ0t − σpνpitP r0t + σxνxitx0t) +
∑
j=1 exp(δjt − σpνpitP rjt + σxνxitxjt)
]dP (ν)
=
∫
Ajt
exp(δjt − σpνpitP rjt + σxνxitxjt)
1 +
∑
j=1 exp(δjt − σpνpitP rjt + σxνxitxjt)
dP (ν) (I.27)
where the third equality in the first row follows from assuming that the random
coefficient and the random utility shocks are independent. The fourth equality uses the
Type I extreme value distributional assumption about the random utility shocks, and the
fifth equality uses that I normalise the components of the utility of the outside good (j = 0)
to zero.
110So everything except the terms θpityit and µi0t, see e.g. Nevo (2000b) for more details.
111So Ajt = {(νit,µit) | Uijt > Uilt∀l = 0, 1..., J}
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Minimising the distance between theoretical and observed market shares
The theoretically predicted market shares can be used to find parameter values that
match them to empirically observed realised market shares sˆrjt. The problem is that
the parameters enter in a nonlinear fashion into the market shares, which is a difficult
minimization problem and more importantly, cannot address price endogeneity concerns
in the usual linear way. The main contribution of BLP and Berry (1994) is to show how
we can estimate the parameters while taking price endogeneity into account in a linear
fashion.112 For logit models without random coefficients, this is easily achieved by an
analytic relationship between market share ratios and mean utility δjt in (I.27). Berry
(1994) and BLP solve the integral in (I.27) by simulating consumers and using a contraction
mapping. The following sketches the procedure and algorithm. For a more detailed account,
see BLP, Berry (1994) or Nevo (2000b).
The algorithm operates on an inner and an outer loop. The inner loop first solves
for δjt, and then linearly estimates the mean coefficients (θp, θx) and ξ. The outer loop
solves for Σ. The inner loop finds a δjt for a given Σ that sets the observed (sˆrjt) and the
theoretical market shares (srjt) equal: minδjt ||srjt − sˆrjt||. The theoretical market shares
are calculated via numerical integration by simulation by drawing a number of consumers
N (a consumer is defined by νit after integrating the random utility component µijt out):
srjt ≈
1
N
∑
i
exp(δjt − σpνpitP rjt + σxνxitxjt)
1 +
∑
j=1 exp(δjt − σpνpitP rjt + σxνxitxjt)
(I.28)
For the baseline I simulate N = 2000 consumers, but also check robustness of the point
estimates with N = 10000 consumers. Berry (1994) proves that there exists a unique δjt
which matches the theoretical and empirical market shares under mild regularity conditions.
Based on this, BLP employ a contraction mapping (nested fixed point algorithm) where
for each step h, the new δh+1jt is found conditional on Σ by:
δh+1jt = δ
h
jt + ln(sˆ
r
jt)− ln(srjt)
112Estimating demand systems has been the focus of a large literature over decades. While allowing
flexible substitution patterns between products, the drawbacks of the popular classic Almost Ideal Demand
System (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980) are the number of parameters required to be estimated and the
requirement of a representative consumer. Therefore, parts of the relevant IO literature have moved from
a product space approach towards a characteristic space approach, which I employ in this chapter as well.
The BLP model has been further extended (e.g. Nevo (2001)) and used in a variety of contexts, often for
merger analysis (e.g. Nevo (2000a)), but also for welfare consequence due to e.g. trade policy changes
(Berry et al., 1999) or the introduction of a particular product (minivan) (Petrin, 2002).
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which is iterated until the change in δjt, so ln(sˆrjt) − ln(srjt), is below a tolerance
level.113
Identifying the linear preference parameters
Thereafter, I obtain the linear parameters (θp, θx) through a linear IV regression of δjt
from its definition on:
δjt = −θpP rjt + θxxjt + ξj + ξt + ∆ξjt (I.29)
where I instrument the endogenous price P rjt with plant cost shifters and use the
appropriate product and time dummies. The price endogeneity arises from correlation with
the unobserved taste shocks ∆ξjt, which might allow changing prices without consequences
for quantities sold, for example.
Moment conditions in outer loop
From the IV regression I also calculate ∆ξjt with which I form the objective GMM function
to be minimised to obtain a solution for Σ:
Σˆ = arg min
Σ
∆ξ′ZWZ ′∆ξ
where Z is the instrument matrix and W = (Z ′Z)−1 is a weighting matrix. The
underlying moment conditions are that the unobserved deviation in mean utility ∆ξ are
orthogonal to the instrument matrix. I will further discuss the choice of the instrument
matrix when I present the results in Section I.4.1. The outer loop searches over the
parameter space of the nonlinear parameters in Σ, and for each iteration, the inner loop
and linear IV regression are performed. This procedure solves for all structural demand
side parameters. The estimation performs better with analytical Jacobians, which are
provided, along with further estimation details and the analytic robust standard errors of
the estimates in Appendix I.D.2.
113I use a tolerance level of on average 10−13 with a maximum tolerance of 10−12 for an individual
jt. Davis and Schiraldi (2014) provide a faster convergence to the unique vector of fixed points via a
Newton-Rhapson algorithm. An alternative to the inner loop contraction mapping is to use a MPEC
(mathematical program with equilibrium constraints) algorithm that takes the market shares as constraints
to the GMM objective function, see Dubé et al. (2012).
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Outside good and observed market shares
The estimation uses data on market shares (of sold quantities), rather than quantities
themselves. Since the size of the market also includes the outside good, we need to quantify
the outside good. BLP, which analyse the car market, for example, take as total market
the population that can buy a vehicle. Here, I take as market size Yt the total amount of
the particular product sold by Indian firms, both by the firms in the sample and outside
the sample by using the plant specific sampling multiplier in the data. Therefore the plant
level quantity sold is:
Qrjt = sˆ
r
jtYt (I.30)
and
∑
j≥1Q
r
jt < 1 due to the outside good. An increase in the production of an
in-sample firm would therefore not increase Yt, but
∑
j Q
r
jt.
Price elasticities of demand
The price elasticity of demand is:
1
ηjt
≡ ∂Qjt
∂Pjt
Pjt
Qjt
=
∂(sjtYt)
∂Pjt
Pjt
sjtYt
=
∂sjt
∂Pjt
Pjt
sjt
=
Pjt
sjt
1
N
∑
i
(θpitsijt(1− sijt)) (I.31)
where sijt ≡ exp(δjt−σ
pνpitPjt+σ
xνxitxjt)
1+
∑
j=1 exp(δjt−σpνpitPjt+σxνxitxjt) . I omit the notation with r for realised output
(or market share) here, since the elasticities can be derived from any prices and quantities
in any equilibrium conditional on the estimated parameters. Cross-elasticities can be
calculated similarly and vary by firm-pair in each market.
I.D.2 Demand side algorithm details, Jacobian and standard errors
For the outer loop that searches over Σ, both an interior-point (see e.g. Byrd et al.
(2000)) as well as sequential quadratic programming (SQP) algorithm perform well (see
e.g. Nocedal and Wright (2006)). As starting values for Σ, I use a vector of zeros, but
checked robustness with various positive and negative starting values. I supply a starting
value for δjt from a model without random coefficients where it has an analytical solution:
δstartjt = log(sˆ
r
jt)− log((outside market share)t).
The Jacobian of the objective function can be solved for analytically and can be supplied
to the optimisation algorithm for speed improvements. The derivative of the objective
function (let us call it f() for simplicity) with respect to the two elements of Σ on the
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diagonal (σ) is, with a slight abuse of notation:
∂f(∆ξ(δ(sr(σ))))
∂σ
=
∂f(.)
∂∆ξ
∂∆ξ
∂δ
∂δ
∂sr
∂sr
∂σ
= 2ZWZ ′∆ξ
(
∂sr
∂δ
)−1
∂sr
∂σ
The second last component of the Jacobian
(
∂sr
∂δ
)−1 is a square matrix with a size equal
to the number of observations (so products times markets or periods). The elements of the
matrix can be calculated by taking the derivative of Equation (I.28), which I repeat for
convenience:
srjt ≈
1
N
∑
i
exp(δjt − σpνpitP rjt + σxνxitxjt)
1 +
∑
j=1 exp(δjt − σpνpitP rjt + σxνxitxjt)
≡ 1
N
∑
i
srijt
∂srjt
∂δjt
=
1
N
∑
i
srijt(1− srijt) ∀j
∂srjt
∂δmt
= − 1
N
∑
i
srijts
r
imt ∀m 6= j
The last component of the Jacobian ∂sr
∂σ
is again obtained by taking the derivative of
the market share equation with respect to each of the k diagonal elements σk of Σ (with
associated draw νkit), so:
∂srjt
∂σp
=
1
N
∑
i
νpits
r
ijt(
∑
j
P rjts
r
ijt − P rjt)
∂srjt
∂σx
=
1
N
∑
i
νxits
r
ijt(xjt −
∑
j
xjts
r
ijt)
The standard errors of Σˆ are obtained by taking the square root of the diagonal terms
of its covariance matrix. The covariance matrix of the GMM estimate σˆ is:
ˆV COV (σˆ) = N (G′ZWZ ′G)−1
(
G′ZWVˆWZ ′G
)
(G′ZWZ ′G)−1
where G is the gradient of the moment conditions, for which we can use part of the
Jacobian of the objective function above:
G ≡
(
∂sr
∂δ
)−1
∂sr
∂σ
and W is the 2SLS weighting matrix and Vˆ a consistent heteroskedasticity robust
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estimator of the moment conditions:
W = (Z ′Z)−1
Vˆ =
1
N
∑
jt
∆ξjtz
′
jtzjt
The linear structural parameters {θp, θx} depend on the non-linear structural parameters
Σ and are solved for via the inner loop in the algorithm. In order to obtain a covariance
matrix of the linear parameters I bootstrap from the estimated ˆV COV (σˆ) and solve the
inner loop for each draw with an associated {θp, θx}. I recover the standard errors of the
linear parameters from the resulting sampling distribution of {θp, θx}.
I.E Details for estimating equilibria
Both the factual and the counterfactual equilibria are determined by a vector of prices,
since the market shares (and output quantities) are a function of prices and the structural
parameters. The input quantities for the counterfactual can be derived from the cost
minimisation conditions once the equilibrium prices (and quantities) are found. Note
that the contraction mapping in the inner loop was only needed to identify the structural
demand parameters. For the equilibria I only search over prices taking the structural
demand and production parameters as given. The strategy is to (1) first find the factual
equilibrium and associated equilibrium prices (i.e. before shock  introduces noise into
realised observed quantities and prices), then (2) calculate the implied factual τ , and (3)
use a counterfactual τ˜ to obtain prices that solve for the counterfactual equilibrium.
The equilibrium conditions are:
Pjt
MCjt
(
Qjt(Pt), cjt(τ )
) − 1
1 + ηjt(Pt)
= 0 (FOC)
2
∂Qjt
∂Pjt
+ (Pjt −MCjt) ∂
2Qjt
(∂Pjt)2
− ∂MCjt
∂Qjt
(
∂Qjt
∂Pjt
)2
≤ 0 (SOC)
For both, the factual and counterfactual equilibria, I use the Hessian (SOC) as a
constraint in the optimisation to ensure profit maximisation (and not minimisation). We
can rewrite the Hessian with markets shares instead of quantities using Equation (I.30):
Qjt = sjtYt. Note that I do not use superscript r in this section since I am now using
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equilibrium, not realised, quantities and prices. The Hessian is:
Hjt = Yt
2 ∂sjt
∂Pjt
+ (Pjt −MCjt) ∂
2sjt
(∂Pjt)2
− Yt∂MCjt
∂sjt
(
∂sjt
∂Pjt
)2
where
∂sjt
∂Pjt
=
1
N
∑
i
(θpitsijt(1− sijt))
∂2sjt
∂(Pjt)2
=
1
N
∑
i
(
(θpit)
2sijt(1− sijt)(1− sijt − sijt)
)
where sijt ≡ exp(δjt − σ
pνpitPjt + σ
xνxitxjt)
1 +
∑
j=1 exp(δjt − σpνpitPjt + σxνxitxjt)
MCjt =
Pjt
1 + ηjt(Pt)
When using a Cobb-Douglas production function, the marginal cost function114 has an
analytical closed form and is a function of output Qjt, output elasticities and distortions
114The cost function is:
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Hence the remaining component of the Hessian is:
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For the factual equilibrium, I search over prices that minimise the summed squared
distances between the markets shares that are a function of these prices s and the
equilibrium market shares sˆ that we know from Equation (I.30), sˆjt =
sˆrjt
exp(jt)
:
P factt = arg min
Pt
−sˆ′s(Pt)
s.t. Hjt(Pt) ≤ 0 ∀ jt
Using realised prices as starting values for the search typically is most efficient, but I
also check the robustness with alternative starting values. I use the first order equilibrium
conditions above to infer the τ . Once we set the counterfactual τ˜ , we can search for the
counterfactual equilibrium prices. For the counterfactuals, I use the first order equilibrium
conditions as the objective function. I minimise the squared distances between the variable
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marginal costs inferred from the prices and demand elasticity, and the variable marginal
costs from the derivative of the cost function:
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Therefore:
P counterfactt = arg min
Pt
−MCC(τ )′MCD(Pt)
s.t. Hjt(Pt) ≤ 0 ∀ jt
Using the factual equilibrium prices as starting values for the counterfactual prices is
typically most efficient, but I checked a range of alternative starting values.
All plant-years where I estimate an elasticity larger than −1 in the original demand
estimation are ignored in terms of finding any equilibrium and are ignored for the compar-
ative statics as well.115 Furthermore I constrain the elasticity to be smaller than −1 in
the factual and counterfactual estimation such that the relationship between prices and
marginal cost markups is defined. This also improves stability in finding the equilibria
since the algorithm does not move over the discontinuity. I also supply a lower bound of
zero on prices to the algorithm.
For both, the factual and the counterfactual equilibria, I solve separately for each
market (i.e. time period) since they are independent. This reduces the dimension over
which prices are searched and speeds up the algorithm considerably. I use a sequential
quadratic programming (SQP) algorithm (Nocedal and Wright, 2006) which almost always
performs faster than an interior point algorithms for these purposes.
115As noted in the main text, there are only 9 observations with a median market share of 0.0004.
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Figure I.13: Cast iron producing plants as
share of all iron alloy producing plants
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Figure I.14: Share of single product plants
in cast iron manufacturing
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While neither the existence nor the uniqueness of equilibria is proven analytically, the
algorithm always finds an equilibrium, including for the bootstrapped equilibria where
I have different simulated structural parameters for each draw. This at least proves
existence for this sample. I perform some checks on the global nature (and uniqueness)
of the minimum by using a range of different starting values which converge to the same
equilibrium.
I.F Details on the Indian iron and steel industry
Iron and steel industry in India
The iron and steel sector in India is an interesting sector in itself. In 2015 India has been
the third largest producer both of total crude steel and pig iron after China and Japan
(WSA, 2016b), up from ninth place for both in 2000 (WSA, 2010). The share of basic
iron and steel (2710 in ISIC3) in value added of total manufacturing was 15% in 2007
(latest year available in UNIDO (2016b) Indstat). After Bahrain, which have a small total
manufacturing sector, this is the largest value added share any basic iron and steel sector
has in their national manufacturing value added in the world (see Figure I.16). Figure
I.13, I.14 and I.15 show more descriptive statistics on the cast iron sample described in the
main text.
Raw materials in the iron and steel industry and carbon emissions
In terms of raw materials used in the iron and steel sector, India was the fourth largest
producer of iron ore after China, Australia and Brazil (WSA, 2016b) in 2015, and the
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Figure I.15: Industry concentration: 35 biggest players in 2004
Other
Notes: The market shares of the 35 largest plants and "other" plants are shown in 2004. The calculation
is based on the single product firms in the final sample.
third largest coal producer (EIA, 2015). Even after the raw material mining stage, the
production chain and process in the iron and steel industry has substantial environmental
significance due to its heavy use of coal. The main raw materials iron ore and coal as well
as alloying elements such as nickel or chromium are relatively abundant resources. Coal has
typically the dual role of providing the heating for smelting and melting in the production
chain, but is also directly required to adjust the carbon content of the products. Carbon
is often burnt out in the melting process and needs to be re-added accordingly. Carbon
emissions come therefore from the heat generation as well as the process of production
directly. For the upstream production of pig iron, coke is the main reducing agent to turn
iron ore into pig iron saturated with carbon in the smelting process.
Globally, in 2013 around 15% of total coal consumption is accounted for by the iron
and steel industry (World Coal Association, 2014), more than twice the entire consumption
of the EU (BP, 2016). India accounts for around 9% of global coal consumption, primarily
through its electricity generating sector which is heavily reliant on coal (BP, 2016).
Therefore even with substitution to a different low-carbon fuel for electricity generation
and heating, coal is likely to remain a necessary ingredient in iron and steel manufacturing,
with accompanying process emissions. According to the UNFCCC (2016), the iron and
steel sector accounts for more than a third of all process emissions in Annex I countries.
Per tonne of produced steel in India around 3.1 to 3.8 tonne of CO2 are emitted (IPCC,
2007). With India’s steel production at 89 million tonnes in 2015 (WSA, 2016b), this
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Figure I.16: Share of basic iron and steel in total manufacturing value added
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implies around 328 million tonnes of total CO2 emissions of the Indian iron and steel
sector, around 82% of UK’s or 13% of India’s total emissions in 2015 (EC, 2016).
Reduction of process emissions can be achieved through process and product innovation.
In terms of process innovation, pulverised coal injection techniques can save around 30%
of coal (WSA, 2016a), and emissions can be reduced through ex-post carbon capture and
storage. In terms of product innovation, it is often cited that 75% of steel types have been
introduced in the past 20 years. The Eiffel Tower would only require a third of today’s
material and old automobiles would only require two thirds of today’s steel (WSA, 2017).
However, if there are barriers to reallocation from less efficient to more efficient firms, then
removing barriers and reallocating inputs could in principle decrease aggregate process
emissions, without any plant level process or product innovations, which this chapter can
shed light on.
86
I.G Further results and robustness checks
I.G.1 Output and input prices
Figure I.17: Output and input prices for selected years
0
50
10
0
15
0
0
50
10
0
15
0
0 20 40 60 0 20 40 60
2002 2005
2008 2011
Ou
tp
ut
 p
ric
e 
ru
pe
es
 p
er
 kg
Input price rupees per kg
Notes: The figure plots deflated output and input prices of the cast iron plants in rupees per kg. Input
prices are recovered by dividing total expenditure on material inputs by the total weight of material inputs.
I.G.2 Detailed results from demand estimation
Instrument choice and first stage
In order to consistently estimate the mixed logit demand model we need instruments for
the endogenous price. Taste shocks captured in ∆ξjt, for example, are likely to be positively
correlated to prices in the mean utility regression (I.29). If higher utility can be derived
from a product, producers are likely to be able to raise prices without compromising
on sales. Note that including product and year fixed effects ξ already goes a long way
by accounting for time or firm invariant taste characteristics as well as other sources of
endogeneity bias that do not vary across these dimensions.
There are several candidates for instruments which have been used in demand estimation.
The profit maximisation condition for plants is a useful guide for instrument choice
around which the literature can be structured. Rewriting condition (I.1) yields Pjt =
1+ηjt(Pt)
MCjt
(
Qjt(Pt),cjt
) . Much of the literature relies on an internal instrument that drives the
numerator 1 + ηjt(Pt).116 However, since I have endogenous marginal costs that depend
116Hausman et al. (1994) estimate a nested logit demand system for beer and use other cities’ beer prices
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on observed marginal cost shifters, I can use these external instruments for prices. Shocks
to input prices are assumed to be uncorrelated with shocks to taste ∆ξjt, conditional on
average product quality which is controlled for by product fixed effects. Armstrong (2016)
shows that internal BLP-style instruments, in particular in the Bertrand Nash structure,
tend to perform poorly in small samples and also lose identifying power asymptotically.
He recommends cost shifters which are consistent over a broad range of cases.
I use the average plant level wages wjt, and the average plant level prices of a tonne of
material inputs PMjt as instruments for output prices Pjt. At the solution of the model, the
first stage Kleibergen-Paap F statistic is 21.81, rejecting a weak instrument hypothesis.
The Hansen overidentification Chi-Square J statistic is smaller than 0.001, with a p-value
close to unity so the hypothesis of valid instruments can not be rejected. The point estimate
of the IV regression of mean utility on price is -17.15*** as shown in Table I.5. A plain
OLS regression in (I.29) yields an estimate of -14.60*** , which is significantly positively
biased as expected.
An alternative instrument was proposed by Foster et al. (2008) who estimate produc-
tivity (TFPQ) and a demand function. They propose to use TFPQ (Ωjt) or the innovation
in the productivity process (ζjt) as instruments for prices. In my data, the correlation
between Ωjt and Pjt is -0.18***, and between ζjt and Pjt -0.09*. This makes intuitive sense,
considering that higher productivity leads to higher output quantity which is associated
with lower prices. However, Forlani et al. (2016) find in their joint estimation of demand
and productivity that shocks in consumer taste and shocks to productivity are negatively
correlated, which would make both TFPQ (Ωjt) and the innovation in it (ζjt) unsuitable
instruments.117 Including TFPQ (Ωjt) as an additional instrument for estimating Equation
(I.29) yields a point estimate of -17.20*** for the instrumented price, very similar to my
baseline result of -17.15*** in Table I.5. The first stage F statistic is 16.05, and Hansen’s
J test of valid instruments cannot be rejected with a p-value of 0.70.
to instrument for a city’s beer price. BLP themselves use other products’ characteristics values of the
same firm and the same product’s characteristics values of other firms (via a competition channel). Both
do not rely on additional data, but require stronger assumptions, as discussed therein and in Nevo (2001).
Reynaert and Verboven (2014) suggest an improved set of BLP instruments based on Chamberlain (1987)
optimal instruments (see also more recent work on this in Gandhi and Houde (2016)). The rank condition
of these types of instruments can be rationalised by noting that they affect the demand elasticities, upon
which the price choice depends in the firm’s optimisation condition.
117I also find that productivity shocks ζjt and unobserved average utility shocks ∆ξjt are negatively
correlated (-0.04), but insignificantly. I avoid using ζjt as instrument also for practical reasons. I would
need to estimate the production side to generate the instrument for the demand side. But when estimating
the demand side first, I can use demand side estimates as instruments for the invertibility condition in the
production estimation.
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Table I.5: Estimates of demand parameters
Point estimate SE
θp -17.15*** 0.40 (bootstrapped)
σp -5.83*** 0.13 (robust)
σx 0.02 1.19 (robust)
ξ Yes .
Notes: The table shows the estimates for the structural parameters on the demand side. The number of
observations is 989. The standard errors of the linear parameter θp depends on the non-linear parameters.
Details for calculation of the standard errors are in Appendix I.D.2.
Estimated demand parameters
I omit the estimates for the dummies (θx, ξj, ξt) in Table I.5. The estimate for the mean
price coefficient θp (-17.15***) is negative and highly statistically significant, as is the
standard deviation of the mean price coefficient σx (-5.83***).118 This means that there is
significant variation in the random coefficient on price. On the other hand, the variance
on the constant (σx) is small and insignificant, so presents little evidence of a random
intercept. See Appendix I.D.2 for details on the calculation of the standard errors.
I.G.3 Further results and robustness checks for the production side
Table I.6 shows the baseline estimates in Column (1) and the OLS results in Column (2).
Since I am only using observations that are part of consecutive spells of data because of the
assumed timing structure of the model, I have fewer observations than for the plain OLS
result in Column (2). Observations that belong to a plant that has consecutive spells but
are in years without consecutive spells are not used for the estimation. The OLS results are
robust to only using the same consecutive-spells sample of Column (1) as well. Importantly,
since there are no lags in the first equation of this GMM system, I can calculate jt and
Ωjt also for the non-consecutive observations (and can use them for the counterfactual
exercise).
Column (3) controls for simultaneity only, which reduces the material elasticity compared
to Column (2) in the Cobb-Douglas specification. In the translog version the mean increases,
but with a much higher standard deviation.
I perform several robustness checks for the crucial scalar unobservable and invertibility
condition in the control function approach. Column (4) includes a variable in the invertibility
condition that is aimed to capture variation in the unobserved τ . I construct a variable
118This translates into a variance of 33.9. The negative sign of the standard deviation is irrelevant as the
square, the variance, is always positive. If I take positive starting values for σp instead of zero, I get an
equal size “positive” standard deviation as solution.
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Table I.6: Estimates from a Cobb-Douglas production function
Type of correction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Simultaneity
& Selectivity
None:
OLS
Simultaneity
only
Sim. & Selec.
w. augmented z
BB system-
GMM
αK
.06*** .04*** .10*** .05** .08
(.02) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.09)
αL
.22*** .14*** .19*** .20*** .06
(.05) (.02) (.05) (.05) (.10)
αM
.64*** .80*** .68*** .65*** .73***
(.05) (.03) (.06) (.05) (.07)
RTS .92*** .99*** .97*** .90*** .86***(.03) (.01) (.02) (.03) (.06)
N 443 1001 512 443 512
Notes: The columns show the output elasticities and returns to scale for different type of corrections for
simultaneity and selectivity. Column (4) includes an additional variable in the material demand equation
(ηˆjt + 1)
P rjtQ
r
jt
PMjt Mjt
=
τMjt
αMjt
P rjtQ
r
jt
PjtQjt
. Column (5) is based on a Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator. Clustered
standard errors at the plant level are in parentheses.
(ηˆjt + 1)
P rjtQ
r
jt
PMjt Mjt
which is similar to the definition of τ and include it in zjt.119 Empirically,
the estimates are very close to the main specification in Column (1) suggesting no violation
of the invertibility condition (I.15). In Column (5), I use the Blundell-Bond system GMM
estimator as a further check for the invertibility. Compared to OLS it also reduces the bias
in the OLS material elasticity in the same direction as my main specification, particularly
for Cobb-Douglas, but yields less precise estimates. We can also inspect the monotonicity
required for the invertibility condition, similar to Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Figure I.18
plots material use against productivity, where I partialled out a polynomial of the other
input variables, and fitted a local kernel with a tight bandwidth. For most of the density,
the smoothed mean is indeed monotonically increasing in productivity (as expected), with
a couple of outliers.
Finally, the autoregressive parameter estimate in the productivity process is 0.87***
for Cobb-Douglas and 0.81** for translog, very similar to the annual persistence parameter
of 0.8 in Foster et al. (2008). The coefficient for the predicted probability of being in the
sample is positive and significant for predicting productivity as expected and in line with
the corrected selection bias in the capital elasticity.
119It is the same apart from using realised rather than expected revenue, and omitting the output
elasticity, which is constant across plants in the Cobb Douglas case.
90
Figure I.18: Monotonicity of material demand in productivity
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Notes: Plotted are the residuals from a regression of log materials mit on a third order polynomial in
labour and capital, against the residuals of a regression of log productivity ωˆjt on the same polynomial.
Table I.7: Estimates from a translog production function
Type of correction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Simultaneity
& Selectivity
None:
OLS
Simultaneity
only
Sim. & Selec.
w. augmented
z
BB system-
GMM
Sim. & Selec.
w. investment
αK
.07 .05 .08 .07 .09 .05
(.14) (.05) (.10) (.11) (.07) (.14)
αL
.28 .13 .08 .28 .04 .14
(.15) (.05) (.21) (.14) (.15) (.34)
αM
.60 .81 .82 .59 .79 .76
(.22) (.13) (.34) (.19) (.17) (.39)
RTS .95 .98 .97 .94 .92 .96(.08) (.06) (.15) (.06) (.05) (.16)
N 443 1001 512 443 511 410
Notes: The columns show the output elasticities and returns to scale for different types of corrections
for simultaneity and selectivity. Column (4) includes an additional variable in the material demand
equation (ηˆjt + 1)
P rjtQ
r
jt
PMjt Mjt
=
τMjt
αMjt
P rjtQ
r
jt
PjtQjt
. Column (5) is based on a Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator.
Column (6) is based on an investment function instead of a material demand function for the invertibility
condition, following the original Olley and Pakes (1996). Standard deviations across the entire sample are
in parentheses.
I.G.4 Translog estimates
The estimates from a translog production function are presented in Table I.7. The translog
elasticities vary by plant and year, but the mean elasticities are very similar to the estimates
from the Cobb-Douglas production function, with returns to scale close to one. For the
translog elasticity, the standard deviation across all plant-years are reported in parentheses.
In Column (6) I additionally use an investment function instead of a material demand
function for the invertibility condition, following the original Olley and Pakes (1996). These
estimates are also less precise because of the lumpiness and zeros in investment data.
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I.G.5 Analysis of estimated plant total factor productivities
How has productivity evolved and how dispersed is it? I recover physical total factor
productivity Ωjt (also denoted TFPQ). Total revenue factor productivity TFPR is simply
defined as Pjt · TFPQjt.120
I find that TFPQ has not significantly changed over time within firms. A linear
within-plants fixed effects regression of logged TFPQ on years yields small and insignificant
results. The same goes for a pooled (across plants) regression suggesting that average
TFPQ stagnated. This also suggests that entry of productive and exit of unproductive firm
did not play a major role either. However, when I weight the pooled regression by output
quantity, TFPQ has increased by 1% per year, significant with SE clustered at the plant.
This comes from changes in the weights, and likely due to more productive firms growing
faster compared to less productive firms, or from larger firms becoming more productive
than smaller firms. When we interpret the weighted TFPQ as a form of aggregate TFPQ,
the results suggest that despite stagnating average TFPQ, aggregate TFPQ seems to have
slightly increased over the sample period.
TFPR increased over the years (using deflated prices), highly significant with SE
clustered at the plant. On average, each year the TFPR increases by 2%, both in the
pooled and the within estimation. This rise in inflation adjusted prices, together with the
result on decreasing markups (Section I.4.1) suggests increasing marginal costs. Indeed,
marginal costs have been rising by a little over 2% per year for the pooled and within
specification. This is mainly due to an increase in input prices. Material input prices have
been rising at around 3% per year, consistent with the global prices increases in raw metals
commodity prices (see e.g. IMF). Increased marginal costs could also have been driven by
changes in τ .
The estimated dispersion in TFPQ is smaller than in some other studies in the
literature.121 The ratio in TFPQ of the 90th percentile plant to the 10th percentile plant
is 1.83 in this sample, much smaller than the ratio reported for India in Hsieh and Klenow
(2009), which is over 20. This is likely due to three aspects. First, Hsieh and Klenow
(2009) don’t observe prices and quantities and cannot estimate TFPQ directly. Second,
they use a value added instead of gross output production function. Third, I look at a
much narrower industry. My ratio is more in line with the ready-mix concrete producers in
120The reported numbers are based on my baseline CD specification of Column (1) that I also use for the
counterfactual analysis.
121The dispersion of productivity (both TFPQ and TFPR) across plants is of interest in itself as it has
become an important feature and subject of analysis in various disciplines, as reviewed in Syverson (2011).
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the US of around 1.91 reported in Syverson (2004a). Finally, the higher dispersion in these
studies could also arise, from lumping Ωjt and jt together, which I disentangle. Indeed
the 90th to 10th percentile ratio of the comparable (Ωjt exp(jt)) in my data is 2.5.
The dispersion in TFPQ is smaller than the dispersion in TFPR. The 90th to 10th
TFPR ratio is 3.3, larger than the average ratios of 1.92 in the US within 4-digit sectors
as reported in Syverson (2004b), but smaller than the ratio of 5 reported for India in
Hsieh and Klenow (2009). Interestingly, I estimate a lower dispersion for TFPQ then for
TFPR, which is the opposite for Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and for Foster et al. (2008). I
also find a robust and significant negative correlation between TFPQ and prices in the
data, rationalised by a standard downward-sloping demand curve. However, because the
dispersion in prices is much larger than the dispersion in TFPQ, combining both leads to
a dispersion in TFPR that is smaller than that of prices but larger than that of TFPQ.
I.G.6 Realised and expected prices
Figure I.19 plots the realised (after shock ) prices against the expected prices.
Figure I.19: Expected and realised prices
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Notes: Plotted is the the realised observed prices log(P rjt) against the equilibrium prices log(Pjt).
I.G.7 Additional descriptive figures on distortions
Figures I.20 and I.21 plot the distortions by year. Figure I.22 plots the annual standard
deviations. We can also compare the distribution of ln(τMjt ) and ln(τLjt) in their baseline
versions with variable markups with a version for each with constant markups as shown in
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Figure I.23 and I.24. Figure I.25 plots ln(τMjt ) against ln(τLjt).
Figure I.20: Dispersion in τMjt by year
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Notes: Plotted is the kernel density of ln(τMjt ) divided by the weighted geometric mean of τMjt , where the
weights are plant material expenditure. Used kernel is epanechnikov with bandwidth 0.2.
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Figure I.21: Dispersion in τLjt by year
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Notes: Plotted is the kernel density of ln(τLjt) divided by the weighted geometric mean of τLjt, where the
weights are plant labour expenditure. Used kernel is epanechnikov with bandwidth 0.2.
Figure I.22: Standard deviation fo τMjt and τ
L
jt by year
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Notes: Plotted are the standard deviations of the demeaned and weighted ln(τMjt ) and ln(τLjt).
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Figure I.23: Markup correction for τMjt
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Figure I.24: Markup correction for τLjt
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Notes: Plotted are the pooled demeaned ln(τMjt ) and ln(τLjt). The vertical axis corresponds to the input
distortions corrected for markups and the horizontal axis corresponds to a “naive” version where an average
markup is used to calculate input distortions instead.
Figure I.25: Correlation between τMjt and τ
L
jt
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Notes: Plotted are ln(τMjt ) and ln(τLjt) divided by the respective weighted means, where the weights are
plant materials and labour expenditure. Pooled across all years.
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Table I.9: Welfare gains in billion rupees
Compensating Variation Profits Total welfare
τ˜Mjt τ˜
L
jt both τ˜
M
jt τ˜
L
jt both τ˜
M
jt τ˜
L
jt both
2000 0.15 0.14 0.27 0.1 0.08 0.18 0.25 0.21 0.45[0.11,0.21] [0.07,0.2] [0.23,0.34] [0.07,0.13] [0.03,0.1] [0.11,0.2] [0.19,0.33] [0.1,0.3] [0.37,0.53]
2001 1.57 0.39 2.12 1 0.21 1.32 2.57 0.6 3.43[1.13,2.25] [0.2,0.62] [1.66,2.76] [0.72,1.19] [0.09,0.3] [0.98,1.43] [1.94,3.37] [0.29,0.91] [2.78,4.15]
2002 3.27 0.56 4.08 2.04 0.32 2.48 5.31 0.88 6.56[2.36,4.2] [0.28,0.92] [3.22,4.81] [1.45,2.41] [0.15,0.48] [1.79,2.77] [3.92,6.51] [0.43,1.4] [5.33,7.45]
2003 2.49 0.89 3.29 1.1 0.39 1.41 3.59 1.28 4.7[1.76,3.57] [0.45,1.41] [2.57,4.26] [0.72,1.38] [0.18,0.54] [1.02,1.64] [2.5,4.9] [0.64,1.92] [3.83,5.77]
2004 2.49 1.66 3.68 0.86 0.49 1.22 3.35 2.15 4.9[1.93,3.02] [0.89,2.34] [3.22,4.02] [0.48,1.12] [0.22,0.66] [0.68,1.38] [2.53,4.1] [1.1,2.97] [4.06,5.34]
2005 2.07 1.4 4.07 1.17 0.8 2.5 3.23 2.2 6.57[1.53,2.87] [0.66,2.4] [3.08,5.34] [0.81,1.42] [0.35,1.29] [1.71,3.29] [2.42,4.24] [0.99,3.73] [5,8.59]
2006 2.1 0.97 3.25 1.13 0.45 1.72 3.23 1.42 4.97[1.52,3.03] [0.48,1.51] [2.55,4.28] [0.78,1.4] [0.2,0.63] [1.22,2.09] [2.43,4.32] [0.69,2.13] [3.97,6.4]
2007 1.3 1.47 2.6 0.79 0.82 1.6 2.1 2.28 4.2[1.04,1.77] [0.81,2.18] [2.13,3.34] [0.59,0.93] [0.35,1.12] [1.04,1.83] [1.68,2.64] [1.14,3.24] [3.4,5.02]
2008 0.07 0.6 0.59 0.14 0.37 0.44 0.21 0.97 1.03[-0.1,0.33] [0.28,0.98] [0.3,0.95] [0.04,0.24] [0.16,0.55] [0.26,0.56] [-0.06,0.57] [0.44,1.51] [0.6,1.49]
2009 2.43 0.81 3.06 1.4 0.41 1.7 3.83 1.22 4.76[1.66,3.81] [0.38,1.31] [2.33,4.27] [0.98,1.81] [0.18,0.61] [1.27,2] [2.68,5.62] [0.56,1.89] [3.76,6.22]
2010 0.51 0.87 1.11 0.19 0.34 0.44 0.7 1.22 1.55[0.39,0.68] [0.44,1.35] [0.79,1.44] [0.13,0.23] [0.15,0.5] [0.26,0.54] [0.54,0.91] [0.59,1.84] [1.07,1.98]
2011 1.8 1.18 3.52 1.55 0.76 2.98 3.35 1.95 6.5[1.18,2.95] [0.61,2.01] [2.84,5.45] [0.96,2.23] [0.35,1.07] [2.14,4.86] [2.18,5.08] [0.96,2.98] [5.06,10.16]
2012 1.54 1.22 2.44 0.63 0.66 1.22 2.17 1.88 3.66[1,2.3] [0.6,1.99] [2,3.18] [0.38,1.01] [0.28,1.03] [0.86,1.54] [1.41,3.29] [0.88,2.96] [2.99,4.74]
Total 21.81 12.16 34.08 12.09 6.09 19.21 33.9 18.26 53.28[16.08,30.12] [6.13,18.87] [27.86,42.38] [8.4,14.74] [2.66,8.61] [13.8,22.31] [24.87,43.82] [8.74,27.27] [44.27,64.09]
Per year 1.68 0.94 2.62 0.93 0.47 1.48 2.61 1.4 4.1[1.24,2.32] [0.47,1.45] [2.14,3.26] [0.65,1.13] [0.2,0.66] [1.06,1.72] [1.91,3.37] [0.67,2.1] [3.41,4.93]
Notes: The table shows the respective welfare gains from eliminating material distortions (τ˜Mjt ), labour distortions (τ˜Ljt) or both in billion rupees. The last three
columns sum the consumer side compensating variation and the profits for total welfare gains. The last two rows report the total across all years and the implied
average per year. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals in brackets (see Section I.2.4).
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I.G.8 Tables with annual welfare gains
Table I.8: Compensating variation as share of consumer expenditure and profit growth
Compensating Variation Profit growth
τ˜Mjt τ˜
L
jt both τ˜Mjt τ˜Ljt both
2000 0.13 0.11 0.23 1.22 1.16 1.38[0.09,0.17] [0.06,0.17] [0.19,0.29] [1.14,1.29] [1.06,1.24] [1.24,1.46]
2001 0.24 0.06 0.32 1.51 1.11 1.66[0.17,0.34] [0.03,0.09] [0.25,0.42] [1.35,1.63] [1.05,1.17] [1.48,1.82]
2002 0.31 0.05 0.39 1.71 1.11 1.86[0.22,0.4] [0.03,0.09] [0.31,0.46] [1.47,1.87] [1.05,1.18] [1.6,2.03]
2003 0.16 0.06 0.21 1.29 1.1 1.37[0.11,0.23] [0.03,0.09] [0.16,0.27] [1.18,1.39] [1.04,1.16] [1.25,1.47]
2004 0.15 0.1 0.22 1.2 1.11 1.28[0.11,0.18] [0.05,0.14] [0.19,0.24] [1.1,1.3] [1.05,1.17] [1.15,1.38]
2005 0.13 0.09 0.26 1.28 1.19 1.61[0.1,0.19] [0.04,0.16] [0.2,0.35] [1.19,1.37] [1.08,1.36] [1.38,1.94]
2006 0.1 0.05 0.16 1.21 1.08 1.32[0.08,0.15] [0.02,0.08] [0.13,0.21] [1.14,1.28] [1.04,1.13] [1.21,1.46]
2007 0.09 0.1 0.18 1.18 1.19 1.36[0.07,0.12] [0.06,0.15] [0.15,0.23] [1.13,1.23] [1.08,1.28] [1.24,1.47]
2008 0.01 0.06 0.06 1.05 1.14 1.17[-0.01,0.04] [0.03,0.11] [0.03,0.1] [1.02,1.1] [1.06,1.23] [1.1,1.24]
2009 0.15 0.05 0.19 1.33 1.1 1.4[0.1,0.24] [0.02,0.08] [0.15,0.27] [1.22,1.5] [1.04,1.16] [1.29,1.56]
2010 0.05 0.08 0.1 1.07 1.13 1.16[0.04,0.06] [0.04,0.13] [0.08,0.14] [1.04,1.1] [1.06,1.21] [1.09,1.22]
2011 0.1 0.06 0.19 1.34 1.17 1.65[0.06,0.16] [0.03,0.11] [0.15,0.29] [1.2,1.52] [1.08,1.24] [1.44,2.2]
2012 0.1 0.08 0.15 1.15 1.15 1.29[0.06,0.14] [0.04,0.12] [0.12,0.2] [1.09,1.26] [1.06,1.26] [1.19,1.43]
Total 0.13 0.07 0.21 1.26 1.13 1.42[0.1,0.18] [0.04,0.11] [0.17,0.26] [1.17,1.35] [1.06,1.21] [1.29,1.56]
Notes: The table shows the respective welfare gains from eliminating material distortions (τ˜Mjt ), labour
distortions (τ˜Ljt) or both. The first three columns express the compensating variation per unit purchased
as a share of the unit price (i.e. as share of expenditure on the products in the sample). The profit ratio is
total profits in the counterfactual divided by total profits in the factual equilibrium. Bootstrapped 95%
confidence intervals in brackets (see Section I.2.4).
I.G.9 Tables with annual input productivity gains
Table I.10 and I.11 report the ratio in the physical and revenue productivities respectively, i.e.
the ratio between the input productivity in the counterfactual and the factual equilibria.122
122The first three columns in both tables show that output increases more than revenues (except in one
case in 2008), as the average price decreases which contributes to the consumer welfare gains. Therefore
the ratios of the counterfactual and factual productivities is lower in the revenue productivity outcomes.
Since we have decreasing prices across the counterfactuals, we would need to correct for this and inflate
the revenue productivity accordingly. But since I can measure output in weight, the physical productivity
is a directly suited metric for deflated value per unit.
98
Table I.10: Physical output and productivity ratios
Output ratio Material productivity Labour productivity
τ˜Mjt τ˜
L
jt both τ˜Mjt τ˜Ljt both τ˜Mjt τ˜Ljt both
2000 1.27 1.26 1.52 0.89 1.19 1.03 0.9 0.55 0.55[1.16,1.35] [1.11,1.37] [1.32,1.63] [0.87,0.93] [1.09,1.31] [0.97,1.13] [0.87,0.96] [0.52,0.58] [0.53,0.59]
2001 1.61 1.15 1.87 0.75 1.1 0.81 1.1 0.8 0.87[1.37,1.83] [1.06,1.24] [1.56,2.1] [0.72,0.79] [1.04,1.17] [0.78,0.88] [1.02,1.24] [0.79,0.83] [0.83,0.95]
2002 1.98 1.16 2.27 0.65 1.09 0.74 1.55 0.85 1.18[1.59,2.2] [1.07,1.26] [1.82,2.42] [0.59,0.75] [1.04,1.18] [0.65,0.86] [1.32,1.86] [0.81,0.89] [1.05,1.35]
2003 1.38 1.15 1.52 0.89 1.1 0.98 1.04 0.88 0.98[1.21,1.53] [1.06,1.23] [1.34,1.65] [0.85,0.95] [1.05,1.18] [0.93,1.07] [0.99,1.15] [0.85,0.93] [0.93,1.09]
2004 1.36 1.21 1.53 0.65 1.12 0.77 1.42 0.81 1.08[1.22,1.44] [1.1,1.3] [1.32,1.58] [0.59,0.76] [1.05,1.25] [0.68,0.92] [1.24,1.72] [0.76,0.86] [0.97,1.23]
2005 1.36 1.24 1.79 0.82 1.12 0.95 1.31 0.81 0.95[1.23,1.49] [1.1,1.42] [1.49,2.05] [0.8,0.85] [1.04,1.26] [0.88,1.1] [1.18,1.53] [0.8,0.84] [0.9,1.08]
2006 1.26 1.12 1.42 0.87 1.05 0.92 1.12 0.88 0.95[1.16,1.36] [1.05,1.19] [1.27,1.56] [0.86,0.9] [1.02,1.1] [0.9,0.98] [1.05,1.23] [0.86,0.91] [0.9,1.02]
2007 1.26 1.28 1.56 0.92 1.15 1.05 1.1 0.62 0.69[1.18,1.33] [1.12,1.42] [1.35,1.71] [0.89,0.95] [1.07,1.25] [0.99,1.14] [1.06,1.17] [0.59,0.65] [0.66,0.74]
2008 1.04 1.21 1.21 0.93 1.1 1.01 0.98 0.92 0.93[0.98,1.11] [1.08,1.34] [1.1,1.32] [0.93,0.95] [1.04,1.2] [0.97,1.09] [0.96,1] [0.87,0.98] [0.9,0.98]
2009 1.38 1.14 1.51 0.74 1.06 0.8 1.05 0.95 0.99[1.22,1.6] [1.06,1.22] [1.33,1.72] [0.73,0.78] [1.02,1.12] [0.77,0.87] [1.02,1.17] [0.91,1.01] [0.95,1.1]
2010 1.12 1.21 1.28 0.95 1.06 1.02 1.01 0.83 0.86[1.08,1.16] [1.1,1.33] [1.17,1.37] [0.94,0.97] [1.02,1.13] [0.98,1.08] [1,1.04] [0.8,0.89] [0.84,0.9]
2011 1.35 1.22 1.72 0.71 1.09 0.78 1.35 0.86 1.17[1.2,1.53] [1.1,1.34] [1.49,2.12] [0.66,0.78] [1.03,1.17] [0.71,0.89] [1.21,1.64] [0.83,0.91] [1.04,1.38]
2012 1.3 1.25 1.53 0.71 1.11 0.79 1.08 0.79 0.92[1.17,1.49] [1.1,1.41] [1.36,1.73] [0.68,0.82] [1.04,1.21] [0.74,0.9] [1.01,1.22] [0.77,0.83] [0.85,1.07]
Total 1.35 1.2 1.58 0.77 1.1 0.86 1.16 0.82 0.95[1.22,1.47] [1.08,1.3] [1.4,1.73] [0.75,0.82] [1.04,1.19] [0.82,0.95] [1.09,1.27] [0.79,0.86] [0.89,1.03]
Notes: The table shows the respective gains from eliminating material distortions (τ˜Mjt ), labour distortions (τ˜Ljt) or both. Outcome variables are the ratio of the
counterfactual to the factual. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals in brackets (see Section I.2.4).
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Table I.11: Revenue and revenue productivity ratios
Revenue ratio Material productivity Labour productivity
τ˜Mjt τ˜
L
jt both τ˜Mjt τ˜Ljt both τ˜Mjt τ˜Ljt both
2000 1.28 1.13 1.39 0.9 1.06 0.95 0.91 0.49 0.51[1.19,1.33] [1.04,1.16] [1.23,1.45] [0.89,0.92] [1.03,1.12] [0.93,0.99] [0.89,0.94] [0.47,0.51] [0.49,0.55]
2001 1.69 1.11 1.81 0.78 1.05 0.78 1.15 0.77 0.84[1.49,1.83] [1.05,1.16] [1.56,1.92] [0.78,0.8] [1.03,1.1] [0.78,0.81] [1.1,1.23] [0.76,0.78] [0.83,0.87]
2002 1.7 1.11 1.73 0.56 1.05 0.56 1.32 0.82 0.9[1.46,1.75] [1.05,1.16] [1.46,1.76] [0.54,0.59] [1.02,1.1] [0.54,0.63] [1.24,1.47] [0.79,0.84] [0.87,0.99]
2003 1.34 1.1 1.4 0.86 1.06 0.9 1.01 0.85 0.9[1.21,1.4] [1.04,1.14] [1.26,1.45] [0.81,0.88] [1.03,1.1] [0.87,0.94] [0.98,1.07] [0.83,0.87] [0.88,0.95]
2004 1.02 1.06 1.03 0.49 0.99 0.51 1.07 0.71 0.73[0.93,1.04] [1.01,1.08] [0.91,1.06] [0.42,0.6] [0.96,1.04] [0.44,0.64] [1.02,1.17] [0.7,0.72] [0.7,0.78]
2005 1.32 1.2 1.55 0.79 1.08 0.83 1.27 0.78 0.83[1.21,1.4] [1.09,1.32] [1.34,1.63] [0.77,0.81] [1.04,1.18] [0.8,0.88] [1.15,1.43] [0.77,0.8] [0.81,0.87]
2006 1.24 1.07 1.31 0.86 1 0.85 1.11 0.84 0.88[1.16,1.3] [1.03,1.1] [1.2,1.36] [0.84,0.88] [1,1.02] [0.84,0.88] [1.06,1.18] [0.83,0.85] [0.86,0.91]
2007 1.15 1.15 1.28 0.84 1.03 0.86 1 0.55 0.56[1.08,1.17] [1.06,1.21] [1.13,1.32] [0.8,0.86] [1.01,1.06] [0.82,0.89] [0.99,1.03] [0.54,0.57] [0.55,0.59]
2008 1.07 1.12 1.17 0.96 1.02 0.98 1.01 0.85 0.9[1.03,1.11] [1.05,1.18] [1.1,1.23] [0.94,0.99] [1.01,1.05] [0.94,1.03] [0.99,1.03] [0.84,0.87] [0.89,0.93]
2009 1.41 1.07 1.44 0.76 0.99 0.77 1.08 0.89 0.95[1.26,1.55] [1.03,1.09] [1.29,1.57] [0.73,0.8] [0.98,1.01] [0.73,0.81] [1.05,1.13] [0.87,0.91] [0.91,1.03]
2010 1.05 1.09 1.12 0.9 0.95 0.89 0.95 0.75 0.75[1.02,1.06] [1.03,1.12] [1.04,1.14] [0.87,0.92] [0.93,0.98] [0.86,0.92] [0.93,0.97] [0.73,0.77] [0.73,0.78]
2011 1.34 1.15 1.52 0.7 1.03 0.69 1.34 0.81 1.03[1.23,1.44] [1.07,1.23] [1.36,1.66] [0.63,0.75] [1.01,1.07] [0.61,0.78] [1.22,1.54] [0.79,0.84] [0.94,1.13]
2012 1.13 1.14 1.24 0.62 1.02 0.64 0.94 0.73 0.75[1.07,1.17] [1.06,1.21] [1.13,1.3] [0.58,0.69] [1.01,1.05] [0.58,0.74] [0.88,1.04] [0.69,0.76] [0.71,0.8]
Total 1.27 1.11 1.36 0.72 1.02 0.74 1.09 0.77 0.81[1.17,1.32] [1.05,1.16] [1.22,1.42] [0.7,0.76] [1.01,1.06] [0.71,0.79] [1.05,1.14] [0.76,0.77] [0.8,0.85]
Notes: The table shows the respective gains from eliminating material distortions (τ˜Mjt ), labour distortions (τ˜Ljt) or both. Outcome variables are the ratio of the
counterfactual to the factual. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals in brackets (see Section I.2.4).
100
I.G.10 Measurement of labour input
Instead of using man-days as labour input Ljt we could also use the wage bill as labour
input , so Laltjt =Ljt ∗ wjt. If higher skill correlates with higher salaries, this alternative
measurement of labour input accounts for difference in quality of labour across plants.
Rerunning the entire analysis with Laltjt yields the results reported in Table I.12, I.13 and
I.14. I omit confidence intervals for simplicity, but almost all point estimates are within
the range of the confidence intervals of the baseline version.
Table I.12: Welfare gains in billion rupees using Laltjt
Comp. Variation Profits Total welfare
τ˜Mjt τ˜
L
jt both τ˜Mjt τ˜Ljt both τ˜Mjt τ˜Ljt both
2000 0.15 0.08 0.22 0.12 0.04 0.16 0.28 0.12 0.38
2001 1.79 0.20 2.09 1.32 0.12 1.51 3.11 0.31 3.60
2002 3.53 0.25 3.94 2.49 0.17 2.74 6.01 0.42 6.68
2003 2.65 0.47 3.04 1.36 0.23 1.52 4.01 0.70 4.56
2004 2.95 0.93 3.63 0.91 0.28 1.08 3.86 1.21 4.71
2005 2.39 0.62 3.29 1.56 0.39 2.16 3.96 1.01 5.45
2006 2.55 0.47 3.09 1.56 0.24 1.87 4.11 0.71 4.96
2007 1.57 0.66 2.06 1.01 0.38 1.34 2.58 1.04 3.39
2008 0.25 0.25 0.70 0.28 0.18 0.70 0.53 0.43 1.40
2009 2.83 0.42 3.18 2.00 0.23 2.19 4.83 0.65 5.37
2010 0.61 0.41 0.87 0.25 0.17 0.37 0.86 0.58 1.24
2011 2.44 0.63 3.48 2.20 0.42 3.21 4.64 1.05 6.69
2012 1.99 0.58 2.38 0.93 0.33 1.24 2.93 0.91 3.62
Total 25.70 5.96 31.97 16.00 3.18 20.09 41.70 9.14 52.07
Per year 1.98 0.46 2.46 1.23 0.24 1.55 3.21 0.70 4.01
Notes: The table shows the respective welfare gains from eliminating material distortions (τ˜Mjt ), labour
distortions (τ˜Ljt) or both in billion rupees. The last three columns sum the consumer side compensating
variation and the profits for total welfare gains. The last two rows report the total across all years and the
implied average per year.
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Table I.13: Compensating variation as share of consumer expenditure and profit growth using
Laltjt
Comp. Variation Profit growth
τ˜Mjt τ˜
L
jt both τ˜Mjt τ˜Ljt both
2000 0.13 0.06 0.19 1.25 1.09 1.34
2001 0.27 0.03 0.32 1.60 1.05 1.69
2002 0.34 0.02 0.38 1.77 1.05 1.85
2003 0.17 0.03 0.19 1.31 1.05 1.34
2004 0.17 0.05 0.21 1.18 1.05 1.21
2005 0.16 0.04 0.22 1.34 1.08 1.47
2006 0.13 0.02 0.15 1.25 1.04 1.31
2007 0.11 0.05 0.14 1.21 1.08 1.27
2008 0.03 0.03 0.08 1.10 1.06 1.25
2009 0.18 0.03 0.21 1.44 1.05 1.48
2010 0.06 0.04 0.08 1.08 1.06 1.12
2011 0.13 0.03 0.19 1.43 1.08 1.62
2012 0.13 0.04 0.15 1.20 1.07 1.26
Total 0.16 0.04 0.19 1.31 1.06 1.39
Notes: The table shows the respective welfare gains from eliminating material distortions (τ˜Mjt ), labour
distortions (τ˜Ljt) or both. The first three columns express the compensating variation per unit purchased
as a share of the unit price (i.e. as share of expenditure on the products in the sample). The profit ratio is
total profits in the counterfactual divided by total profits in the factual equilibrium.
Table I.14: Physical output and productivity ratios using Laltjt
Output ratio Material productivity Labour productivity
τ˜Mjt τ˜
L
jt both τ˜Mjt τ˜Ljt both τ˜Mjt τ˜Ljt both
2000 1.29 1.15 1.43 0.90 1.09 0.96 0.79 0.78 0.74
2001 1.74 1.08 1.88 0.78 1.04 0.81 1.05 0.85 0.83
2002 2.12 1.07 2.27 0.67 1.03 0.71 1.45 0.86 1.13
2003 1.40 1.07 1.46 0.89 1.04 0.93 0.93 0.84 0.86
2004 1.40 1.11 1.49 0.61 1.04 0.66 1.63 0.88 1.32
2005 1.45 1.10 1.64 0.84 1.03 0.89 1.20 0.80 0.88
2006 1.31 1.05 1.39 0.90 1.01 0.92 1.04 0.89 0.91
2007 1.31 1.11 1.42 0.93 1.04 0.96 1.08 0.83 0.93
2008 1.11 1.09 1.31 0.94 1.03 0.94 0.96 0.88 0.90
2009 1.51 1.07 1.59 0.76 1.02 0.78 0.97 0.89 0.88
2010 1.14 1.10 1.22 0.96 1.01 0.97 1.01 0.92 0.98
2011 1.50 1.12 1.74 0.71 1.04 0.74 1.23 0.82 0.98
2012 1.41 1.11 1.53 0.71 1.04 0.74 1.12 0.86 1.07
Total 1.43 1.09 1.55 0.77 1.03 0.81 1.11 0.86 0.95
Notes: The table shows the respective gains from eliminating material distortions (τ˜Mjt ), labour distortions
(τ˜Ljt) or both. Outcome variables are the ratio of the counterfactual to the factual.
I.G.11 Wedges as tax income
When the τ are interpreted as taxes, removing differences in τ also affects government
revenues. In Table I.15, I add the tax revenue changes to the welfare calculations. The
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difference to the baseline version is statistically significant when using bootstrapped
differences.
I.G.12 A counterfactual of more negatively correlated TFPQ and τ
Figure I.26: Correlation between TFPQ and τ
Notes: Plotted are the plant TFPQ (Ωjt) and the annually demeaned ln(τMjt ) or ln(τLjt). The left panels
correspond to the factual equilibrium. The right panel corresponds to an alternative counterfactual, where
the τ are reduced for all above average productivity plants and increased for all below average productivity
plants until the correlation is -0.5.
Figure I.26 shows the correlations between plant level TFPQ (Ω) and τ . In the factual
equilibrium (the two left panels), there is no significant correlation between Ω and τM and
a slight positive correlation with τL. I construct an alternative counterfactual where the
τ are set such that their weighted geometric average is preserved, but the τ are reduced
for all above average productivity plants and increased for all below average productivity
plants. This does not remove misallocation. The two right panels depict this counterfactual
and the resulting correlation between Ω and τ . There are substantial welfare gains from
moving from the left to the right panels. The size of the welfare gains depends on how
strongly the (artificial) correlation differs in the counterfactual compared to the factual. In
this case (correlation to both around -0.5) the welfare gains are roughly half of the welfare
gains of the baseline results where the τ are removed instead.
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Table I.15: Welfare gains in billion rupees with tax income adjustments
Total welfare Taxes on materials Taxes on labour Total welfare with taxes
τ˜Mjt τ˜
L
jt both τ˜
M
jt τ˜
L
jt both τ˜
M
jt τ˜
L
jt both τ˜
M
jt τ˜
L
jt both
2000 0.25 0.21 0.45 -0.08 0.01 -0.08 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.23 0.24 0.44[0.19,0.33] [0.1,0.3] [0.37,0.53] [-0.09,-0.05] [0.01,0.03] [-0.1,-0.05] [0.03,0.07] [0,0.03] [0.03,0.09] [0.15,0.32] [0.12,0.35] [0.33,0.54]
2001 2.57 0.6 3.43 0.05 0.19 0.13 0.85 0.12 0.97 3.48 0.91 4.53[1.94,3.37] [0.29,0.91] [2.78,4.15] [-0.38,0.5] [0.1,0.29] [-0.35,0.55] [0.45,1.18] [0.03,0.24] [0.47,1.33] [2.29,4.68] [0.42,1.42] [3.27,5.76]
2002 5.31 0.88 6.56 0.27 0.48 0.26 1.26 0.2 1.24 6.85 1.56 8.05[3.92,6.51] [0.43,1.4] [5.33,7.45] [-0.4,0.86] [0.28,0.75] [-0.38,0.83] [0.61,1.65] [0.05,0.4] [0.54,1.58] [4.68,8.14] [0.77,2.51] [6.14,8.99]
2003 3.59 1.28 4.7 -0.14 0.21 -0.06 1.01 0.28 1.15 4.46 1.76 5.8[2.5,4.9] [0.64,1.92] [3.83,5.77] [-0.66,0.34] [0.06,0.35] [-0.63,0.42] [0.43,1.4] [0.07,0.54] [0.53,1.62] [2.73,6.15] [0.84,2.75] [4.3,7.46]
2004 3.35 2.15 4.9 -0.43 0.03 -0.43 -0.11 0.13 -0.18 2.81 2.31 4.29[2.53,4.1] [1.1,2.97] [4.06,5.34] [-0.69,-0.35] [-0.13,0.15] [-0.69,-0.02] [-0.47,0] [-0.04,0.19] [-0.55,0] [1.9,3.35] [1.22,3.09] [3.22,4.75]
2005 3.23 2.2 6.57 -0.37 0.72 -0.22 0.9 0.55 1.42 3.77 3.47 7.77[2.42,4.24] [0.99,3.73] [5,8.59] [-0.76,0.09] [0.33,1.31] [-0.9,0.31] [0.49,1.25] [0.13,1.12] [0.62,1.91] [2.41,5.1] [1.52,6.02] [5.43,10.17]
2006 3.23 1.42 4.97 -0.1 0.1 0.02 0.88 0.22 1.09 4.01 1.73 6.08[2.43,4.32] [0.69,2.13] [3.97,6.4] [-0.56,0.33] [-0.01,0.21] [-0.53,0.45] [0.46,1.25] [0.05,0.42] [0.49,1.53] [2.66,5.56] [0.79,2.69] [4.47,7.97]
2007 2.1 2.28 4.2 -0.44 -0.11 -0.43 0.3 0.3 0.54 1.96 2.47 4.31[1.68,2.64] [1.14,3.24] [3.4,5.02] [-0.81,-0.3] [-0.3,0.01] [-0.82,-0.24] [0.11,0.41] [0.06,0.54] [0.13,0.8] [1.41,2.53] [1.23,3.54] [3.21,5.32]
2008 0.21 0.97 1.03 0.13 0 0.19 0.13 0.18 0.29 0.47 1.16 1.51[-0.06,0.57] [0.44,1.51] [0.6,1.49] [0,0.27] [-0.11,0.08] [-0.01,0.39] [0.06,0.2] [0.04,0.34] [0.11,0.48] [0.17,0.89] [0.51,1.83] [1.01,2.13]
2009 3.83 1.22 4.76 0.21 0.1 0.25 1.22 0.15 1.28 5.26 1.47 6.3[2.68,5.62] [0.56,1.89] [3.76,6.22] [-0.43,0.9] [0,0.17] [-0.41,0.89] [0.63,1.8] [0.03,0.27] [0.63,1.89] [3.18,7.93] [0.67,2.29] [4.34,8.79]
2010 0.7 1.22 1.55 -0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.08 0.14 0.19 0.72 1.35 1.76[0.54,0.91] [0.59,1.84] [1.07,1.98] [-0.11,0.01] [-0.14,0.06] [-0.09,0.19] [0.01,0.1] [0.02,0.24] [0.03,0.27] [0.5,0.93] [0.68,1.99] [1.2,2.27]
2011 3.35 1.95 6.5 0.68 0.91 1.39 1.16 0.51 1.61 5.18 3.37 9.51[2.18,5.08] [0.96,2.98] [5.06,10.16] [-0.24,1.58] [0.46,1.46] [-0.07,2.53] [0.62,1.66] [0.13,1.01] [0.73,2.28] [2.99,7.52] [1.59,5.31] [6.99,12.81]
2012 2.17 1.88 3.66 -0.03 0.14 0.17 0.35 0.4 0.63 2.49 2.42 4.47[1.41,3.29] [0.88,2.96] [2.99,4.74] [-0.22,0.18] [-0.07,0.31] [-0.16,0.35] [0.12,0.49] [0.1,0.77] [0.2,1.03] [1.49,3.77] [1.1,3.87] [3.27,5.81]
Total 33.9 18.26 53.28 -0.3 2.78 1.2 8.09 3.19 10.31 41.68 24.23 64.8[24.87,43.82] [8.74,27.27] [44.27,64.09] [-4.74,3.59] [1.1,4.64] [-4.28,5.8] [3.89,11.07] [0.72,5.84] [4.36,14.29] [26.9,55.02] [11.37,37.39] [48.41,81.18]
Per year 2.61 1.4 4.1 -0.02 0.21 0.09 0.62 0.25 0.79 3.21 1.86 4.98[1.91,3.37] [0.67,2.1] [3.41,4.93] [-0.36,0.28] [0.08,0.36] [-0.33,0.45] [0.3,0.85] [0.06,0.45] [0.34,1.1] [2.07,4.23] [0.87,2.88] [3.72,6.24]
Notes: The table shows the respective welfare gains from eliminating material distortions (τ˜Mjt ), labour distortions (τ˜Ljt) or both in billion rupees. Bootstrapped 95%
confidence intervals in brackets (see Section I.2.4).
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Table I.16: Determinants of plant level changes in input productivities
Dependent variable: ∆ plant mat. prod. (log) ∆ plant lab. prod. (log)
Counterfactual: τ˜Mjt τ˜Ljt both τ˜Mjt τ˜Ljt both
Dep. var. (exp) 10th - [.8, 1.4] [.9, 1.2] [.8, 1.5] [.8, 1.4] [.4, 1.7] [.4, 1.8]90th percentiles:
τMjt (log demeaned)
-1.03*** -0.01** -0.89*** 0.96*** -0.00** 0.36***
(0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)
τLjt (log demeaned)
0.00 1.00*** 0.48*** 0.00 -1.00*** -0.91***
(0.33) (0.00) (0.00) (0.32) (0.00) (0.00)
TFPQ (log) -0.01** -0.00 -0.01** -0.01** -0.00 -0.00**(0.04) (0.33) (0.02) (0.04) (0.33) (0.02)
Markup -0.07*** -0.01** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.00** -0.02***(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
N 979 979 979 979 979 979
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00
Notes: Coefficients are standardized. p-values in parentheses are based on clustered standard errors at the
plant level. Dependent variables are the log of the ratio of the input productivities in the counterfactual
to the factual (i.e. the difference ∆ in logs). Only observations with an initial demand elasticity < −1 are
included.
I.G.13 Heterogeneity in plant input productivity changes
Table I.16 reports the 10th and 90th percentile of the input productivity ratios (between
counterfactual and factual) in the table header. There is substantial heterogeneity in
the comparative statics across plants. For the third column, for example, where both
distortions are removed, the 10th percentile is a decrease in material productivity of 20%
while the 90th percentile is an increase of 50%.
I run regressions where the dependent variable is the change in the log input produc-
tivities between the counterfactual and the factual equilibrium at the level of plants. I
regress this on the two τ , plant productivity TFPQ (Ω) and initial markups. The table
reports standardized coefficients. The R2 is extremely high, and the variation in input
productivity growth across plants can be well explained by the initial input distortions.
Removing distortions in one input has large effects on the changes in plant level input
productivity of the same input. This is intuitive. Plants with a high τM face costs using
materials, and when these costs are reduced in the counterfactual, the plant has incentives
to use the previously constrained materials relatively more intensively, thereby decreasing
the ratio of output to materials. This also provides intuition of why aggregate input
productivities do not increase when distortions in both markets are removed. The plants
that grow (i.e. previously constrained through high τ) also use the input relatively more
intensively and addressing both distortions compensates each distortion’s effects on the
input productivities.
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Table I.17: Change in markup variation
Factual Counterfactual
τ˜Mjt
Counterfactual
τ˜Ljt
Counterfactual
τ˜Mjt and τ˜Ljt
Median 1.26 1.25 1.27 1.26
95th/5th 1.30 1.20 1.32 1.23
90th/10th 1.21 1.14 1.22 1.16
75th/25th 1.09 1.07 1.10 1.07
Notes: The table shows the median and ratios of percentiles of the markups in different equilibria, pooled
across years.
I.G.14 Changes in markup dispersion
Table I.17 reports the median and the ratios of markups of the the 95th to th 5th percentile,
the 90th to the 10th percentile and the 75th to the 25th percentile across all years. The
first column reports the ratios for the factual equilibrium and the other columns for the
corresponding counterfactual equilibria. The median markup is similar, but the variation in
markups is lower in the counterfactuals except for the one where only labour misallocation
is removed (τ˜Ljt).
I.G.15 Modifying and discussing Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
The way Hsieh and Klenow (2009) calculate losses from misallocation is by calculating the
output gap Y
Y ∗ :
Y
Y ∗
=
S∏
s=1
(
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αs
s X
βs
s L
1−αs−βs
s
)θs(
TFP ∗sKαss X
βs
s L
1−αs−βs
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TFP θss
TFP ∗θss
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i
(
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TFP ∗s
TFPRs
TFPRsi
)σ−1] θsσ−1
(I.32)
where I follow the notation in their paper, and adding Xsi as material input for firm i
in sector s with corresponding output elasticity βs. The other components are:
Asi
TFP ∗s
=
(PsiYsi)
σ
σ−1/Kαssi (vXsi)
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∑
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∑
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(I.34)
As in their paper, I calibrate the demand elasticity σ to 3, θs = PsYsPY because of the perfect
competition assumption in the final good sector, and I take the output elasticities from
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Table I.18: Output gains from replication and extension of Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
2 factor value added model 3 factor gross output model
CRS RS=0.95 RS=0.92 CRS RS=0.95 RS=0.92
Manufacturing 95 37 12 41 2 -16[93,98] [36,40] [10,15] [39,42] [1,3] [-16,-15]
Basic metals 146 71 37 54 10 -9[127,175] [64,87] [30,53] [51,59] [9,12] [-11,-7]
Basic metals with - - - 32 -3 -19
estimated elasticities [29,34] [-5,-1] [-20,-17]
Notes: Calculated is the average gain from the four periods 2000-2003, in percent. The square brackets contain the minimum
and maximum of the four years. The columns have different returns to scale assumptions, and the elasticities are scaled to
fit them accordingly. The elasticities corresponding to the first two rows are from the NBER-CES database. The last row
uses the estimated elasticities from this chapter, and they are scaled to fit the returns to scale accordingly. The last column
of this row just uses the estimated returns to scale (0.92).
the CES-NBER database for each sector.123
The first point to note is that aggregate sectoral output Ys can be written in two ways
in their paper:
Ys = TFP
∗
sK
αs
s X
βs
s L
1−αs−βs
s (I.35)
Ys =
( Ms∑
i=1
Y
σ−1
σ
si
) σ
σ−1
(I.36)
where the first equation is the aggregate production function, and the second is the utility
function of the representative consumer.124 The output gap in Equation (I.32) can not
only be interpreted as pure production side TFP gap, but equally as gap in utility. The
latter interpretation is in line with the results of this chapter.
Second, I replicate their analysis and adjust two assumptions. First I either use their 2
factor value added production model,125 or add materials as a third factor for gross output
production functions. The second adjustment are the assumed returns to scale, where I
use their constant returns to scale, 0.95, or my estimated 0.92 returns to scale. The results
are reported in Table I.18. I replicate the analysis for the entire manufacturing sector (first
row), or for the basic metals sector only (second and third row). In addition, I use the
123Trimming of outliers is analogously done to their paper by pooling sectors in a year and trimming top
and bottom 1% of both ratios, Asi
TFP∗s
and TFPRsi
TFPRs
, and then recalculating all sector level variables.
124The demand function is derived through a cost minimisation of a representative purchaser in industry
s, who minimises the expenditure of all varieties in industry s (
∑
i PsiYsi) subject to Ys ≥ Y¯s. That is
subject to some minimum level of CES output or “utility” where Ys =
(∑Ms
i=1 Y
σ−1
σ
si
) σ
σ−1
, which describe
the preferences over varieties with an elasticity of substitution σ.
125That is dropping Xsi from the analysis and using value added instead of revenues for PsiYsi.
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estimated input elasticities instead of the CES-NBER elasticities in the third row.126
In their paper they report output gains between 100 and 128 percent for the years 1987
and 1994 respectively. I use the years 2000 to 2003 and calculate gains of 95 percent, close
to their estimates from earlier years. When I reduce the assumed returns to scale to 0.95
or 0.92, the hypothetical gains fall dramatically to only a tenth of the gains under CRS.127
Moving to a gross output model shrinks the gains as well.128 With 0.92 returns to scale,
some of the gains are actually negative – India would be better off with misallocation than
without. Part of the problem why these strange results arise in their model lies with the
definition of the counterfactual τ˜ . In this chapter, I use a geometric average instead of
unity, which addresses measurement error in the distortions that is constant across plants,
for example in the output elasticities (that are scaled by the returns to scale), as discussed
in Section I.2.4.
126When I use my sample of cast iron plants only and apply my estimated elasticities to their model,
I obtain a positive correlation between the implied logged TFPQ from their model, and my estimated
logged TFPQ. The R2 is 0.27, so there is a substantial difference between the productivities.
127For a theoretical analysis of the sensitivity of these types of models to the returns to scale assumption
see Hopenhayn (2014b).
128Gandhi et al. (2017) explore the theoretical and empirical relationships between value added and gross
output production functions. See also Dias et al. (2016) which find larger gains in a Hsieh and Klenow
(2009) 2 factor value added type model (their Table A1) than in a gross output 3 factor model (their Table
4).
108
Chapter II
Input misallocation and geographical supplier
access
II.1 Introduction
A growing literature documents losses from misallocation of production inputs. While
the vast majority of studies focuses on capital misallocation or labour misallocation, for
example from financial frictions or hiring and firing laws, we know much less about the
degree and the determinants of misallocation of input materials. Chapter I shows that
the welfare losses from misallocation of material inputs are substantial for the cast iron
industry in India, and are even higher than the losses from misallocation of labour.
This chapter asks: What is causing these costly input material distortions and mis-
allocation losses? I present evidence that access to suppliers is a significant driver of
these input distortions in the Indian cast iron industry. This is the first study to show
that precisely estimated input distortions that lead to misallocation capture differences in
supplier access.
The steel industry relies on extensive shipping of heavy and bulky material inputs.
Geography and transport infrastructure, particularly railroads, are thus important features
in the production process. Any issues with sourcing are likely to play a role in the
documented misallocation from material input distortions. I begin this chapter by analysing
the issues in Indian freight transport. Sourcing inputs through the transportation network
in India is characterised by frequent delays and uncertainty. Infrastructure is outdated,
leading to breakdowns, freight trains share congested tracks with passenger trains, and
there are state border checkpoints for tax purposes that delay shipments, to name a few.
With longer sourcing routes, these issues are likely to become more severe.
Shipping fees also increase with longer sourcing routes. The advantage of this analysis
is that I observe plant specific input prices that are measured at the factory gate. They
explicitly contain input shipping fees and the model accounts for differences in these
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observed input prices. Any differences in estimated input distortions are therefore net of
input shipping fees and the measure of supplier access is not simply picking up those. In
the trade literature, shipping fees are often called direct trade costs. There is a large body
of evidence that suggest that direct trade costs cannot account for the implied total costs
of trade (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004). There are indirect costs of trade, such as
search costs, contracting costs or costs associated with delay and uncertainty. The freight
transport issues in India, such as uncertainty, are examples of such indirect costs of trade.1
While the estimated input distortions are net of shipping fees, they would certainly
capture differences in indirect trade costs. And if indirect trade costs increase with poorer
geographical access to suppliers, the estimated material input distortions should decrease
with better supplier access. This chapter tests this hypothesis. I estimate input distortions
for the cast iron industry as described in Chapter I. The advantage of this methodology is
that distortions are cleaned from differences in fundamentals across plant, such as demand
conditions and market power, productivity, and production techniques.
I construct a measure of supplier access by combining the cost to reach suppliers with
the size of supplier industries in the around 540 districts of India. The cost to reach
suppliers is based on the fastest path between any bilateral pairs of districts. I collect
geo-located data on the entire rail and road infrastructure in India. Using information on
the types of rails and roads (e.g. motorways vs. tertiary roads), I construct a weighted
network graph to compute the fastest path between district pairs.
Over the sample period from 2000 to 2012, there was hardly any variation in the
railway infrastructure, which is the main mode of transport for this industry. Therefore,
the infrastructure component is time invariant in the measure of supplier access. Even if
there was time-variation, placement of railway infrastructure, as well as the location choice
of plants is non-random.2 To address these issues, I condition the analysis on district fixed
effects, and therefore use the variation in supplier access that is driven by the expansion
and contraction of supplier industries in distant districts over time.
A one standard deviation increase in supplier access is associated with almost a third
of a standard deviation decrease in the input material distortion. The estimate is robust
to using lagged supplier access, addressing potential reverse causality concerns. To provide
1While storage can smooth over uncertainties, it is costly and therefore also part of indirect costs of
trade.
2Endogenous infrastructure placement is a central challenge in the literature on the effects of infras-
tructure investments. There are some strategies to address this. Faber (2014), for example, constructs a
hypothetical infrastructure network based on construction costs and a minimum spanning tree. Banerjee
et al. (2012) use the areas on the straight line between start and end point of a transportation link.
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more evidence for the causality of the relationship, I present three types of placebo test.
The first shows that supplier access has no significant relationship with the estimated
labour distortion. The second shows that a measure of access to irrelevant “supplier”
industries, e.g. textiles, rubber or food, is not related to the material input distortion.
The third placebo test shows that access to markets on the output side cannot explain the
distortion on the input side. It is thus only the access to relevant input suppliers that is
associated with the material input distortions that drive misallocation losses.
The policy implications of this analysis are nuanced. Differences in shipping fees mirror
the geographic reality that shipping goods across space is costly. While theoretically
beneficial for manufacturing, it is also costly to build infrastructure to equalise shipping
fees for all plants. The findings of this chapter are conditional on the observed differences
in input shipping fees, however. The distortions pick up the indirect trade costs, and those
are in turn driven by supplier access. Addressing reliability, delay and shipping uncertainty,
for example, could reduce the impact of supplier access on indirect trade costs, and could
thus reduce misallocation losses.
This chapter contributes to a rapidly growing literature on the determinants of mis-
allocation in manufacturing industries. The focus in the literature has been on financial
frictions3, labour market distortions4, trade barriers5 or land misallocation and property
rights6. Other sources for misallocation include R&D subsidies (Acemoglu et al., 2018),
informational frictions (David et al., 2016; Allen, 2014), entry barriers and innovation
(Peters, 2013), differential state taxes (Fajgelbaum et al., 2018), or misspecification and
3See for example Buera et al. (2011). These also include limited enforcement (Amaral and Quintin,
2010), imperfect corporate control (Caselli and Gennaioli, 2013), limits on issuable debt (Midrigan and
Xu, 2014), borrowing constraints (Moll, 2014; Gopinath et al., 2017; Wang, 2017), financial subsidies
(Buera et al., 2013) and other various sources of capital misallocation (David and Venkateswaran, 2017;
Gorodnichenko et al., 2018). There is ample micro-evidence on capital misallocation in the developing
context, summarised by Banerjee and Duflo (2005).
4An early paper in this literature is Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) on the the ease of job reallocation.
Lagos (2006), Guner et al. (2008) and Garicano et al. (2016) study the impacts of versions of size-dependent
labour laws on misallocation and welfare. Hsieh et al. (Forthcoming) study the misallocation of talent
based on racial and gender discrimination. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016), Hsieh and Moretti (2019) and
Bryan and Morten (Forthcoming) present evidence on spatial misallocation of labour due to lack of local
insurance in India, migration constraints in Indonesia, and housing constraints in the US respectively.
5There is a trade literature on misallocation or the “competitive” effects of trade openness. Higher
output market competition can affect markups and reallocate market shares to increase allocative efficiency
(Epifani and Gancia, 2011; Barseghyan and DiCecio, 2011; Edmond et al., 2015; Galle, 2016; Arkolakis
et al., 2018, e.g.). A smaller literature also analyses the effect of trade openness on input markets (e.g.
Amiti and Konings, 2007; Goldberg et al., 2010; De Loecker et al., 2016).
6Duranton et al. (2015) analyse the degree of misallocation comparing Indian districts using an Olley
and Pakes (1996) decomposition. They find that misallocation of land and buildings is large, partially
explained by the repeal of the Urban Land Act. For studies in the agricultural context, see Adamopoulos
and Restuccia (2014a), Chari et al. (2017) or Chen et al. (2017).
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measurement error7. Atalay (2014) documents dispersion of material input prices and
its possible reasons in two narrow US industries. Conceptually, the input distortions in
the misallocation literature are different from input price differences. An advantage of
this chapter and Chapter I is that I observe material input prices, and can disentangle
misallocation estimates from those.
Most of the literature on measuring misallocation abstracts from intermediate inputs
entirely by using value added production functions.8 There is even less work on potential
determinants of misallocation of material inputs. As an exception, Boehm and Oberfield
(2018) study misallocation of intermediate inputs in India due to court congestion that
generates a hold up problem in their model. In current work in progress, Hornbeck and
Rotemberg (2019) examine the impact of railroad expansion on input reallocation in
historic US manufacturing using a growth decomposition.9 This chapter aims to address
the literature gap in misallocation of input materials.
This chapter is also related to the literature studying the effect of transport networks
on productivity and welfare.10 Perhaps most closely related are papers that examine
the effects of changes in market access.11 Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) analyse the
contribution of historical railroads on agricultural productivity in the US. Alder (2017)
compares the road construction projects in India with a counterfactual following a Chinese
infrastructure model. Allen and Atkin (2016) estimate the impact of road expansion in
India on the volatility of grain prices and farmer production choices, and Huang and Xiong
(2018) analyse Chinese road expansion. As in this chapter, they use geo-located transport
infrastructure data to compute intra-national trade costs and a measure of market access.
Two aspects set this chapter apart from this literature. First, these studies use access to
output markets where the entire economic activity of other regions are taken into account.
7Asker et al. (2014) show that adjustment costs can account for capital “misallocation”. Bils et al.
(2017), Rotemberg and White (2017) and Haltiwanger et al. (2018) show that measurement error, data
cleaning procedures and misspecification respectively affect misallocation estimates. The estimates used in
this chapter are based on the carefully specified and estimated model in Chapter I which aims to minimise
misattribution of fundamental heterogeneity to misallocation distortions.
8Exceptions are Jones (2013) or Dias et al. (2016), for example.
9The citation of Hornbeck and Rotemberg (2019) refers to a presentation at LSE and conversations
with one of the authors. At the time of submission, there was no working paper version available.
10There is a longer literature that analyses the effects of transport infrastructure starting with Fogel
(1964), which as received growing attention more recently. Allen and Arkolakis (2014), Allen and Arkolakis
(2019) and Fajgelbaum and Schaal (2017) develop frameworks for estimating the impact of transport
infrastructure investment on welfare in spatial equilibrium, where the latter two also account for traffic
congestion. See Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017) for a review.
11Redding and Venables (2004) provide a theoretical foundation of both market access on the output
side and supplier access on the input side. Redding (2010) and references therein provide a summary of
the earlier literature on market access.
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In contrast, I am using a measure of supplier access on the input side. Moreover, I only
take access to relevant potential suppliers into account. Naturally, to study distortions on
intermediate inputs, the access to these suppliers instead of market access is the object
of interest. Second, while these studies rely on variation in infrastructure construction
for changes in market access, I use growth in distant supplier industries for variation in
supplier access.
A related literature estimates the intra-national costs of trade from price differences
instead of using fastest path algorithms (Fackler and Goodwin, 2001; Anderson and
Van Wincoop, 2004). Donaldson (2018) infers trade costs from price differences of single
origin goods and finds that railroads decreased trade costs in colonial India. Atkin and
Donaldson (2015) use price differentials at the barcode level for Ethiopia and Nigeria.
Importantly, they adjust for markups which would otherwise distort trade costs estimates
when using prices. Asturias et al. (2018) examine the impact of road construction on
allocative efficiency in India using price gaps. The misallocation in their model comes from
dispersion of markups. In contrast, this chapter accounts for variable endogenous markups
as fundamental differences in demand, and misallocation stems from distortions on the
input side. I provide some evidence that the findings are robust to controlling for proxies
for monopsony power as well.
The remainder of the chapter starts with a discussion of the relevant issues in Indian
freight transportation in Section II.2, which are likely to be captured as indirect trade
costs in the estimated input distortions. Section II.3 describes the plant level data as
well as the construction of a weighted network graph from geo-located rail and road data.
Section II.4 first describes how I recover input distortions. I then construct a measure of
supplier access and discuss the identification strategy and main specification. The results
along with placebo tests and discussions are presented in Section III.4 before Section III.5
concludes.
II.2 Freight transport issues in India
India’s freight transport infrastructure has often been criticised by industry and policy
makers alike. Its poor state has been identified as a key constraint for the efficient running
and expansion of heavy industry and steel in particular (NCAER, 2015). Inadequate road
quality and severe congestions result in high and uncertain transit times, with average
truck speeds at around a third of those in developed countries (NTDPC, 2014).
While the share of freight traffic on rail is at around 30% overall (NTDPC, 2014), it is
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more important for the steel industry with a rail share of around 70% (EY, 2014). There
are issues with rail shipping that mirror the problems with road shipping. Passenger trains
and freight trains share the same tracks, leading to congestion. Further delays are frequent
due to outdated infrastructure operating above capacity limits, breakdowns, different rail
gauges requiring different wagons, and numerous state border checkpoints for tax purposes
which can take days or weeks to clear (EY, 2013; NTDPC, 2014; EY, 2014; NCAER, 2015).
Freight trains are only travelling at an average speed of 25km/h (Appendix II.A.1) and the
Government of India is investing heavily to increase the speed and reliability with current
rail infrastructure projects (NTDPC, 2014). Van Leemput (2016) estimates that India
faces higher internal than international trade barriers.
Steel plants require to ship a large amount of heavy and bulky inputs.12 The above
described issues suggest that there are two types of costs to shipping. One type are the
shipping fees, the direct trade costs. The other types are indirect trade costs, such as delay
and uncertainty. In fact, we know from the trade literature, that these “indirect” costs of
trade are large (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004). They can also include search costs
and contract enforcement costs (Startz, 2018). Using a specific railway line in India, Firth
(2017) presents evidence that the variance of shipping time causes the bulk of costs to
firms and constrains their operation.
Crucially, the shipping fees are explicitly included in the (factory gate) input prices and
are thus observed. The indirect trade costs, however, are not accounted for. Differences in
indirect trade costs would therefore be captured by the estimated input distortion. Plants
that need to source from further away are more likely to experience any of these issues in
freight transportation and likely have higher indirect trade costs and distortions. The aim
of this chapter is to test this hypothesis.
I use the Enterprise Survey in India from World Bank (2005a) for some motivating
evidence. The survey asks firms whether transportation is an obstacle for their growth.
Around a third of the firms answer that transportation is an obstacle. I regress the logged
demeaned input distortion τMjt , which I will derive below, on the district average of the
responses in Table II.1. Plants that claim that they face transportation obstacles also have
higher estimated material input distortions τMjt .
12One tonne of steel requires the transportation of more than four tonnes of input materials (NCAER,
2015). Chapter I provides a more detailed description of the cast iron industry in India.
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Table II.1: Transport obstacles as distortions: Some evidence using World Bank (2005a)
(1)
Transport obstacle? 0.24**
(0.10)
N 27
R2 0.19
Notes: The regression is at the district level in 2005. The dependent variable is τMjt demeaned by the weighted geometric
mean and in logs. The independent variable is the district average of the survey question whether transportation is an
obstacle to firm growth from World Bank (2005a). Year is 2005, and only respondents from the metals or minerals industry
are used. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
II.3 Plant data and infrastructure network
There are three main data sources that I use for this chapter. The first one is the ASI
plant data, the second is geo-located data for administrative boundaries, and the third is
the universe of geo-located roads and railways.
II.3.1 Plant data
The input distortions are recovered from plant level panel data from the Annual Survey
of Industries (ASI) from 2000 to 2012. I focus on single product plants that produce a
cast iron. Cast iron is an important product of the basic steel sector in India and is a
sector that requires substantial transportation. The narrow focus delivers a clean estimate
of input distortions, as discussed in Chapter I. Crucially, I use information on quantity
and prices on the output and the input side. I end up with 926 observations for the final
analysis. For a much more detailed account of the Indian cast iron sector, the plant level
data, the rationale of focusing on single products and descriptive statistics I refer the
reader to Chapter I.
II.3.2 Geographic data
The geo-located data of administrative boundaries is from Database of Global Admin-
istrative Areas (GADM) (2016). The data of transport infrastructure is from OSMF
(2016).
Matching plant data with the location of firms
There are no exact geographical identifiers of plants in the ASI due to confidentiality. By
matching the panel and the cross-sectional versions of the ASI, I obtain the districts of
plants which are only contained in the latter version. The district centroids act as plant
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locations for the rest of the chapter.13 I matched the ASI districts to the 594 geo-coded
district data via fuzzy string matching within states, with extensive manual matching and
checks until all districts were matched.
Information on transport infrastructure
I use data on railroads and roads. Transportation via inland waterways is negligible, as it
is severely underdeveloped in India (NTDPC, 2014).14 The share of imported materials
in total materials is around 2% in quantity and value terms for this sample. I therefore
ignore international sourcing. The transport network contains information about the type
of each edge, for example broad vs. narrow gauge rails, or motorways vs. secondary roads.
This information is used to assess the speed for each edge of the network.
There is, however, no temporal information on the opening of railroad tracks and roads.
Figure II.4 in Appendix II.A.1 shows that the route kilometres of railways during the
sample period for 2000-2012 only increased by 3.8%, almost all of it in the last 4 years.
Furthermore, the average speed of goods trains was nearly constant (see Figure II.4), due
to little investment in upgrading of existing infrastructure. I therefore treat the transport
infrastructure as constant over time using a snapshot from the end of the sample period.
For roads, the picture is slightly different, and there has been an increase in total road
length (Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, 2016). Since the steel industry relies
predominately on rails (see Section II.2), I ignore this temporal variation. I provide a
robustness check using only railways, with very similar results.
Construction of geographical network
In order to run network analysis algorithms to calculate access to suppliers, we need a
weighted undirected network graph with connected plant locations (district centroids). I
prepare the infrastructure data by keeping only segments that can be used for shipping,
i.e. deleting abandoned rail tracks, rural bridleways etc. I then perform a series of network
preparation and cleaning tasks, for example, to make sure that road intersections contain
nodes and that relevant nodes are snapped to each other. I connect the plant locations
(district centroids) with a straight line to the nearest point in the network.15 The full
13I also repeatedly drew random points in each district as plant location and estimate the effect for each
draw. The average effect is close to the reported estimates.
14The share of transportation via waterways in India is less than 1% of tonne-km (Raghuram, 2004),
at least an order of magnitude lower than in Bangladesh, the US, China or Germany (Rangaraj and
Raghuram, 2007; NCAER, 2015)
15I am assigning a low speed to travelling on this edge, see Table II.2.
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Figure II.1: Indian rail and road transport network
Notes: The map shows the undirected network graph of 1.6 mil. edges and 1.2 mil. nodes, based on Indian
rail and road infrastructure.
network contains around 1.6 million edges and 1.2 million nodes, which can still be handled
well with a standard computer and optimised network algorithms. Figure II.1 shows the
entire network graph of roads and railways that are used for the analysis.
Speed assumptions and edge weights
The weights for the network edges are determined by how fast goods can be shipped on a
particular piece of infrastructure. This depends on length and speed. The length can be
calculated, but we need assumptions for speed. I exploit the information on the type of
infrastructure and assign them into speed classes. For example, travelling on railroads and
motorways is faster than on tertiary roads. Table II.2 shows the speed assumptions for
different edge types, which are based on reported figures from the literature.16 Only the
relative speed values matter for the way that supplier access will be constructed. Figure
II.2 shows the prevalence of speed classes in terms of route kilometres.
16The assumptions for average speed of goods trains are supported by information from the Ministry of
Railways (see Figure II.4). Average truck speeds on roads in India are typically a third of the counterparts
in more developed countries (NTDPC, 2014). EY (2013) estimates average truck speeds at around 20 km
per hour. Baum-Snow et al. (2018) assume 25 km per hour for Chinese roads. Allen and Atkin (2016) use
a value of 20 miles per hour for non-highway roads for India. Alder (2017) uses speeds of 35 km per hour
based on a survey by the World Bank (2005b) which argues that truck speeds are typically less then 40 km
per hour in India. The (short) direct connection from the district centroid (plant location) to the closest
point in the network is assigned a low speed of 5 km per hour. I compared the calculated fastest path
times between a few district pairs to the duration using Google Maps, and the results are reassuringly
close.
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Figure II.2: Share of speed classes in network
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Table II.2: Average speed by edge types
Rail edge type Road edge type Speed in
km/h
Broad gauge
rail
Motorway, mo-
torway link
25
Narrow gauge
rail, light rail
Primary, pri-
mary link,
trunk, trunk
link
20
Secondary, sec-
ondary link
15
Funicular,
yard, plat-
form, station,
freight station,
turntable
Tertiary, ter-
tiary link,
tertiary un-
classified, road,
minor
10
Connection of
plant location
to network
5
Notes: The right table shows the speed assumptions for different types of infrastructure. The left figure
shows the shares of the speed classes in total route km of the network.
II.4 Recovering distortions and empirical strategy
The question this chapter asks is whether differences in access to suppliers can explain
the material input distortions faced by cast iron plants. I first show how I estimate the
input distortions. Then I construct a measure of supplier access. Finally I will provide the
empirical strategy and specification.
II.4.1 Measuring input distortions
The input distortions τMjt and τLjt vary by plant j and time t for material inputs Mjt and
labour Ljt respectively. I use the model and follow the estimation in Chapter I, and only
briefly sketch the set-up here.17 Firms are profit maximising and interact with differentiated
products in a Nash-Bertrand setting. They minimise short run costs:
min
Ljt,Mjt
rjtKjt + τ
L
jtwjtLjt + τ
M
jt P
M
jt Mjt
s.t. F (Kjt, Ljt,Mjt)Ωjt ≥ Qjt
As in Chapter I, the rental rate rjt is not observed and contains the true rental rate along
with any capital distortions and adjustment costs. Plant specific wages wjt and input
prices PMjt are observed and capture local labour market differences and input shipping
17Alternatively, see Singer (2018).
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fees.18 The distortions are modelled as implicit input taxes, which capture a variety of
disadvantages that a particular plant faces by using that particular input. This can include,
for example, actual taxes, corruption and legal costs, constrained access or information
costs. Importantly, differences in indirect trade costs such as uncertainty, delay or search
costs would also be captured by the material input distortions. The aim of this chapter
is to provide evidence on what these material input distortions capture. Combining the
first order condition of the cost minimisation problem with the Bertrand profit maximising
conditions yields the following equations for the input distortions:
τXjt = (ηjt + 1)α
X
jt
PjtQjt
PXjtXjt
∀X ∈ (M,L) (II.1)
which depends on the plant specific inverse demand elasticity ηjt, on the input specific
output elasticity αXjt , and the revenue share of the input expenditure in equilibrium
PjtQjt
PXjtXjt
.
The required demand and production side parameters are estimated as in Chapter I.
It is worth to briefly discuss the assumption that inputs are elastically supplied, i.e.
that plants are price takers on the input side.19 As Appendix II.B.1 shows, differences in
monopsony power would be captured by the distortions. If access to suppliers is related
to monopsony power, then this matters for the interpretation of my findings, particularly
whether the relationship between distortions and supplier access represents indirect trade
costs or monopsony power. My results are robust to including year and district or plant
fixed effects which eliminates monopsony power that is constant along these dimensions.20
Nevertheless, I control for two constructed proxies for plant specific monopsony power, and
construct an input distortion net of monopsony power in robustness checks in Appendix
II.B.1. The results are similar which suggest that the distortions capture indirect trade
costs rather than monopsony power.
By focusing on a single product, the elasticities and the recovered distortions are
relatively well measured. They are disentangled from fundamental heterogeneity across
plants within sectors, both in terms of production technique and demand conditions. This
puts us in a position to explain a distortion with a signal to noise ratio that is much higher
than usually found in the literature.
18For example, see Cheng and Morrow (2018) for local labour markets in China, and Meunier et al.
(2016) for geographical differences in input shipping costs for US cement plants.
19The input suppliers are allowed to have arbitrary market power as long as single cast iron plants
cannot affect input prices in different ways.
20That is, cast iron plants are allowed to have monopsony power (dPMjt /dMjt 6= 0), as long as they
share a common materials price elasticity of material input consumption (d logPMt /d logMt) or if the
plant specific elasticity is fixed over time (d logPMj /d logMj).
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II.4.2 Measuring supplier access
A first measure for access to suppliers is the district rail penetration, which is simply the
total rail km divided by the district size in square km. Adamopoulos (2011) uses a similar
measure on a country level for international comparisons, and I use this measure for some
additional results. Since it only varies at the district level, we cannot condition on district
fixed effects and it is thus likely endogenous. It also does not capture access to suppliers
through the transportation network outside of the district.
To obtain a measure of a plant’s potential to reach suppliers, I construct a measure of
supplier access SAdt for each district d in period t. Redding and Venables (2004) provide
a theoretical foundation of both market access on the output side and supplier access on
the input side. This is the access to potential suppliers, not necessarily the actual supplier
choices made by plants.21 It is similar to the measure of market access in Donaldson and
Hornbeck (2016), but on the input side and only considering relevant input suppliers (as
opposed to population size):
SAdt = −
∑
h
TdhNht (II.2)
where Tdh are the costs in district d to source from district h and a function of the fastest
path through the transport network. Nht is the share of the relevant suppliers in district
h in the country-wide value of the supplier industry at time t.22 The relevant supplier
industries are mainly pig iron and coking coal, derived from the detailed information of
input use of the cast iron plants in the data. I also use a version of SAdt for robustness
checks where I exclude the same district such that h 6= d. For Tdh I follow the literature
and use a function that is concave in the fastest path FPdh from h to d, which also captures
mobilisation costs:
Tdh = 1 + FP
0.8
dh (II.3)
where the value 0.8 as well as the structure of the function is in line with recent studies
21I do not observe plant to plant trade. The measure should therefore be interpreted as access to
potential suppliers. This is standard in the literature, dating back to the measure of “market potential” in
Harris (1954).
22For each district I multiply the plant level values with their sampling multiplier, where the sampling
multiplier constitutes how many plants are represented by each plant, to recover a measure based on the
universe of plants. Note that when using logged SAdt, it does not matter whether we take Nht as the
share or the absolute size of supplier industries, as it will be absorbed by the year fixed effects.
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Figure II.3: Average supplier access, supplier presence and change in supplier access
Notes: The left map shows the average supplier access of districts. The middle map shows the average size
of supplier industry. The right map shows the average of the absolute deviation of the supplier access
from its average within districts. Darker shading mean higher values.
relating travel time to costs.23 I also use a linear version Tdh = FPdh for robustness checks.
I calculate the fastest route FPdh using network algorithms. Since we have an undirected
graph with positive weights, I can use Dijkstra’s 1959 algorithm using the distance divided
by the speed as edge weights.24 The resulting histogram of bilateral shipping times is
plotted in Figure II.5 in Appendix II.A.2. The median shipping time is 62 hours, and
manual inspection yields shipping times between district pairs that are close to estimates
using Google Maps for the same district pairs.
As mentioned in the introduction, this chapter stands out from the literature by
combining (i) directly measured costs Tdh with (ii) only including relevant potential
supplier industries that I recover from the input product codes. Based on the calculated
fastest path FPdh, Figure II.3 plots the average SAdt over the sample period for all districts
in India in the left map. The middle map plots the location of the supplier industries
(average value over time). The right map plots the average of the absolute deviation of the
SAdt to its within district average, i.e. a measure of how much it changed over time. This
is a summary of the variation that I use for identification to which I turn next.
23See e.g. Baum-Snow et al. (2018), Alder (2017), Roberts et al. (2012). Also Au and Henderson (2006)
use a concave relationship between distance and shipping costs. I also performed some robustness checks
by varying parameters (γ1, γ2) in Tdh = 1 + γ1FP
γ2
dh , with similar results.
24With my network of 1.6 million edges and 1.2 million nodes, it takes only around a minute to
calculate the fastest path matrix with an optimised algorithm. The maximum running time for Dijkstra’s
algorithm with a Fibonacci heap (Fredman and Tarjan, 1987) for one source node to all other nodes is
O(|E|+ |V | log |V |) where |E| is the number of edges and |V | the number of nodes. Other studies that
used Dijkstra’s 1959 algorithm to analyse economic outcomes are e.g. Faber (2014) or Donaldson and
Hornbeck (2016). If an exact vector based network is not available but only rasterized data then a fast
marching algorithm can be used (Allen and Arkolakis, 2014; Faber, 2014; Allen and Atkin, 2016; Alder,
2017).
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II.4.3 Identification and estimation
There are two sources of variation in supplier access SAdt, the time-invariant network
component Tdh and the time-variant geography of shares of the relevant potential suppliers
Nht. There are two endogenous location decisions. One is the location decision of plants,
which likely depends on the transport infrastructure. The other is the location decision
of infrastructure, which is placed strategically, not randomly. Both give rise to omitted
variables and reverse causality concerns. Despite these concerns, others have used changes
in infrastructure (e.g Donaldson and Hornbeck, 2016)25, but I cannot use this variation
even if I wanted to, as there were hardly any changes in railway infrastructure for this
sample period in India (see Appendix II.A.1).
My strategy is to use variation in the growth or decline of (distant) supplier industries
as the identifying source for variation in SAdt by using district fixed effects. For example,
if the supplier industry grows in a distant district A, and district A is better connected to
district B than to C, then the supplier access for plants in district B improves compared
to those in C. The main specification is:
log(τMjt ) = φSAdt +Xjtχ+ λd + κt + ιjt (II.4)
where τMjt is the material input distortion estimated from the structural model and SAdt
the supplier access for district d at time t.26 Xjt is a vector of control variables, such as
plant age or legal form, λd are district fixed effects, κt year fixed effects and ιjt an error.
If the growth in supplier industries in other districts is uncorrelated to the shocks to
distortions ιjt, the effect is identified. There may be further reverse causality concerns
warranted if current plant distortions affect supplier industries in other districts, or
endogeneity issues when plants and supplier industries are hit by correlated shocks. To
at least partially address these concerns, I use lagged supplier access SAdt−1 and obtain
similar estimates. I also include plant fixed effects in reported robustness checks, which
along with further robustness checks are reported in Section II.5.2.
As argued above, the estimates of τMjt taken from Chapter I are relatively clean. However,
they are still estimated. Since they are used as a dependent variable there is no classical
measurement attenuation bias problem. The advantage of the method in Chapter I is that
I can recover a distribution of τMjt for every single plant, based on the parametric bootstrap
25Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) state that this is their main endogeneity concern. They run robustness
checks by controlling for the presence of nearby railroad tracks.
26I demeaned τMjt within every year.
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Table II.3: Input material distortion and supplier access
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Supplier access -0.27*** -0.23*** -0.28** -0.19** -0.26**
[-3.92] [-3.19] [-2.05] [-2.43] [-2.17]
Supplier access (lagged) -0.31**
[-2.15]
Rail km/sqkm -0.25* -0.21
[-1.70] [-1.47]
Plant level controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District level controls No Yes No No Yes Yes
State level controls No Yes No No Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE No No Yes Yes No No
N 926 882 926 926 882 882
R2 0.07 0.25 0.46 0.46 0.26 0.26
Notes: The dependent variable is the logged demeaned (by year) distortion in material inputs τMjt . Coefficients are standard-
ised. t-statistics in brackets are based on standard errors clustered at the district level. Plant level controls include firm age,
dummies on ownership type, and whether plants are part of the census section. District level controls include population,
population density and gender ratio in 2001, district population growth from 1991-2001, and whether the district was subject
to left wing extremism (who sometimes target infrastructure) in the years leading up to 2009. State level controls include
the male literacy rate and the share of male industrial workers in 2001. Data for district and state level controls is based on
the population census and retrieved from indiastat.com.
from estimated production and demand parameters. This allows me to perform robustness
checks with respect to the uncertainty in the dependent variable.
II.5 Results
II.5.1 Access to suppliers decreases material input distortions
The distortions τMjt do not capture shipping fees, as those are accounted for in the model
and observed in PMjt . In Appendix II.A.3 I show that input prices inclusive of shipping
fees PMjt and supplier access SAdt are negatively correlated as expected.27 The indirect
costs of trade, such as uncertainty or delays in shipping or search costs, on the other hand,
will be picked up by the distortions τMjt . I test the hypothesis that with longer routes to
suppliers, i.e. a lower SAdt, the distortions τMjt are higher, most likely because the indirect
trade costs are higher.
Table II.3 shows the results from estimating regression (II.4). The first two columns
are without district effects λd.28 The main result is in Column (3), controlling for district
fixed effects. A one standard deviation increase in supplier access reduces the material
distortion by 0.28 of its standard deviation.
27The relationship is marginally insignificant, possibly due to heterogeneous input quality having a
bigger effect on input prices than shipping fees.
28The OLS estimates without district fixed effects are slightly upward biased. This suggest that plants
with higher distortions τMjt tend to locate in better connected areas.
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For the interpretation of the results, it is relevant whether the distortions are likely to
rather capture input market power (monopsony power) or indirect trade costs. Monopsony
power is proportional to the measured input distortions as shown in Appendix II.B.1.
Therefore, the results in Table II.3 would only be consistent with a monopsony power story
if worse access to suppliers increased monopsony power. We would expect, however, that
if supplier access is poor, there are few suppliers around, which would suggest that there
is less monopsony power. In this sense, the monopsony power story would work against
the reported results. In Appendix II.B.1, I construct two proxies for monopsony power,
one based on market share, one based on directly estimating the input price elasticity.
The results are robust to controlling for either. In addition, I construct a measure of
input distortion net of monopsony power as a dependent variable, which confirms the
main results (all additional results in Table II.7). Overall, the results strongly suggest that
indirect costs of trade are captured by the estimated distortions. These distortions in turn
lead to misallocation of input materials with adverse aggregate consequences.
For this industry, the welfare costs of materials misallocation are large (see Chapter I),
and differences in supplier access are a significant contributor. Taking the results at face
value, it is worth making the following four points. First, it is important to note that the
relationship between distortions and differences in supplier access are not simply features
of our spatial reality. It is costly to move goods across space. However, since shipping
costs are accounted for, the part in distortions that is due to differences in supplier access
can be addressed without necessarily reducing shipping fees.29 These are not the transport
costs of moving goods across space, but differences in costs generated by the multitude of
freight transport issues described in Section II.2.
Second, this analysis has policy implications, as it provides us with a margin that we
can address to improve allocative efficiency. Reducing costs of uncertainty and delays, e.g.
by strengthening the transportation infrastructure network, or reducing border checkpoints
due to differential tax systems is likely to improve allocative efficiency. In fact, the GST
(good and sales tax) reform in 2017 unifies the tax system and substantially reduces border
checkpoints within India. Loosely speaking, if indirect trade costs are reduced, we would
start to see the relationship between supplier access and input distortions disappear.
Third, while the analysis provides evidence that differences in supplier access generate
misallocation, I cannot distinguish between its components, such as information, search or
uncertainty costs. Fourth, while there is a significant relationship between supplier access
29Shipping fees can also be regarded as additional spatial frictions, quantified by Behrens et al. (2017)
for the US in a setting with endogenous markups, for example.
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Table II.4: Input material distortion and supplier access: robustness checks
Excl. own dist. Linear costs Plant FE Rail only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Supplier access -0.28** -0.32** -0.17* -0.30*
[-2.00] [-2.32] [-1.76] [-1.79]
Supplier access (lagged) -0.40** -0.36** -0.22** -0.33*
[-2.55] [-2.39] [-2.00] [-1.93]
Plant level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Plant FE No No No No Yes Yes No No
N 926 926 926 926 924 924 926 926
R2 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.73 0.73 0.45 0.46
Notes: The dependent variable is the logged demeaned (by year) distortion on material inputs τMjt . The supplier access in
the first two columns excludes the own district of a plant when calculating supplier access SAdt = −
∑
h TdhNht∀h 6= d.
Columns (3) and (4) assume linear costs, i.e. Tdh = FPdh. Columns (5) and (6) include plant fixed effects. Columns (7)
and (8) calculated the fastest path FPdh based on the railway network alone instead of using roads and rails. Coefficients
are standardised. t-statistics in brackets are based on standard errors clustered at the district level. Plant level controls
include firm age, dummies on ownership type, and whether plants are part of the census section.
and material input distortions, there is still unexplained variation left in the material
distortions as the R2 show.
In Columns (5) and (6), I add a measure of district rail penetration, which is total
rail km per district area. Both omit district fixed effects. In Column (6), I additionally
instrument supplier access with a measure of supplier access that is demeaned at the
district level to account for the lack of district fixed effects. The supplier access coefficient
is robust to controlling for district rail penetration. The effect of district rail penetration is
marginally significant as well, which suggest that the shipping constraints within districts
may matter as well. I next explore the robustness of the results and provide placebo
analyses to test the identification assumption.
II.5.2 Robustness and three placebo tests
Robustness checks
I perform a number of robustness checks. First, there might be some correlation between
simultaneous shocks that affect the cast iron industry, but also its suppliers. In Column
(4) of Table II.3, I use lagged supplier access, and the effect, if anything is slightly larger.30
Second, I exclude the own districts of plants when calculating supplier access (Equation
(II.2)) in Column (1) and (2) of Table II.4. Third, I use the fastest path directly as cost of
shipping (Equation (II.3)) in Columns (3) and (4) of Table II.4. Fourth, Columns (5) and
(6) include plant fixed effects. Fifth, for Columns (7) and (8) I use the railway network
30This suggests an upward bias in the current period supplier access. Suppose a plant receives a shock
which reduces some components in its input distortion. If it increases input demand, then the well
connected suppliers could benefit, introducing a reverse causality problem, which biases the current period
supplier access in the reported direction.
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Table II.5: Placebos: labour distortion, irrelevant supplier access, or market access
τLjt Irrelevant inputs Market access
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Supplier access -0.11
[-1.30]
Supplier access (textiles) -0.15
[-1.16]
Supplier access (food) 0.46
[1.55]
Supplier access (rubber) -0.33
[-1.26]
Market access -0.36
[-1.47]
Plant level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 926 926 926 926 926
R2 0.42 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
Notes: The dependent variable is the logged demeaned (by year) labour distortion τLjt in Column (1) and the material
distortion τMjt in all other columns. The supplier access in the Columns (2) -(4) is based on access to the textiles, food,
and rubber industries respectively. The market access variable in Column (5) is access to output markets, i.e. to those
industries that buy cast iron. Coefficients are standardised. t-statistics in brackets are based on standard errors clustered
at the district level. Plant level controls include firm age, dummies on ownership type, and whether plants are part of the
census section.
only, dropping all roads before calculating the fastest path.31 Overall, the effect of supplier
access differences remains robust.
To assess the effect that the dependent variable, the distortion, is estimated, I make use
of the estimated covariance matrices of the underlying production and demand parameters.
As described in Chapter I, I obtain a different set of τMjt for every draw from the distribution
of the estimated fundamental parameters. For every set of τMjt , I run regression (II.4) and
obtain the point estimates and t-statistics of supplier access. In total, I run 330 regressions
and plot the point estimates and t-statistics in Figure II.6 in Appendix II.B.2. The average
point estimate is -0.295 with a minimum to maximum of -0.34 to -0.22. All estimates are
significant at the 10% level at least.
I next run three placebo tests to provide further support for the causality of the
estimated relationship.
Placebo 1: No effect on labour distortions
The first placebo takes the estimated logged labour distortion τLjt as dependent variable.
The access to materials suppliers should not affect these distortions. Because commuting
happens predominately within districts, the access to distant suppliers should also not pick
31In another robustness check, I use the geographic distance instead of the geodesic distance (shortest
path) of the network, with similar results.
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up access to labour markets, which is likely contained in τLjt. As Column (1) in Table II.5
reports, the association is not statistically significant.
Placebo 2: No effect of access to irrelevant supplier
For a second placebo test, I construct a measure of supplier access to irrelevant supplier
industries. In particular, access to textiles, food or rubber industries. Columns (2) to (4)
of Table II.5 show that there is no effect. This shows that it is only differences in access to
relevant suppliers that is contained in the input misallocation distortions τMjt .
Placebo 3: No effect from access to output markets
Finally, a concern is that the input distortions τMjt capture additional costs from shipping
the outputs, rather than inputs. To test this, I also construct a market access variable. It
is based on the size of the industries that buy from the cast iron plants in the sample, i.e.
the downstream firms such as engine manufacturing that use cast iron as input. Column
(5) in Table II.5 reports that the estimate, while negative, is not statistically significant.
The data I use provides a measure of distributional (i.e. shipping costs) on the output
side. I show in Table II.8 in Appendix II.B.3, that this measure of output shipping costs is
significantly correlated to market access. This suggests that the measure of market access
captures what we think it should capture, access to buyers, but is not significantly driving
distortions on the input side.
On the whole, it is only the access to relevant input suppliers that affect material input
distortions, and consequently misallocation losses.
II.6 Conclusion
Misallocation of input materials in Indian cast iron are severe and associated with high
welfare costs, as Chapter I shows. This chapter asks what these costly material input
distortions represent. I find that differences in access to suppliers through the transportation
network drives the estimated input distortions. I show that it is only the access to
relevant input suppliers, as access to irrelevant suppliers or access to output markets is not
significantly related to the distortions on the input side.
I emphasise that the input misallocation distortions should be interpreted in terms
of differences in indirect trade costs. Differences in shipping fees represent the spatial
reality, as it is inherently costly to ship goods across space, and therefore hard to eliminate.
Since input shipping fees are observed and accounted for in the model, the distortions are
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net of input shipping fees. On the other hand, any indirect trade costs associated with
sourcing inputs, which are lower for better supplier access, are captured in the estimated
distortions. This sheds more light into the black box of misallocation losses, which were
found to be large in Chapter I, and more generally contributes to identify distortions in
the misallocation literature.
The policy implications are that there are aggregate reallocation gains from reducing
differences in indirect trade costs, without necessarily decreasing shipping costs. These
include, for example, costs of delay, search and uncertainty. State border checkpoints
for goods within India, for example, create shipping delays and are, for the purposes of
this study, policy distortions that create input misallocation. The described relationship
between supplier access and misallocation distortions is likely to have external validity in
contexts of industries that require substantial input shipping, but face unreliable transport
infrastructure.
While I cannot distinguish between different types of indirect trade costs that increase
with remoteness, this chapter provides an important insight into the drivers of misallocation.
Especially misallocation of input materials has received little attention and we have known
even less about underlying determinants. Future research aims to quantify the misallocation
costs of differences in supplier access as well as other potential drivers in India and other
countries.
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Appendix to Chapter II
II.A Additional descriptives for the construction of supplier ac-
cess
II.A.1 Railway route kilometres and speed
Figure II.4: Total route kilometres of Indian railways and average speed of goods trains
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Notes: Vertical lines indicate sample period. Source: Calculated based on information from Ministry of
Railways India, retrieved through indiastat.com
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II.A.2 Estimates of the fastest path FPdh
Figure II.5: Histogram of bilateral fastest paths FPdh
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Notes: The figure plots the histogram for bilateral estimated shipping times FPdh between districts using
the road and railroad transport network. Shipping times are trimmed at 200 hours. Shipping times are
estimated using Dijkstra’s 1959 algorithm, with speed assumptions as edge weights as shown in Table II.2.
II.A.3 Correlation between input price and supplier access
Table II.6: Input prices and supplier access
Input price (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Supplier access -0.22 -0.20 -0.19 -0.18
[-1.32] [-1.31] [-1.41] [-1.26]
Plant level controls No Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes No No
Plant FE No No Yes Yes
N 946 946 946 946
R2 0.32 0.33 0.64 0.65
Notes: The dependent variable is the logged material input price logPMjt . Coefficients are standardised. t-statistics in
brackets are based on standard errors clustered at the district level. Plant level controls include firm age, dummies on
ownership type, and whether plants are part of the census section.
II.B Robustness checks
II.B.1 Monopsony power
The first part of this Appendix is the same as Appendix I.B in Chapter I, repeated here
for convenience. If plants are not price takers on the input side and have some monopsony
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power, the cost minimisation problem changes to:
min
Ljt,Mjt
rjtKjt + τ
Ladj
jt wjt(Ljt)Ljt + τ
Madj
jt P
M
jt (Mjt)Mjt
s.t. F (Kjt, Ljt,Mjt)Ωjt ≥ Qjt
where τMadj is the new input distortion adjusted for monopsony power, and the input
prices are some functions of the input quantities. The first order condition with respect to
materials is:
τ
Madj
jt (ψjt + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡τMjt
= (ηjt + 1)α
M
jt
PjtQjt
PMjt Mjt
(II.5)
where ψjt ≡ ∂P
M
jt Mjt
∂MjtPMjt
is the inverse input price elasticity of input demand. Note that if we
ignore τMadjjt , and use that MRPM ≡ (ηjt + 1)αMjt PjtQjtMjt , we can write (ψjt + 1) = MRPMPMjt .
That is (ψjt + 1) is the ability to pay an input a lower price than its marginal revenue
product, a common definition of market power on the input side, or monopsony power.
The measured input distortion τMjt captures input market power as well as other input
distortions τMadj . If ψjt does not vary across plants, or does not vary across time for
individual plants, than it will be absorbed by year or plant fixed effects respectively (see
Table II.4).
I construct an admittedly heuristic plant specific measure of ψjt by regressing logged
input prices on a second order polynomial in input quantities controlling for district and
time fixed effects:
log(PMjt ) = f(log(Mjt)) + λd + κt + υjt (II.6)
Based on the coefficients, I can compute ψjt. I plot the histogram of input market
power (ψjt + 1) in Figure I.12 in Appendix I.B of Chapter I. The majority of plants has a
negative elasticity ψjt and therefore an input market power (ψjt + 1) below one. A negative
ψjt means that input prices decrease for larger quantities, which can be related to quantity
discounts instead of input market power.
I use the estimated measures (ψjt + 1) as control variables in Column (3) and (4) in
Table II.7. In Columns (5) and (6) I instead use (ψjt + 1) to recover the adjusted distortion
τMadj as dependent variable. I construct a second proxy for input market power. If larger
plants can exert more market power on the input side as well, a larger market share of a
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plant in a given district can proxy for monopsony power. In Column (1) and (2) of Table
II.7 I control for plant market shares within a district.32 Overall, the results are robust
to these additional test, and the input distortions are significantly higher for plants with
worse supplier access, supporting the interpretation that this is driven by indirect trade
costs.
Table II.7: Monopsony power: additional proxy controls and adjusted input distortion
Input distortion τMjt (log) Adjusted τ
Madj (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Supplier access -0.27*** -0.28** -0.27*** -0.25** -0.25*** -0.19
[-4.76] [-2.11] [-4.77] [-2.06] [-4.45] [-1.57]
Market share in district 0.03 -0.04
[0.48] [-0.69]
Inv. inp price elasticity + 1 (log) 0.06 0.14
[0.61] [1.08]
Plant level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 926 925 926 925 926 925
R2 0.20 0.46 0.20 0.46 0.31 0.54
Notes: The dependent variable is the demeaned (by year) logged material input distortion τjt in the first four columns, and
the adjusted logged τMadj in the last two columns. The market share is calculated at the district year level in terms of
value of cast iron sold. The input price elasticity is estimated from a regression of logged input prices on a second order
polynomial in logged material input use, controlling for plant and year fixed effects. I take the log of the inverse plant level
input price elasticities plus one log(ψjt + 1), i.e. the log of the markdown. Plant level controls include firm age, dummies
on ownership type, and whether plants are part of the census section. Coefficients are standardised. t-statistics in brackets
are based on standard errors clustered at the district level.
II.B.2 Accounting for estimated input distortions
Figure II.6: Distribution of point estimates and t-statistics
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Notes: The left panel plots the histogram of 330 point estimates of supplier access of Equation (II.4).
Each individual regression has a different τMjt as dependent variable, based on 330 draws of the underlying
production and demand parameters from their estimated covariance matrices. The right panel shows the
histogram of t-statistics of the supplier access estimates. All estimates are significant at the 10% at least.
32These controls may be bad controls in the sense of Angrist and Pischke (2008), but the point is to
show that the coefficient of supplier access is reasonably robust to those.
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II.B.3 Market access and output shipping costs
Table II.8 shows the result from a regression of the share of output shipping costs in
revenues on market access (i.e. access to buyers). Column (2) shows that the access to
suppliers is in turn not relevant for output shipping costs.
Table II.8: Market access and share of output shipping costs in revenue
(1) (2)
Market access -0.11*
[-1.72]
Supplier access 0.00
[0.02]
Year FE Yes Yes
N 946 946
R2 0.04 0.02
Notes: Standardized coefficients. t-statistics in brackets based on SE clustered on districts.
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Chapter III
Can lower electricity prices improve energy
efficiency? Evidence from half a million Indian
plant observations
III.1 Introduction
High energy prices are often regarded as a barrier to industrial development. Upgrading
capital vintages to take advantage of electric power and automation are key elements to
improving performance in manufacturing industries. High energy, and in particular, high
electricity prices can slow this process by reducing the incentives to switch production
from more traditional manufacturing processes.1 In developed countries, energy-intensive
industries are often granted exemptions and subsidies for electricity costs to withstand
international competition and avoid layoffs. At the same time, countries aim to improve
their energy efficiency as part of their climate goals. At least for manufacturing, improving
energy efficiency is one of the principal pillars to reduce the energy and carbon intensity of
GDP. Low energy prices may in turn fail to provide sufficient incentives to improve energy
efficiency.
A priori, electricity prices can have ambiguous effects on electricity productivity (output
divided by electricity consumed). The more obvious channel is that higher prices improve
electricity productivity by inducing substitution away from electricity and optimisation
of production processes which improve electricity consumption per output. Lower prices,
on the other hand, can also improve electricity productivity by incentivising upgrades of
production processes to those that require more electricity but also increase output. The
ratio between output and consumption can fall or rise when considering choices between
different production techniques. While the pricing of electricity is important from an
1Ryan (2018) provides evidence from a field experiment in Gujarat (India) on the complementarity
of electricity and modern capital and skilled labour. Abeberese (2017) provides evidence on changes in
production due to electricity prices in India.
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environmental and developmental perspective, we have little causal evidence on the net
effect.
This chapter examines the effect of electricity prices on electricity productivity. I use
annual plant level panel data from Indian manufacturing from 1998 to 2013 which includes
information on the quantity and the average price of electricity consumed. Addressing
endogeneity concerns, I find that higher electricity prices decrease electricity productivity.
While electricity consumption falls with higher prices, output decreases relatively more.
This implies that lower electricity prices can not only increase output, but also improve
energy efficiency. Policy makers often navigate trade-offs between developmental and
environmental goals when it comes to energy prices. These results suggest that lowering
electricity prices does not necessarily decrease energy efficiency. To my knowledge, these
are the first causal estimates to show this for an entire manufacturing sector in a developing
country.
I emphasise that this result is likely to be especially relevant in contexts of industrial
development and where industrial electricity prices are comparatively high, which is
both the case for India.2 I find that the effect was stronger during high price periods.
Furthermore, I show that this effect is unique to electricity: the effect of coal prices on coal
productivity are the opposite – higher coal prices increase coal productivity and have no
significant effect on different measures of firm performance.3 Depending on the fuel mix of
electricity generation, these results suggests that taxing dirtier fuels yields better economic
and environmental outcomes than taxing electricity, most likely due to the special role of
electricity in modern production. This finding is particularly relevant for climate policy in
developing countries. Relatively lower industrial electricity prices than coal prices could
deliver both, substitution from fossil fuels to electricity, and despite increasing electricity
use, improving electricity productivity and output.
I begin the analysis by documenting that energy productivity in Indian manufacturing
has been fairly flat since the 60s but increased sharply from around 2000. Electricity
productivity increased from 2000 to 2013 by around 35%. Simultaneously, real average
industrial electricity prices fell by around 45%, a robust finding across various data sources
from plant level data to price indices and manually collected tariffs. Indian industries are
characterised by significant cross-sectional dispersion of both electricity productivity and
2Compared to average industrial electricity prices in G7 countries, India’s prices have been around 80%
higher in 1998. They only dropped below the G7 average after 2004 and were around half the G7 prices in
2013 (but still above US prices). In PPP terms, India’s industrial electricity prices have been more than
double the G7 average throughout (see Figure III.20 and Table III.10).
3The instruments used for coal prices are different to those used for electricity prices.
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electricity prices across plants, even within states within industries. With the decrease
in electricity prices, there has been a convergence of electricity prices across plants. The
concurrent fall in prices and secular increase in efficiency provides motivating evidence for
a careful econometric analysis.
Plant level electricity prices are subject to endogeneity concerns in a regression of
electricity productivity on prices. For example, most Indian states have increasing block
tariffs for industry such that plants with higher consumption pay higher prices, or plants
may negotiate discounts or enjoy favourable relationships with state electricity providers,
which could be correlated with their economic position. I use two different instruments to
address these endogeneity concerns, based on the institutional context of Indian electricity
pricing. The first is based on the electricity price paid by other plants in the same state but
in a different industry. I kernel weight them by the distance to the other plants in terms of
the electricity quantity purchased. The second is a Bartik (1991) shift-share instrument
similar to the instrument constructed in Abeberese (2017). The shares are the state level
shares of coal power plants in the total installed generation capacity fixed at a pre-sample
period. These shares are interacted with a representative coal price that is set by coal
companies for power utilities and shifts generation costs.
The bias in the OLS estimates is sizeable. While the OLS based elasticity of electricity
productivity with respect to electricity prices is 0.37, the elasticities are -0.24 and -0.78
for the two IVs, all statistically significant. This positive bias could, for example, arise
from less efficient plants receiving more favourable tariffs or exemptions, perhaps through
corruption. It is worth noting that from a back of the envelope calculation, the size of the
causal estimates from the micro data can explain the entire secular increase in aggregate
electricity productivity remarkably well. I provide a range of robustness checks and an
analysis of heterogeneous effects by industry.
To shed more light on mechanisms, I examine further plant decisions and outcomes.
The effect of prices on output outweighs the effect on electricity consumption. Since total
variable costs decrease, the results suggest that plants scale down with higher electricity
prices. I present evidence that higher electricity prices significantly decrease profits, plant
productivity (TFP), investment, employment, machine to labour ratios and markups. This
is consistent with a setting where electricity prices influence production and investment
decision beyond electricity consumption. Lower prices can incentivise firms to invest in
modern electricity intensive machinery, processes and products. These, in turn, improve
productivity, output and performance.
While there are clear positive effects of the decrease in electricity prices on firm
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performance and electricity productivity, there may have also been effects on consumers.
The decrease in markups suggest that there is imperfect pass-through of electricity costs
to consumers. I estimate the incidence of electricity prices as share of consumer surplus
in total surplus. The degree to which consumers and producers share the surplus is
determined by how well producers can substitute to electricity, by their market power
and demand elasticities, and how marginal costs are passed-through to prices. Ganapati
et al. (2016) show how incidence can be expressed as a function of these parameters in a
generalised oligopoly. I exploit the detailed information on output quantities and prices in
the data to estimate the pass-through elasticities by industry, using the above instruments
for marginal costs, and combine these with my estimates of plant level market power and
demand elasticities to recover pass-through rates and incidence shares at the plant level.
On average, two thirds of the incidence of lower electricity prices fell on consumers. The
pricing of electricity for industry is therefore not only highly relevant for firms, but has
substantial welfare implications for consumers.
There are a number of related papers. The closest paper is perhaps Abeberese (2017).
She studies the effect of electricity prices on firms switching industries within narrow
industries in India, using a similar shift-share instrument. Her analysis covers nine years
beginning in 2000. She finds that higher electricity prices make firms switch to less
electricity-intensive industries, which is consistent with the story of this chapter. She also
finds negative effects on output, TFP, and the machine-labour ratio. The last section of
this chapter can confirm these latter findings using new data over 16 years, with three
times the observations and two different instruments. Similarly, Elliott et al. (2019) find
that higher electricity prices induce firms to switch to less energy-intensive products in
China as well.
In the literature on energy prices and industrial energy efficiency, Davis et al. (2008) is
one of the first studies to use micro data on prices and electricity productivity on a national
scale. They find that the correlation of electricity productivity and electricity prices in US
manufacturing industries is generally positive. An IV based on fuel shares in state power
generation turns the elasticities for a small number of industries negative. Nevertheless,
in contrast to India, this suggests that in a developed country like the US, the effects of
higher electricity prices are dominated by the first channel through cost minimisation and
substitution, rather than the second channel through TFP, investment and size reduction.
This is not to say that the second channel is absent. Deschenes (2011) estimates a −0.12
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elasticity of employment to electricity prices using state-industry level data in the US.4
Aldy and Pizer (2015) find a negative impact of energy prices on output using a long
industry level panel in the US. Linn (2008) also finds a positive elasticity of electricity
productivity to energy prices in the US (0.22).5 Popp (2002) also uses US state level prices
for a bundle of energy to show a positive effect of energy prices on innovation. However,
these elasticities are with respect to an index of all energy sources, not just electricity,
and rely on state level prices. State level prices ignore the substantial heterogeneity in
electricity prices across plants that Davis et al. (2013) report. Kahn and Mansur (2013)
show that energy-intensive industries in the US tend to cluster in low electricity price
counties. Bundling energy prices mix the (potentially opposite) effects of electricity and
coal prices. The Porter and Van der Linde (1995) hypothesis, which postulates firm benefits
from environmental regulation, may apply to fossil fuels, but not necessarily to electricity.
In the developing context, Fisher-Vanden et al. (2004) report a positive elasticity
of electricity productivity to electricity prices (0.23) for a subsample of Chinese firms
in 1997-1999. This is, however, based on OLS regressions and in line with my OLS
estimates.6 Rentschler and Kornejew (2017) examine Indonesian small and micro firms in
2013. They find that firm level electricity prices reduce profitability, but increase (total)
energy efficiency, based on OLS estimates. For India, Golder (2011) found that foreign
firms have a higher energy productivity in 2008, and Sadath and Acharya (2015) report
a negative elasticity of investment to energy prices. In the literature on decomposition
analysis of energy efficiency, Mukherjee (2010, 2012) finds that energy productivity varies
across Indian states, and that firms are not at their efficiency frontier. Ghani et al. (2014)
report an increase in electricity productivity in the 2000s which was mainly through
improvements in existing state-industry clusters.7
This chapter is also related to the literature studying the firm level relationships between
environmental and economic performance. In the developed country context, environmental
policies such as the European Emission Trading scheme or carbon taxes are often found
4In France, Marin and Vona (2017) find an employment elasticity with respect to electricity price of
−0.26 and an electricity consumption elasticity of −0.6. See Cox et al. (2014) for broadly comparable
elasticities for Germany. Marin and Vona (2017) also find a negative −0.11 TFP elasticity.
5His findings suggest that entrants’ energy efficiency respond more to energy prices than that of
incumbents. See also Pizer et al. (2002) who study technology adoption, energy prices and aggregate
energy efficiency.
6See also their later paper (Fisher-Vanden et al., 2016). Using aggregate data, Hang and Tu (2007)
find a negative elasticity of electricity productivity to electricity prices in China after 1995.
7For other decomposition studies of energy productivity, see e.g. Cornillie and Fankhauser (2004)
for Eastern Europe and Liu and Ang (2007) for a review article on decompositions into within-energy
productivity and product mix.
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to improve environmental performance with little to no impact on economic performance
(Martin et al., 2014, 2015; Dechezleprêtre and Sato, 2017).8 This is not at odds with my
findings. Carbon pricing increases fossil fuels prices more than electricity prices and I
find a null effect of coal prices on productivity. As in Acemoglu et al. (2012), it is the
relative price between clean and dirty energy that matters. The role of electricity is special,
because it is a complementary input to modern machinery and production processes (Ryan,
2018). Reducing relative electricity prices can incentivise to improve production techniques
and products, especially in the case of developing countries with already high electricity
prices, as in India.
The chapter also contributes to the literature on energy cost pass-through and incidence.
The recent theoretical literature emphasises the importance of imperfect competition in
accounting for incidence (Weyl and Fabinger, 2013). De Loecker et al. (2016) estimate
imperfect marginal cost pass-through from input tariff reductions in large companies in
India. I estimate marginal cost pass-through allowing for imperfect competition and
input substitution following Ganapati et al. (2016). They study five specific products
in US manufacturing and show that incidence on consumers is lower than under perfect
competition models.9 Miller et al. (2017) study pass-through and incidence in the US
cement industry based on Weyl and Fabinger (2013). They estimate that pass-through of
energy costs is above unity, and the share of incidence of carbon pricing for producers only
11%. I recover the distribution of pass-through rates where some plants and industries also
fully pass on costs. A small literature focuses on energy and emission cost pass-through of
utilities rather than firms (Fabra and Reguant, 2014; Hausman, 2018).
While this chapter focuses on the effects of electricity prices, a related literature focuses
on the reliability of electricity and its implications. This is important in a developing
country context where shortages are frequent. Allcott et al. (2016) show that power
shortages in India reduce revenues by about 5% on average, and distort the plant size
distribution due to returns to scale in self-generation.10 Due to the institutional context
in India, shortages are not related to electricity prices, and I show that they are not
significantly correlated. Nevertheless, I provide robustness analyses for my estimates
8The European Emission Trading scheme might have even spurred innovation (Calel and Dechezlepretre,
2016).
9In my analysis the incidence on consumers is also around 50% lower compared to an alternative perfect
competition assumption.
10See also Alam (2013) for evidence on India using satellite data, and Reinikka and Svensson (2002)
and Foster and Steinbuks (2009) using data of African countries. Ryan (2017) simulates the impact of
transmission capacity improvements on the Indian electricity wholesale market.
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controlling for power shortages.
The findings in this chapter have important policy conclusions. While it is more obvious
that low electricity prices can spur industrial development, it is rather novel evidence that
low electricity prices can also improve energy efficiency (i.e. electricity productivity). In
this context of industrial development and high electricity prices, and in contrast to taxing
fossil fuels for industry, there appears to be little trade-off in electricity pricing between
economic and electricity efficiency goals. Lower prices, however, still increase the quantity
of electricity used. The size of the associated negative environmental externalities depends
on the source of energy in generation, but taxing fossil fuels instead of taxing electricity
use in industry is likely to have net economic and environmental benefits. I contribute
to the literature by exploiting a large nationally representative panel of plants with plant
level information on electricity quantity and expenditure. I develop an instrument for
causal interpretations that is not reliant on additional information and can thus be readily
calculated in similar contexts for other studies.
The rest of the chapter sets the stage with a brief analysis of the Indian electricity
market in Section III.2. While the Indian electricity sector is interesting in its own right,
the insights provide context for the identification strategy. I describe the data used in
Section III.2.2 and present aggregate trends and the dispersion of electricity productivity
and prices in Section III.2.3. Section III.3 develops the empirical strategy. Section III.4
discusses the results, potential mechanisms and incidence before I offer a brief conclusion
in Section III.5.
III.2 India’s electricity sector and descriptive statistics
III.2.1 India’s electricity sector
I briefly discuss the issues that are relevant for identification, interpretation or robustness
checks. These include ownership, type of electricity generation, effects of deregulation,
level of electricity prices and cross-subsidisation, tariff setting, coal prices for utilities, and
outages and self-generation.
India’s electricity generation is dominated by state and central governments. In 1998,
government owned 65% and 30% of installed capacity respectively, with the remaining 5%
owned privately (Ministry of Power, 1998a; Planning Commission, 2001). The Electricity
Act of 2003 aimed to open this heavily regulated sector to more competition.11 This led to
11The preamble states “An Act to consolidate the laws relating to generation [...] of electricity [...],
promoting competition therein [...].”.
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more privately owned power plants entering the electricity generation sector. By 2013, the
share of privately owned capacity rose to 31%, cutting mostly into the share of state-owned
capacity (40%), while the centrally owned share remained at 29% (Planning Commission,
2014). In February 2019, the share of the private sector (46%) was almost equal to the
share of the combined government owned capacity (Central Electricity Authority, 2019).
From 1998 to 2013, total installed capacity rose by 143%.
Most of India’s electricity is generated from thermal plants (74% in 1998, 68% in 2013),
with the remainder produced by hydro (25% in 1998, 18% in 2013) and renewables (1% in
1998, 12% in 2013) (Ministry of Power, 1998a; Planning Commission, 2014). Of the thermal
generation, the lion’s share falls on coal-based generation (around 85% throughout). The
share of thermal generation in a state is mainly determined by the presence of coalfields, as
coal accounts for up to two-thirds of production costs in these plants (IEA, 2015; Abeberese,
2017). I collect geo-referenced data on Indian coalfields and power plants by installed
capacity, ownership and year of commission.12 Figure III.6 in Appendix III.A shows maps
visualising the capacity increase and the clustering of coal-fired plants close to coalfields.
In 2013, a one percent increase in the distance of a district to the nearest coalfield is
associated with a 2 MW lower coal power capacity.13
The opening up of the power market after the Electricity Act of 2003 appears to have
contributed to lower electricity prices. I examine the relationship between the median of
the district level industrial electricity price and the share of installed coal fired capacity
that is privately owned within a district. Table III.8 in Appendix III.B shows that the
share of privately owned plants is significantly negatively associated with median electricity
prices – but only after 2003.14 A one percentage point increase in the share of privately
owned plants decreases median electricity prices by 3%. I use the information on the
distance to coalfields, the timing of the Electricity Act, and the share of privately owned
plants for robustness checks in the empirical analysis below.
Industrial electricity prices are high in India, also due to heavy cross-subsidisation. Part
of the reason why the share of privately owned plants may decrease industrial electricity
prices is that they are not cross-subsidising as heavily between end-users as state and central
12See III.2.2 for sources.
13This is from a regression of installed coal capacity on logged distance to the nearest coalfield, all at
the district level in 2013. This is based on 594 Indian districts. The coefficient is −191.4 with a robust
t-statistic of 3.8 and R2 of 0.066.
14This holds conditional on district and year fixed effects, and conditional on district and region by year
fixed effects. I also control for time-varying total district level installed capacity. As the last column shows,
the share of private thermal capacity is also predicted by the distance to coalfields, which I will use to
construct an instrument for robustness checks.
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governments.15 Average electricity tariffs in 1998 were the equivalent of 15.7 US cents (2004
USD) for industrial users, but only 2.6 and 6.8 cents for agricultural and residential users
respectively, despite cost of supply usually being lower for industry (Ministry of Power,
1998b).16 While agricultural consumers made up 32% of electricity consumption in 1998,
they only accounted for 3.6% of revenues from electricity sales (Planning Commission,
2002). The main reason for the heavy cross-subsidisation is political – farmers form
important voting blocs that the governments try to cater to (Abeberese, 2017).
Despite efforts to reduce cross-subsidisation and depoliticize tariffs based on the Electric-
ity Act (2003), industrial tariffs were still 7.6 US cents (2004 USD) compared to 2.2 cents
for agricultural tariffs in 2013 (Ministry of Power, 2014b). Until 2004, India’s industrial
tariffs were higher than the average G7 tariff (Figure III.20 and Table III.10 in Appendix
III.H) despite being a low-income country. In contrast, residential tariffs have been less
than half of the G7 average.17 While industrial tariffs have typically been above the average
cost of supply, high subsidies are required for the agricultural sector. In part driven by the
heavy cross-subsidisation, state electricity utilities have been loss-making almost across
the board, recovering only between 73% and 89% of annual costs between 1998 and 2013
(Central Electricity Authority, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2018). The comparatively
high industrial tariffs in India are important contextual information for the interpretation
of the results of this chapter.
Individual states can set tariffs and cross-subsidies for different end-users and locations
within their jurisdiction.18 Industrial tariffs mostly follow increasing block tariffs, as
manually collected data from government reports shows.19 The increase of tariffs in
purchase quantity in India is in contrast to block tariffs that are typically decreasing for
industry. In European countries, the tariff band for the largest consumers is on average
15I am somewhat abstracting from generation, transmission and distribution, because utilities and
generation are often integrated in India (Planning Commission, 2001; IEA, 2015).
16For the agricultural and residential tariffs, I calculated a simple average of state-wise average electricity
tariffs, pooling consumption bands. The industrial tariffs are taken from the micro data and are comparable
with reported simple averages. Values are deflated with the fuel and electricity deflator into base year
2004 and the 2004 exchange rate is applied.
17Based on the same data source, residential tariffs in G7 countries increased from 15.3 to 19.7 US cents
(2004 USD).
18There is very limited regional trading of electricity. The networks across regions are in the process of
getting better integrated (IEA, 2015).
19On average, a higher band (of five bands) is associated with a 2.5 percent increase in the tariff. This
is from a regression of manually collected log deflated electricity tariffs at the state-year-band level on
consumption bands, accounting for state-year fixed effects. Figure III.17 in Appendix III.G shows the
average tariffs across Indian states for industrial consumers of five different sizes in 2007, using data from
one of the annual government reports (Central Electricity Authority, 2008).
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less than half of the tariff band for the smallest consumers (Eurostat, 2016). In any case,
increasing or decreasing block tariffs are one of the challenges to identify the effect of
electricity prices on firm performance that I deal with below.
Electricity prices are to be adjusted in line with cost pressures according to the 2003
Electricity Act (see also Abeberese, 2017). Coal is the dominant cost factor in coal-based
electricity production. In terms of coal production, the largest public company Coal India
Limited acts almost as monopoly. It supplied 81% (in 1998) and 63% (in 2013) of total
domestic and imported coal (Minsitry of Coal, 2006, 2015).20 Other public companies
(mainly Singareni Collieries Company Limited) accounted for around 10% while private
companies accounted for only 5% throughout this period. The production, marketing and
price setting of coal is effectively controlled by the government. The prices of coal for
power utilities and industry differ and are set independently.21 Coal price adjustments
for power utilities are mainly due to changes in international coal prices and the cost of
production (Minsitry of Coal, 2006, 2015; Abeberese, 2017). This, in turn, affects the costs
of coal-fired power plants and electricity prices, and provides a rationale for a cost shifting
instrument below.
Since 2010, the coal price also contains an additional tax of 50 | /tonne (4% of the
price) to incentivise cleaner and more energy efficient production and electricity generation.
The Bureau of Energy Efficiency was created in 2002 under the Ministry of Power to
coordinate policies aimed at energy efficiency. The main programmes are small credits for
energy conservation, and subsidies for capital investment and energy audits (Bureau of
Energy Efficiency, 2014). Ryan (2018) provides more details on these and internationally
funded energy efficiency programmes in India.
Total generated electricity fell short of total required electricity by 4%-11% between
1998 and 2013 (Ministry of Power, 2018). Power shortages persist despite falling average
plant load capacity factors from 79% in 2007 to 66% in 2013. In addition, India’s electricity
transmission losses are one of the highest in the world (IEA, 2015). Under peak times,
the power shortages are higher by a few percentage points, partly driven by frequently
occurring outages. Outages led to adoption of electricity generators by larger industrial
plants. Importantly for the analysis below, the adoption of electricity generators is driven
by smoothing over outages, not by electricity prices, since self-generation is typically
20Coal imports grew from 5% to 23% during this period mainly eating into the market share of Coal
India Limited. The share of imported coal specifically for electricity generation was even lower (Ministry
of Power, 2014a).
21This is relevant for the exclusion restriction, which I will discuss further below. See also Figure III.27
in Appendix III.J.
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more expensive than buying electricity.22 Distribution companies are not allowed to
adjust electricity pricing to clear markets as a response to shortages (Allcott et al., 2016).
Therefore, the correlation between annual state level electricity shortages and electricity
prices is insignificant and small (see Table III.9 in Appendix III.C).23 The main reason
for shortages are problems with technical equipment or networks. Coal supply issues are
only responsible for 0.2% to 3.3% of outages in thermal plants24, and while coal supply
affects electricity prices, it is thus unlikely to affect outages. These institutional features
are important for the empirical analysis to identify the effect of electricity prices and not
shortages. I control for shortages in robustness checks.
III.2.2 Data
Plant level data
The main data source is the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), India’s mandatory annual
establishment level manufacturing survey since 1953. Its long history makes it a relatively
reliable data source in the development country context. The survey divides plants into
a census sector (all plants are sampled) and a sampling sector (20% within each state
4-digit-industry strata are sampled).25 The formal firms in the ASI are representative of
two-thirds of manufacturing output (Allcott et al., 2016). By combining the panel and the
cross-sectional editions of the ASI, I retrieved panel identifiers as well as district codes,
which are only available in the respective editions. I use an annual panel from 1998 to
2013 for the main analysis.26
I use the quantity and value of electricity purchased, electricity generated, and the
quantity and value of coal purchased. By dividing electricity purchase value by quantity, I
can calculate the average price paid for electricity at the plant level. I use further plant level
data on output (sales), employees, wages, capital, investment in machineries, intermediate
inputs, and other fuel expenditures (gas and oil). I construct total variable costs as the sum
22Bhattacharya and Patel (2008) estimate self-generation to be around 25% more expensive than buying
electricity.
23This is in line with Allcott et al. (2016) who provide further evidence and show that a rainfall based
instrument for hydro generation is also not correlated with electricity prices in India.
24Calculated as share of total planned and unplanned outages, annually from 1998 to 2009 using data
from Allcott et al. (2016).
25The cutoff for the census classifier is ≥ 100 employees (until 2004 ≥ 200). The sampling frame consists
of all plants ≥ 10 employees with electricity and all plants with ≥ 20 employees without electricity.
26The accounting year in India is from April to March. Throughout the chapter, I refer to the first year
of the accounting year for ASI data and Government reports. So for example, year April 2006 to March
2007 is referred to as 2006.
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of wages, input costs and other expenses, and total revenues as the sum of sales and other
receipts. The difference is total profits. For the analysis of cost pass-through and incidence,
I exploit the information of output sales and output quantity at the plant-product level to
construct a measure of output prices and quantity.27
I winsorize the lowest and highest percentile of each variable within each year to
reduce the sensitivity to outliers.28 All monetary values from all sources are deflated
into a common base year 2004 throughout this chapter.29 I drop observations in non-
manufacturing industries and those with a missing electricity price, electricity productivity
or output. All regressions are weighted by the included sampling multiplier.
Table III.1 shows that after the cleaning steps, there are 485948 plant year observations
from 160955 plants. There is considerable self-generation as the average amount of electricity
self-generated is a quarter of the amount of electricity bought. This is driven by the 35%
of the plants that engage in self-generation, primarily to cope with outages as discussed
in the previous section. Electricity productivity is based on electricity consumed which
is the sum of self-generated and purchased electricity minus electricity sold. The average
electricity productivity is lower when weighting by consumed electricity, which suggests
that larger electricity consumers are less electricity productive.30 On average, electricity
has the largest share in fuel expenditure (0.63).31 Electricity expenditure constitutes on
average about 6% of total average costs. The average electricity price is around seven times
higher than the coal price in kWh equivalent, as coal is a rawer form of energy. Machinery
is the main type of capital and investment (as opposed to e.g. buildings). The average
variable cost markup (total revenues divided by total variable costs) is 20%, slightly lower
than the marginal cost markup of 30%. Marginal cost markups are calculated following
De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). Plant total factor productivity (TFP) are similar
for different methods, following Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) or
27Output prices are the average of product prices, weighted by their quantities.
28I winsorize final variables only. That is electricity productivity (sales divided by electricity use) is
winsorized before sales and electricity use are individually winsorized to avoid double winsorization.
29I deflate outputs and inputs using 3-digit industry deflators, investment and installed capital and
machinery using a machinery deflator, wages, total revenues, total costs and total profits using a state
deflator, and fuels and manually collected tariffs and prices (electricity, coal, gas, oil) using a fuel and
electricity deflator.
30Weighting by consumption maps plant level electricity productivity into aggregate electricity produc-
tivity, comparable with Figure III.2.
31This is similar to the 60% that Marin and Vona (2017) report for France. Note that the share in raw
energy is lower, because electricity prices are much higher per unit of energy than coal, gas or oil prices.
As Figure III.16 in Appendix III.F shows, the share of electricity in the energy mix in terms of energy
units has been between 16 and 20% since 1998.
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Table III.1: Summary statistics from plant level data
Main variables:
Mean
Electricity bought (GWh) 0.82
Electricity generated (GWh) 0.21
Electricity sold (GWh) 0.03
Electricity consumed (GWh) 0.99
Electricity price (| per kWh) 4.57
Output (in mil. | ) 119
Electricity share in total var cost 0.06
Electricity productivity (|per kWh) 449
Electricity productivity (|per | ) 107
Weighted by electricity consumed:
Electricity productivity (|per kWh) 130
Electricity productivity (|per | ) 33
Weighted by fuel consumed:
Electricity share in fuel expenditure 0.63
Observations 485948
Firms 160955
Districts in sample 541
States in sample 32
Regions in sample 6
4-digit industries in sample 133
2-digit industries in sample 22
Additional variables:
Mean Obs.
Employees 72 485344
Total capital (in mil. | ) 36 482756
Mach. capital (in mil. | ) 21 474922
Capital investment (in mil. | ) 8.1 483211
Mach. investment (in mil. | ) 4.1 476043
Total revenue (in mil. | ) 119 485867
Total variable costs (in mil. | ) 101 485867
Total profit (in mil. | ) 17 485867
AC-Markup (Price/AC) 1.2 485867
MC-Markup (Price/MC) 1.3 477712
TFP (Wooldridge) 7.3 477712
TFP (Levinsohn-Petrin) 9.8 477712
TFP (Olley-Pakes) 7 379040
Coal consumed (tonne) 383 485948
Coal price (|per tonne) 4153 49650
Coal price (|per kWh equivalent) .64 49650
Coal productivity (| per th. tonne) 1076 49650
Coal productivity (| per | ) 296 49650
Weighted by coal consumed:
Coal productivity (| per th. tonne) 56 49650
Coal productivity (| per | ) 23 49650
Notes: The table shows the sample means based on the pooled plant level data from 1998-2013. The
means are calculated using the sampling multiplier as weights. Were indicated, the means are additionally
weighted by the consumed electricity, fuel or coal to make the means more representative of aggregate
productivities.
Wooldridge (2009).32
For robustness checks and trends in aggregate statistics, I add the 1993 and 1996 cross
sectional editions of ASI micro data. I also collected aggregate ASI data at the industry
by state by year level from 1967 to 1997 for long run trends.
Additional data
Coal prices for thermal power plants (as opposed to manufacturing plants) are from the
Minsitry of Coal (2012, 2015). I use the published annual pit-head prices specifically for
power utilities customers and inclusive of royalties and taxes, based on a representative
Coal India Limited (CIL) mine and grade selected by the Minsitry of Coal (2012).33 Shares
of coal fired power plants in state installed capacity in 1998 are from the Ministry of Power
32See Chapter I (or Singer (2018)) for the details of an example of the TFP methodology and implemen-
tation of Wooldridge (2009). Markups are calculated following De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) after
estimating production functions following Wooldridge (2009).
33These are the ones of Eastern Coalfields Limited of Coal India Limited, Rajmahal field, Grade E.
These are also in line with those used by Abeberese (2017). After 2011, India switched the coal grading
from Useful Heat Value (UHV) to Gross Calorific Value (GCV). I used the prices of the new grades G9
based on the correspondence given in Minsitry of Coal (2013). Prices are deflated with the electricity and
fuel deflator from Office of the Economic Adviser (2019). Figure III.27 in Appendix III.J plots these prices
in real terms.
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(1998a, 2003).34
For the instrument for plant level coal prices (see Section III.3.4), I use the pit-head
prices specifically for industry with the appropriate coal grades (Minsitry of Coal, 2012,
2015). Geo-located data on Indian coalfields is from Trippi and Tewalt (2011) which I
combine with geo-located data of the 541 districts to calculate distances.
State-level average tariffs by consumer type and size are collected from annual reports
of the Indian Central Electricity Authority (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2015)
and from Indiastat (2019) through Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha questions. Data on
international industrial energy prices comes from IEA (2018), and international GDP
deflators, exchange rates and PPP conversion factors from World Bank (2017). Deflators for
India (industry-wise, electricity and fuel, machinery) are from the Office of the Economic
Adviser (2019) and the state-wise deflator is from the Reserve Bank of India (2019).
Data on state level power shortages comes from the Central Electricity Authority (2006,
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014), and from Allcott et al. (2016) for before
2005.35 Geo-located data on the location, capacity and ownership of coal fired power plants
comes from the Center for Media and Democracy (2017), for gas plants from KAPSARC
(2018), for nuclear plants from NPCIL (2015) and for hydro plants from Gupta and Shankar
(2019).
III.2.3 Trends in electricity productivity and prices
To motivate the empirical analysis, I next present relevant patterns and trends in the data.
Industrial energy efficiency from 1967-2013
Combining the plant level data with sector-state level data from 1967, Figure III.1 plots the
energy productivity in Indian manufacturing over 47 years. I calculate this ratio by dividing
total deflated manufacturing output by total deflated fuel use (electricity, coal, oil, gas).
Between 1967 and 1999, energy productivity was rather constant between 7 and 10 |per
| . From 2000, there was a remarkable increase in energy productivity, which more than
doubled until 2013. This was not driven by a particular industry alone. Figure III.10 in
Appendix III.E shows that a similar trend appears from 2000 for different industry groups.
Furthermore, Figure III.7 in Appendix III.D shows that similar trends occurred across
34Thermal shares as on 31st of March 1998, one day before the beginning of the sample I use. Chhattisgarh,
Jharkhand and Uttarakhand were created in 2000, and thermal shares correspond to 31st of Jan 2003, the
first available data. I follow Abeberese (2017) using these shares.
35Data on the type of forced outages are also from Allcott et al. (2016).
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Figure III.1: Indian long run energy productivity in manufacturing
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Notes: The figure plots annual energy productivity ratios (value of output divided by the value of fuel
and electricity used). Output is deflated at the 2-digit industry level using 2-digit industry deflators
before aggregating over industries. Fuel and electricity use is deflated using a general fuel and electricity
wholesale price deflator. The ratio of aggregate output to aggregate fuel and electricity consumption is
displayed. The base year for deflation is 2004 throughout this chapter. Wholesale price deflators are from
the Office of the Economic Adviser from the Government of India. From 1967 to 1997 the raw ASI data in
pre-aggregated form is used (at industry state year aggregation). From 1998 the raw plant level ASI data
is used and aggregated with sampling multipliers.
all states. This secular increase in India is entirely different than the evolution in OECD
countries, as Figure III.15 in Appendix III.F shows. The increase in energy productivity
is consistent with the drop in emission intensity from 1990-2010 for a subsample of large
firms reported in Barrows and Ollivier (2018). The fuel with the highest share in energy
costs is electricity. I next examine electricity productivity.
Industrial electricity productivity and prices 1993-2013
Figure III.2 mirrors a similar trend in aggregated electricity productivity in output per
kWh from 1993 using solely micro data. From 2000 electricity productivity increased
by 35%.36 This trend did not occur because of substitution away from electricity. The
share of electricity in fuel expenditure was 65% in 2000 and 63% in 2013.37 Interestingly,
electricity prices fell from 1999/2000 during this secular increase in electricity productivity,
and almost halved by 2013 (right panel of Figure III.2). The purpose of this chapter is to
36Also the “other” fuel productivity increased considerably since 2000, as Figure III.14 in Appendix III.F
shows.
37It was around 16 to 20% in energy unit terms, as Figure III.16 in Appendix III.F shows.
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analyse whether there is a causal mechanism relating those two trends. In fact, the two
figures of aggregate data visualise the causal results surprisingly well. A regression of the
aggregate logged electricity productivity on aggregate logged electricity prices yields an
elasticity of -0.4. This is the opposite sign of the OLS plant level estimate, but remarkably
close to the IV estimates in the main analysis.
The increase in electricity productivity occurred in all sectors, except for perhaps
metals and minerals (see Figure III.11 in Appendix III.E), and in most states (see Figure
III.8 in Appendix III.D). Alternative data sources (IEA, 2016; UNIDO, 2016a) match
the pattern of electricity productivity in Figure III.15 in appendix III.F. The secular
electricity price decline is similar within states (Figure III.9) and within industries (Figure
III.12). Two alternative sources of electricity prices confirm the price trends. Figure III.18
plots the electricity price index in real terms from the Office of the Economic Adviser
(2019) (Appendix III.G), and Figure III.19 plots the average of industrial electricity tariffs
collected from the reports of the Central Electricity Authority. The price trend in the
2000s is in contrast to many other countries, where electricity prices rather increased.
Figure III.20 (Appendix III.H) plots industrial electricity prices for a range of OECD and
non-OECD countries. While electricity prices in India almost halved during the sample
period, prices in OECD countries grew by 40% (see Table III.10).38
In summary, the trends are similar across different data sources, and provide a rather
unique setting to study their relationship.
III.2.4 Heterogeneity in electricity productivity and prices
Is there much variation to explain across plants? The aggregate graphs in Figure III.2
mask substantial heterogeneity, both in terms of productivity and prices. Figure III.3
plots the histogram of electricity productivity and prices in 2003.39 Even when partialling
out state-industry (4-digit) effects, there remains substantial variation. The 90th to 10th
percentile range drops from 3.5 to 2.7 for logged electricity productivity, and from 2.1 to
1.4 | for electricity prices. The electricity productivity dispersion is even larger than the
TFP dispersions found in the literature (Bartelsman and Doms, 2000; Syverson, 2004b,
2011). Plants at the 90th percentile pay around 50% higher electricity prices than those at
the 10th percentile.
I decompose the variance following Davis et al. (2013) (see Figure III.4 for details).
38See Sato et al. (2019) for more evidence on general price trends in various countries since 1995. They
show that electricity is the most important fuel when accounting for overall energy prices.
39Similar plots are shown in Figure III.21 and Figure III.22 in Appendix III.I for all years.
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Figure III.2: Electricity productivity and electricity prices in manufacturing
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Notes: The left panel plots annual electricity productivity ratios (value of output divided by the quantity
of electricity used in kWh). They are calculated by first aggregating the value of output and the quantity
of electricity bought by plants, and then taking the ratio of the aggregates. The right panel plots real
average electricity prices. They are calculated by first aggregating the value of electricity bought by plants
and the quantity bought, and then taking the ratio of the aggregates. Plant output is deflated using
3-digit industry deflators before aggregating over industries. Electricity values are deflated using a general
fuel and electricity wholesale price deflator. The base year for deflation is 2004 throughout this chapter.
Wholesale price deflators are from the Office of the Economic Adviser from the Government of India. All
data points come from the raw plant level ASI data (from 711166 observations including years before 1998)
and aggregated with sampling multipliers.
Figure III.3: Heterogeneity in electricity productivity and in electricity prices
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Notes: The left panel plots the histogram of plant level logged electricity productivity in 2003. Electricity
productivity ratios are the value of output divided by the quantity of electricity used in kWh. The kernel
density plot to the left shows the distribution of the residuals of logged electricity productivity after
partialling out state by 4-digit industry by year fixed effects. The right panel plots the histogram of plant
level electricity prices in 2003. The kernel density plot to the left shows the distribution of the residuals of
electricity price after partialling out state by 4-digit industry by year fixed effects. Both panels are similar
for all years as shown in Figure III.21 and Figure III.22 in Appendix III.I. Plant output is deflated using
3-digit industry deflators. Electricity prices are deflated using a general fuel and electricity wholesale price
deflator. The base year for deflation is 2004 throughout this chapter. Wholesale price deflators are from
the Office of the Economic Adviser from the Government of India.
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Figure III.4: Electricity productivity and price variance decomposition
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Notes: The left panel plots the annual total variance of logged electricity productivity and the variance
explained by specified groups. The right panel plots the same for logged electricity prices. The annual
variance is calculated as V =
∑
e se (pe − p)2 , where se are purchase weights multiplied by the sample
multiplier, pe are logged electricity productivity or prices, p the weighted average log productivity or price.
I use the decomposition of Davis et al. (2013) to decompose total variance into a within “group” component
VW , and a component across “groups” V G:
V =
∑
e se
(
pe − pg
)2
+
∑
g sg
(
pg − p
)2
= VW + V G
where sg =
∑
e∈g se and pg the weighted average of log productivity or price within group g. I calculate
the decomposition separately five times for the five groups shown in the graph. The regions plot V G and
correspond to the across-group variance in the total variance V , where higher shares explain more of the
variation (see also Figure III.23). Groups are deciles of electricity purchase quantity, 4-digit industries,
states, and combinations. Plant output and electricity prices are deflated.
Figure III.5: CDFs of plant electricity productivity and prices in 2003 conditional on 2002
quartiles
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Notes: Plotted are the CDFs in 2003, separately for each quartile of the respective values in 2002. The
left panel shows the distribution of the logged electricity productivity (i.e. the value of output divided by
the electricity use in kWh). The right panel shows the distribution of the electricity price. The CDFs are
empirical CDFs obtained through a Gaussian kernel smoother with bandwidth 0.1. The graphs show that
each higher quartile first order stochastically dominates the lower quartiles. The conditional CDF of the
plants that belong to the higher previous year quartile lies to the right of the CDF of the plants belonging
to the lower previous year quartile. While individual plants move up and down the ranking of electricity
productivity and energy prices from one year to the next, the probability of higher productivity and prices
increases in last periods productivity and prices. The conditional CDFs for other years look similar, see
Figure III.25. Plant output and electricity prices are deflated.
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The state-industry effects can only account for around 60% of the cross-sectional variance
in electricity prices, and 50% of electricity productivity (see Figure III.23 in Appendix
III.I).40 For electricity productivity, there is more variation across industries, while for
electricity prices there is more variation across states. This is intuitive, as production
techniques tend to vary more across industries, while electricity price setting varies more
by states as explained in Section III.2.1. The main analysis accounts for industry by year
by region fixed effects to account for differences in electricity productivity across industries.
Importantly, we learn from these descriptives that there is enough interesting variation left
after accounting for these fixed effects.
The deciles of electricity consumption in India cannot explain much of the variance.
This is in contrast to the findings for the US (Davis et al., 2013) and France (Marin and
Vona, 2017) and consistent with the observation in Section III.2.1 that tariff schedules are
increasing or decreasing in India. The variance in electricity prices has been decreasing
from 1998 to 2013. Figure III.24 in Appendix III.I plots quantiles of the distribution
over time and shows a convergence in electricity prices that accompanied the secular
decline. Interestingly, when we compare the decrease in the total variance of electricity
prices in Figure III.4 with the constant shares in Figure III.23, we can conclude that the
convergence has not been driven by reductions across industries or states alone, but by
overall convergence.
Finally, I study the persistence of electricity productivity and prices within plants.
Following Farinas and Ruano (2005), I plot the conditional (on previous period values)
CDF of logged electricity productivity and electricity prices in Figure III.5. I divide
the sample into four quartiles based on previous period values and plot the four CDFs
separately. As the CDF of the higher quartiles are to the right for every value, they first
order stochastically dominate the distributions of plants ranked in lower previous period
quartiles to the left. Plants from a higher previous quartile are more likely to belong to the
higher quartile in the current period.41 Both electricity productivity and electricity prices
are persistent. The implication of this persistence for the analysis is that I use variation
within and across plants, which I will discuss in the next section.
40Variation across districts (not plotted) can explain around 22% and 45% of electricity productivity
and electricity prices respectively. Districts for the later years are not available for all observations.
41See Figure III.23 in Appendix III.I for the same conclusion for a different year.
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III.3 Empirical strategy
There are substantial endogeneity concerns when estimating the relationship between
electricity productivity and electricity prices. The baseline specification is:
yjisrt = β log(P
E)jisrt + αirt + jisrt (III.1)
where yjisrt is the logged outcome (electricity productivity as output divided by elec-
tricity consumed in kWh) for plant j in industry i in state s in region r in year t, and PE
is the electricity price. The analysis is conditional on 4-digit industry by region by year
fixed effects αirt. This accounts for aggregate technology and price trends that can differ
by industry.42 India is divided into six regions, and there is poor integration of electricity
markets across regions (IEA, 2015; Ryan, 2017; Ministry of Power, 2018), and therefore
αirt allows for differential fixed effects across regions.
III.3.1 Endogeneity concerns
Within these clusters, there are still endogeneity concerns. The exogenous component of
prices log(PE)jisrt are mostly at the state-year or district-year level as discussed in Section
III.2.1. These are price adjustment due to electricity generation cost pressures for example.
However, log(PE)jisrt also contain endogenous variation. Suppose the endogenous elements
contained in the price can be expressed as ξjisrt at the plant level and λisrt at the industry
level within states. Both these elements are also contained in the composite error term
jisrt = ξjisrt + λisrt + µjisrt, where µjisrt is the true random component. Using plant fixed
effects would not address any endogeneity that is time varying at the plant level. I return
to additional problems associated with plant fixed effects in Section III.3.6. Industry by
state by year effects would eliminate most exogenous variation as well. My strategy is to
rely on instruments which are not correlated with λisrt and ξjisrt and therefore isolate the
exogenous price variation. Before explaining my identification strategy I describe the main
endogeneity concerns.
First, shocks to output and electricity demand (in ξjisrt) also affect electricity prices
due to different tariffs for different consumption bands (see e.g. Figure III.17 in Appendix
III.G). Second, plants or groups of firms within an industry may negotiate or exert pressure
for lower electricity prices (in ξjisrt and λisrt). Their bargaining power in turn is likely
42There are 133 4-digit industries in the final sample. There are six regions, 32 states and 541 districts
in the final sample.
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related to their economic performance as well. This can lead to reverse causality problems
at the plant level. Third, shocks to industries and regions may jointly affect economic
performance, electricity productivity and electricity pricing (in λisrt). The third concern
is at least partially taken care of by the industry by region by year effects. Prices may
also be adjusted across the board as a response to changes in electricity productivity and
electricity demand. I use lagged electricity prices to address reverse causality issues at the
more aggregate level and find similar results. Fourth, even within states, plants may locate
where electricity prices are low and that may be correlated to their electricity productivity
and consumption (in ξjisrt). Sixth, average electricity prices at the plant level may suffer
from measurement error (in ξjisrt). The two instruments discussed next aim to isolate the
exogenous variation in prices from ξjisrt and λisrt.
III.3.2 An instrument based on other plants (IV A)
The main idea of the first instrument is to extract the exogenous signal of the prices by
relying on prices of other plants, which must also have been affected by exogenous electricity
price changes. The exogenous part is mainly at the state-year level. Some weighted average
of other plants could therefore extract the common exogenous signal. In order to avoid
capturing the endogenous component λisrt in the instrument as well, I rely on information
of plants in the same state, but in different industries. Specifically, I use prices of plants
with similar purchase quantities in the same year, in the same state, but in different 2-digit
industries i2d. The underlying assumption is that the endogenous components λisrt are not
correlated across 2-digit industries within a state. They are allowed to be correlated across
4-digit industries within 2-digit industries.43 Recall that industry by region by year effects
are taken out, so the element in λisrt common within regions are allowed to be correlated
across 2-digit industries as well. The second assumption is that the (weighted) average of
ξjisrt of plants in other industries is not correlated to the plant specific ξjisrt.
I use plants with similar purchase quantities to address the structure of tariffs which
are based on purchase quantities. The instrument is a weighted average of prices of other
plants, weighted by the distance in their purchase quantities, which smooths out individual
43There are 22 2-digit industries and 133 4-digit industries in the final sample.
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shocks. I use a triangular kernel function to determine weights:
wq∗(qj) =

bq∗−|log(qj)−log(q∗)|
b2
q∗
log(qj) ∈ [log(q∗)− bq∗ , log(q∗) + bq∗ ],
∀sj = sj∗ , tj = tj∗ , i2dj 6= i2dj∗ .
0 otherwise
(III.2)
where q∗ is the electricity quantity purchased in kWh by plant j∗ that we want to
create the instrument for, and qj is the electricity quantity purchased by other plants j.
The cutoff bq∗ is the 25th percentile of the distribution of the logged ratio of the purchase
quantities in absolute terms |log(qj)− log(q∗)|, and is thus allowed to vary by plant j∗
that we want to instrument for.44 That is, the support of the kernel weights is over the
25% of plants that are closest in terms of electricity purchased, conditional on being in the
same state sj = sj∗ and year tj = tj∗ and in different 2-digit industries i2dj 6= i2dj∗ , and the
weight decreases linearly in the distance of logged purchase quantity. The first instrument
IV A for the electricity price of plant j∗ is then the average of the electricity prices of other
plants PEjisrt, weighted by the triangular kernel weights:
IV Aj∗isrt = P
E
jisrt
wq∗(qj)∑
qj
wq∗(qj)
(III.3)
This instrument alleviates the concerns laid out above. It takes care of bargaining
power and price distortions through corruption of a particular plant, as well as groups of
plants within an industry, as only plants from all other 2-digit industries are considered.
The kernel smooths over the discontinuities of different consumption and price bands. The
instrument also takes care of plant location sorting within states and measurement error of
prices at the plant level. What the instrument captures are price movements at the state
level for similar consumption quantities, which are primarily driven by generation cost
factors (see Section III.2.1) after filtering out the endogenous components described above.
The instrument is similar to the Hausman instruments in demand estimation, which
instrument goods prices with prices of the same good in other cities (Hausman et al.,
1994; Hausman, 1996; Nevo, 2001). They are relevant because they share the common
marginal costs of producing the good (electricity). My (and the Hausman) instruments
assume that there are no endogenous factors that are common across plants from different
(2-digit) industries that affect their electricity productivity and the pricing of electricity
44The advantage of a bandwidth that is flexible rather than fixed is to ensure that enough observations
are used for the construction of the instruments. I also tried the 10th and the 50th percentile, as well as a
fixed cutoff based on the average 25th percentile, with similar results.
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simultaneously. In a robustness check, I also exclude plants from the instrument which are
based in the same district (IV C). This allows for endogenous components in prices that
are spatially correlated within districts, and the results are quantitatively very similar.
The advantage of this instrument is that it can be readily calculated in other settings.
This facilitates comparable analyses and further explorations of the relationship between
electricity prices and electricity productivities in developing vs. developed, as well as in
high price vs. low price, countries. Future work will follow up on this.
III.3.3 A shift-share instrument based on electricity generation (IV B)
The main idea for the second instrument is to use a cost shifter for electricity generation
directly, following Abeberese (2017).45 Since coal is the largest cost factor in electricity
generation (see Section III.2.1), the price of coal shifts electricity generation costs, and
therefore electricity prices. The instrument is based on a shift-share structure as in Bartik
(1991). The shifters are nationally representative coal prices specifically for power utilities
(see Section III.2.2). It is weighted by the shares of thermal coal fired installed capacity in
total installed capacity at the state level:
IV Bsrt = log(P
CoalPower
t )
coal based installed capacitysr1998
total installed capacitysr1998
(III.4)
I use the pre-sample shares of installed capacity in March 1998. I provide a map of the
thermal shares in Figure III.26 in Appendix III.J. As discussed in Section III.2.2, the coal
price for power utilities is set independently to the coal price for industry, and is thus
unlikely to directly affect manufacturing plants. Figure III.27 in Appendix III.J plots both
coal prices in real terms, and shows that often one decreases while the other increases at
the same time.46
This isolates the exogenous movements in electricity prices, driven by cost pressures
from coal prices. It addresses the endogeneity concerns raised in the beginning of the
section, including common endogenous movements in electricity productivity and electricity
prices at the state-year level, as the coal price used in the instrument does not vary across
states. While the coal prices for power utilities and industries are set independently, I also
exclude industries that use coal in the sectoral analysis and find similar results.
45A similar shift-share instrument for energy prices relying on thermal shares in generation has been
used in Abeberese (2017), Ganapati et al. (2016) and Elliott et al. (2019). Linn (2008) and Marin and
Vona (2017) use national energy prices directly interacted with fixed fuel shares at the plant level.
46See also Abeberese (2017) for more discussion.
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An advantage of instrument IV B is that it might be less susceptible to the above
described specific types of common shocks that threaten the validity of instrument IV A, if
they exist. The two disadvantages of IV B are that it tends to be much weaker than IV A
and that it relies on external data.
III.3.4 Two similar instruments for coal prices (IV E and IV F )
In Section III.4.4 I compare the effect of electricity prices to the effect of coal prices. This
provides additional support for the hypothesis that electricity prices can have distinct
effects. Specifically, I ask whether higher electricity prices have more adverse effects than
higher coal prices. Coal prices suffer from a similar endogeneity concern as electricity prices.
I construct two instruments that are similar to the ones above. The first instrument, IV E
is the analogue to IV A, using coal prices of plants in the same state, but from different
2-digit industries, without the kernel weights. The second instrument, IV F , is a shift-share
instrument like IV B. The shares are the logged distances of district centroids to the
nearest coalfields. The distance increases sourcing costs. The shifter is the nationally
representative coal price (at pit heads) for industry (as opposed to power utilities), taken
from the Minsitry of Coal (2012, 2015). The location of coalfields is illustrated in Figure
III.6 in Appendix III.A.
III.3.5 Recovering pass-through rates and consumer incidence
While plants have to pay the electricity costs, the incidence of higher electricity prices
may be shared between producers and consumers. The degree to which incidence falls on
consumers depends on one hand on the degree to which electricity prices affect marginal
costs (γ ≡ dMC/dPE), which depends on the ability to substitute. On the other hand, it
depends on the pass-through rate of marginal costs to output prices (ρMC ≡ dP/dMC),
which depends on market structure and market power. I employ a partial equilibrium
analysis following Ganapati et al. (2016) that allows for factor substitution, incomplete
pass-through and imperfect competition. As they show, under the assumption that average
variable costs are equal to marginal costs (AV C = MC) incidence on consumers in a
generalised oligopoly, where CS and PS are consumer and producer surplus, is:
I ≡ dCS/dP
E
dPS/dPE
=
ρMC
1− (1− LD) ρMC (III.5)
where ρMC ≡ dP/dMC is the pass-through rate of marginal costs to prices, L ≡ (P −
MC)/P is the Lerner (1934) index, and D ≡ −[dQ/dP ][P/Q] the market elasticity of
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demand. I next describe how I recover the three required parameters L, and D and ρMC .
There is an established literature recovering markups µ from the production side
from firm revenue and input data (Hall, 1988, 1990; Hall and Jones, 1999; De Loecker
and Warzynski, 2012). The basic intuition is that if plants are cost minimising, we can
use the first order condition of a variable input, which describes a relationship between
markups, the output elasticity of that input, and the revenue share of that input. I follow
this literature to estimate plant level markups (µ) and the plant level Lerner index L,
using materials as variable input. I estimate the output elasticity along with TFP using
Wooldridge (2009) building on Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
It is well know that for standard oligopolistic environments, the first order conditions
of firm profit maximisation imply a mapping between markups and demand elasticities.47
For the market level demand elasticities D, I take the median of the plant level demand
elasticities within a 4-digit industry by year by state cluster.48 Market demand conditions
are thus allowed to vary across industries, time and space. The alternative is to estimate
demand functions as e.g. in Ganapati et al. (2016). The two approaches require different
assumptions. Since we need to estimate markups and production functions in any case
and assume oligopolistic competition and cost minimisation already, the additional profit
maximisation assumption to recover demand elasticities appears innocuous. Independently
of how demand elasticities are recovered, the main challenge is to get estimates for the
pass-through.
Estimating the pass-through parameter ρMC requires data on revenues and output
quantity. The most direct way is to regress prices on marginal cost. Revenues and quantities
are separately reported for most plants in the data, which allows me to calculate average
sales prices at the plant-product level. I calculate the plant level average price across
products, weighted by the quantity of each product. From the estimated plant level price
marginal cost markups µ, I can back out plant level marginal costs with these prices. I
recover prices and marginal costs for 87% of the 485948 observations, covering 121 of
the 133 4-digit industries. Since I also construct total variable cost, I can recover AV C
by dividing total variable costs by quantity. This allows me to examine the validity of
the underlying assumption (AV C = MC) for Equation (III.5). A regression of logged
AV C on logged MC yields a coefficient of 0.98 and an R2 of 0.95, which suggests that the
47For example, see the first chapter of this thesis.
48Plant level markups (and demand elasticities) can diverge from the market demand elasticities due
to distortions for example. The first chapter of this thesis provides a good example of such distortions
(alternatively see Singer (2018)). Taking the median or mean of production or demand elasticities is
common in the literature, see e.g. Asker et al. (2014). The median is more robust to outliers.
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assumption is not unreasonable.
The pass-through parameter ρMC is likely to differ by industry and firms, depending for
example on the market structure, concentration or market power. I estimate a pass-through
elasticity for each 4-digit industry separately, regressing prices (log(P )) on marginal costs
(log(MC)). I instrument for the endogenous marginal costs using the two instruments
for the electricity price IV A and IV B described above.49 The pass-through elasticity is
converted into the pass-through rate ρMC by multiplying it with the plant level markup µ.
To summarise, the empirical components are:
L̂jisrt = 1− 1
µ̂jisrt
(III.6)
̂D,isrt = MEDIANisrt
(
1
1− 1/µ̂jisrt
)
(III.7)
ρ̂MC,jisrt = µ̂jisrt
̂d log(Pjisrt)
d log(MCjisrt)
(III.8)
Finally, the incidence of consumer surplus as share of total incidence is:
Ishare = I/(1 + I) (III.9)
III.3.6 Specification choice and estimation
I conclude this section by making a few remarks about model specifications and estimation.
First, I do not include state by year effects for the baseline specification. This is because
IV B only varies at the state by year level and most of the exogenous variation is also at
the state by year level.
Second, I do not include plant fixed effects for the baseline specification. This is
primarily because the IVs address time varying plant unobservables, while plant fixed
effects cannot address those. On the contrary, plant fixed effects could introduce bias
because of violations of the strict exogeneity assumption that comes with it. Past shocks
to output and electricity productivity are likely correlated with current electricity prices,
as block tariffs increase or decrease with consumption, violating the strict exogeneity
condition for fixed effects. Moreover, much of the interesting variation is between plants.
I showed in Section III.2.4 that electricity productivity and prices are persistent within
49Endogeneity concerns arise for example because marginal costs are estimated leading to measurement
error. I use the instruments separately. For each industry, I take the weighted average of the two IV
coefficients, where the weights are the t-statistics.
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plants. A regression of logged electricity productivity on plant fixed effects can explain
80% of the variation (R2). Additionally, including plant fixed effects can be thought of as
exploiting shorter-run variation, as in Ganapati et al. (2016) for example. The mechanisms
in this chapter, e.g. scaling and upgrading production processes, are likely to be more
relevant in the medium to longer run. In robustness checks, I included state trends or
plant fixed effects, which leaves us with broadly similar conclusions.
Third, I exploit the panel structure for calculation of standard errors in all specifications.
I two-way cluster standard errors at the plant level, and at the state by year level, since
one of the instruments varies at that level. I provide robustness checks clustering at the
district, and the region by year level with similar results. Since I am running the same
model with multiple outcomes, I apply the Holm (1979) Bonferroni correction for multiple
hypothesis testing in Table III.21 in Appendix III.M. Finally, I use the two instruments
separately to enable comparisons, but provide an over-identified IV-regression with two
instruments as robustness check.
III.4 Results
I first present the main results, along with robustness checks. Then I explore mechanisms
and calculate incidence towards the end of this section.
III.4.1 Electricity prices and electricity productivity, use and output
First stages
The first stage coefficients, standard errors and Kleibergen Paap F-statistic are reported in
each table for each regression separately. For the main specifications, Table III.2 shows
that both instruments are strong and shift the endogenous electricity price in the expected
direction.
Lower electricity prices improve electricity productivity
The correlation between electricity prices and electricity productivity is positive. An
OLS regression of logged electricity productivity on logged electricity prices suggests an
elasticity of 0.37 (Column (1) in Table III.2). The endogeneity bias in these estimates is
large, however. The causal IV estimates in Column (2) and (3) are of opposite sign and
statistically highly significant. A one percent increase in electricity prices is associated with
a 0.24 or 0.78 percent decrease in electricity productivity for the IV A based on other plants
and the shift-share IV B respectively. The positive bias in the OLS estimates suggests
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Table III.2: Electricity prices and electricity productivity
Electricity productivity (log)
(1) (2) (3)
log(PE)
0.366*** -0.239*** -0.776***
(0.044) (0.070) (0.105)
OLS/IV OLS IV A IV B
Observations 485948 485948 485948
Ind-region-year FE Yes Yes Yes
First stage coef. - 0.97*** 0.06***
First stage SE - 0.005 0.003
F-stat (Kleib.-Paap) - 43147.813 296.255
SE clustered by Plant Plant Plant
No. of first clusters 160955 160955 160955
SE clustered by State-year State-year State-year
No. of second clusters 501 501 501
Notes: The dependent variable is logged electricity productivity (value of output divided by the quantity of electricity used
in kWh). Each column represents a separate regression at the plant level. The first column reports the results from an OLS
regression on logged electricity prices. The second column uses the IV A based on the electricity prices of similar plants.
The third column uses the shift-share IV B . The first stage statistics are reported. All regressions contain industry by year
by region fixed effects. Regressions are weighted by the recorded sampling multiplier. Standard errors in parentheses are
two-way clustered at the plant and the state by year level. Plant output is deflated using 3-digit industry deflators and
electricity prices are deflated using a general fuel and electricity wholesale price deflator.
that less efficient plants also manage to obtain lower electricity prices through deliberate
exemptions, negotiations, corruption or location choices, for example. The effect is more
strongly negative for IV B, which could be due to heterogeneous local average treatment
effects, but it is reassuring that both instruments significantly correct the OLS bias in the
same direction.
As documented in Section III.2.3, there was a secular increase in aggregate electricity
productivity (35%) with a concurrent reduction in electricity prices of 45% during the
sample period . How well can the causal estimates from micro data explain this aggregate
phenomenon? In a back of the envelope calculation taking the average of the IV A
and IV B estimates as -0.51, the documented reduction of electricity prices predicts a
(1− 0.45)−0.51 = 36% increase in electricity productivity. Considering that the simple OLS
correlation is of opposite sign, these estimates can explain the aggregate secular trends
remarkably well.
Electricity prices affect electricity consumption and output
Why have lower electricity prices improved electricity productivity in India? Higher
electricity prices still do reduce electricity consumption. Table III.3a presents the regressions
split up into the components of electricity productivity, with logged electricity consumption
(in kWh) or logged output as dependent variables. In both the OLS and IV regressions,
electricity prices reduce electricity consumption, with the causal effect being slightly larger.
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Table III.3: Electricity prices, output, electricity use, and lagged electricity prices
(a) Electricity prices, output and electricity use
Output (log)) Electricity consumption (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(PE)
-0.0265 -0.743*** -1.597*** -0.385*** -0.479*** -0.797***
(0.073) (0.143) (0.153) (0.064) (0.155) (0.148)
OLS/IV OLS IV A IV B OLS IV A IV B
Observations 485948 485948 485948 485948 485948 485948
Ind-region-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First stage coef. - 0.97*** 0.06*** - 0.97*** 0.06***
First stage SE - 0.005 0.003 - 0.005 0.003
F-stat (Kleib.-Paap) - 43147.813 296.255 - 43147.813 296.255
Two-way cluster plant state-year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(b) Lagged electricity prices and electricity productivity
Electricity productivity (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(PE)
0.296*** -0.272*** -0.735***
(0.049) (0.062) (0.087)
Lagged log(PE) 0.0177 -0.274*** -0.727***(0.042) (0.060) (0.086)
OLS/IV OLS IV A IV B OLS IV A(lag) IV B(lag)
Observations 225833 225833 225833 225833 225833 225833
Ind-region-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First stage coef. - 0.98*** 0.06*** - 0.98*** 0.07***
First stage SE - 0.005 0.003 - 0.005 0.003
F-stat (Kleib.-Paap) - 46140.249 421.264 - 39687.361 405.830
SE clustered by Plant Plant Plant Plant Plant Plant
No. of first clusters 67834 67834 67834 67834 67834 67834
SE clustered by State-year State-year State-year State-year State-year State-year
No. of second clusters 469 469 469 469 469 469
Notes: The dependent variable in panel (a) is logged output or logged electricity consumption (in kWh) as indicated. The
dependent variable in panel (b) is logged electricity productivity (value of output divided by the quantity of electricity used
in kWh). Each column represents a separate regression at the plant level. The first three columns in panel (b) restrict the
sample to the same observations as in the last three columns, where lagged logged electricity prices (and lagged instruments)
are used. Regressions are weighted by the recorded sampling multiplier. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered
at the plant and the state by year level. The rest of the table layout follows the same structure as the main Table III.2.
A one percent increase in electricity prices reduces physical electricity consumption by 0.49
to 0.81 percent.
The OLS effect of electricity prices on output is close to zero. In contrast, the IV
estimates of the output elasticity are large and negative (between -0.74 and -1.59). The
endogeneity bias operates through both electricity consumption and output, but mainly
through the latter. Tariff schedules that increases in size biases OLS output estimates
upwards. The effects on electricity consumption and output are close to the ones in
Abeberese (2017). While she does not examine electricity productivity at the plant level,
she finds that firms with high electricity prices produce products that are typically less
electricity intensive on average, suggesting product switching as a channel. I will explore
further mechanisms in Section III.4.4.
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Table III.4: Electricity prices and electricity productivity in high price periods
Electricity productivity (log)
(1) (2) (3)
log(PE)
0.471*** 0.00847 -0.732***
(0.061) (0.094) (0.168)
log(PE) · 1(year < 2006) -0.217** -0.531*** -0.0926(0.084) (0.128) (0.193)
OLS/IV OLS IV A IV B
Observations 485948 485948 485948
Ind by region by year FE Yes Yes Yes
First stage coef. 1/1 - 0.96*** 0.06***
First stage SE 1/1 - 0.006 0.005
First stage coef. 1/2 - 0.03*** 0.01
First stage SE 1/2 - 0.009 0.007
First stage coef. 2/1 - -0.00*** -0.00***
First stage SE 2/1 - 0.000 0.000
First stage coef. 2/2 - 0.99*** 0.06***
First stage SE 2/2 - 0.007 0.005
F-stat (Kleibergen-Paap) - 11055.255 68.011
Two-way cluster plant state-year Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is logged electricity productivity (value of output divided by the quantity of electricity used in
kWh). Each column represents a separate regression at the plant level. The independent variables are the logged electricity
price, and an interaction with a dummy that is one for all years before 2006. Instruments are interacted in the same way. The
first stage statistics refer to variable 1 and corresponding instrument 1 etc. Note that mainly the corresponding instruments
shift the variables (i.e. 1/1 and 2/2). Regressions are weighted by the recorded sampling multiplier. Standard errors in
parentheses are two-way clustered at the plant and the state by year level. The rest of the table layout follows the same
structure as the main Table III.2.
III.4.2 Stronger effect during high price periods
Next, I examine whether the effect was stronger for high price periods. It is likely that
decreasing electricity prices have particularly strong effects on output when electricity
prices are at high levels already. This particularly discourages plants from using electricity
associated with modern productive production processes. The nature of the comparatively
high Indian electricity prices (see Section III.2.1 and Appendix III.H) and the subsequent
halving of prices during the sample period (Figure III.2) lend itself to test this hypothesis.
I interact the electricity price with an indicator for the first eight years of the sample
periods in Table III.4. The average real price in the first eight years was 5.5 |per kWh
compared to 3.8 |per kWh in the second eight years. The interaction term is negative
for both IV and the OLS specifications. For the IV A, the entire effect is driven by the
period where electricity prices were high. For IV B, the interaction effect is negative as
well, but insignificant.50 This suggests that the negative implications of high electricity
prices on output and electricity productivity are particularly relevant in contexts with high
electricity prices.
50The conclusions are similar when looking at three periods as in Table III.17 in Appendix III.K.
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III.4.3 Robustness and further analysis
I conduct a range of robustness checks, with most of the results in Appendix III.K. First,
I use lagged prices and lagged instruments to allow for some time to adjust to prices.
This also addresses potential remaining reverse causality concerns. Using lags cuts the
sample in around a half as spells of firm observations are required. Table III.3b first
shows the contemporaneous effects for the smaller sample and then the lagged effects.
The IV estimates reassuringly hardly change. The positive bias in the OLS estimates is
substantially reduced when using lags.
Second, I use two alternative instruments. The first, IV C , is similar to IV A except that
I exclude plants in the same districts for the construction of the instrument. The second
one, IV D, is similar to IV B and is also a shift-share instrument. The shift uses the timing
of the 2003 Electricity Act and the shares are the calculated distance of district centroids to
coalfields. The rationale for the second instruments builds on the finding in Section III.2.1
and Table III.8 in Appendix III.B that the share of private power capacity can explain
lower electricity prices, but only after 2003. Since local changes in private power share are
likely to be endogenous, I use the distance to coalfields. Table III.8 also shows that the
distance of districts to coalfields predicts shares in the private power capacity. Therefore,
I use the distance to coalfields interacted with the post 2003 dummy as an instrument,
controlling for the distance to coalfields. Table III.11 in Appendix III.K shows that the
estimate using IV C are very close to IV A. The estimate for IV D is -0.48, in magnitude
similar to the other three instruments, but is insignificant, and also rather weak (F=7.2).
Third, I restrict the sample to electricity intensive sectors, loosely defined as the 2-digit
sectors with an above average electricity intensity. The effects are marginally smaller as
Table III.12 in Appendix III.K shows. Fourth, I run the analysis by six broad industry
groups in Table III.16a and Table III.16b. Only for metals and minerals, the estimates
are non-negative, but insignificant, and there is still significant upward bias in the OLS
estimates. The null effect for this sector might be explained with the basic metals industry
predominately relying on coal across many production techniques,51 such that there is
less scope to move to electricity based production. Figures III.10 and III.11 in Appendix
III.E support this. While energy productivity rose in this sector, electricity productivity
remained fairly stable.
Fifth, I run an over-identified model using both IV A and IV B simultaneously in Table
III.13. The effects are again similar, mainly driven by the stronger IV A. The Sargan-
51See also Chapter I of this thesis.
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Hansen J-test rejects that both instruments have the same effect. This is not too surprising
given the difference in the estimates, which can, however, also be due to heterogeneous
local average treatment effects.
Sixth, I control for the distance from districts to coalfields, for state-year level power
shortages, and for both in Table III.18. The estimates remain negative and are similar
in magnitude. I already showed in Table III.9 in Appendix III.C that shortages can not
explain electricity prices. Both, the distance to coalfields and shortages are significant
when explaining electricity productivity, however. Seventh, I control for state fixed
effects, state trends, and then for plant fixed effects in Table III.14. One of the estimates
turns insignificant, but as discussed in Section III.3.6, plant fixed effects can introduce
bias. Eighth, I two-way cluster at the district and the region year level, allowing more
generously for arbitrary correlation in errors, with slightly larger standard errors but still
significant results (Table III.15). Finally, I adjust all p-values upwards to account for
multiple hypothesis testing in Table III.21 in Appendix III.M. Almost all estimates remain
statistically significant at conventional levels.
Overall, these checks reinforce the conclusion that the OLS estimates are significantly
upward biased and higher electricity prices reduce electricity productivity.
III.4.4 Mechanisms and incidence
How do high electricity prices affect plants? In this section I explore the impacts of
electricity prices on a range of outcomes to shed more light on mechanisms, as well as
calculate incidence and contrast the effects with the impact of coal prices.
Plants scale up with lower electricity prices and substitute from coal
We have seen that higher electricity prices reduce output. Table III.5a shows the effect on
total revenues, total variable costs and profits (in levels).52 Electricity prices reduce total
revenues, but they also reduce total variable costs. A one percent increase in electricity
prices reduces revenues by 1.3-1.4 million | , but also reduce total costs by 1.1 million | ,
and profits go down by 0.2 million | . This strongly suggest that plants scale down with
rising electricity prices. It is difficult to think of an alternative mechanism that brings
total costs down when electricity prices rise. Substitution to other fuels should generally
increase costs. Table III.5c shows that there is some substitution. The IV estimate of the
effect of prices on the share of electricity expenditure in total fuel expenditure is near zero
52See Section III.2.2 for their description.
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and insignificant. With these constant shares, electricity consumed must decrease with
increasing prices (as shown in Table III.3a). Using plants that report physical electricity
and coal units, the ratio between electricity to coal energy inputs decreases with rising
electricity prices in Columns (8-9), as plants substitute to coal. Finally, employment also
decreases with higher electricity prices as Table III.19 in Appendix III.K shows. These
results are consistent with plant size increasing with lower electricity prices.
Electricity prices affect investment, productivity and markups
If electricity is complementary to modern production techniques, then lower electricity
prices (compared to other fuels) can incentivise switching to these production techniques
and scaling up. Table III.5c reports the impact of higher electricity prices on investment in
machinery and plant total factor productivity (TFP). Both investment and TFP decline.
The effects on investment are sizeable.53 The effects on TFP are small, but highly significant
and robust to different methodologies to estimate TFP.54 This is in line with Abeberese
(2017), who found reductions in employment, investment and TFP to support her main
analysis of product switching. My results are consistent with the finding of firms switching
to products that require less electricity but also reduce performance. Vice versa, lower
electricity prices incentivise to a switch to production techniques that rely on electricity,
but improve performance. Ryan (2018) uses experimental variation through consulting
services to show a positive effect of higher electricity productivity on the modernisation of
plants’ input mix in India.55 Since higher efficiency reduces the de-facto price of electricity
per unit produced, these results are both consistent with the effects of lower electricity
prices on production technique. Table III.19 in Appendix III.K provides support for this
and shows that the machine to labour ratio falls with higher electricity prices, even though
employment falls. The effect is large with an elasticity between -0.6 and -1.5.56 There is
also some evidence that lower electricity prices increase product scope measured as the
number of products (Table III.19).
53I use the inverse hyperbolic sine instead of the log of machinery investments to deal with zeros. The
effects can be interpreted as elasticity.
54The baseline effects are on TFP measured via Wooldridge (2009) using deflated revenue data, so
should be interpreted as revenue TFP. Since markups shrink, we would expect the impact on physical
TFP to be larger. Table III.20 in Appendix III.K provide the effects on TFP measured via Olley and
Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) or Ackerberg et al. (2015).
55He runs a field experiment of energy audits in the state of Gujarat. He also finds that plants use more
energy as a response to energy efficiency improvements, due to a rebound effect, consistent with a de-facto
reduction in prices.
56The machine intensity of output also falls.
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Table III.5: Electricity prices and firm performance: scale, substitution, productivity and markups
(a) Electricity prices, profits, revenues and costs (levels)
Profits (mil. |) Total revenues (mil. |) Avg. variable costs (AVC) (mil. |)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
log(PE)
-4.952*** -20.63*** -22.43*** -30.18*** -132.6*** -139.9*** -24.12*** -109.1*** -114.3***
(1.518) (3.258) (4.043) (8.858) (19.749) (21.231) (7.398) (16.539) (17.469)
OLS/IV OLS IV A IV B OLS IV A IV B OLS IV A IV B
Observations 485867 485867 485867 485867 485867 485867 485867 485867 485867
Ind-region-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First stage coef. - 0.97*** 0.06*** - 0.97*** 0.06*** - 0.97*** 0.06***
First stage SE - 0.005 0.003 - 0.005 0.003 - 0.005 0.003
F-stat (Kleib.-Paap) - 43124.701 296.290 - 43124.701 296.290 - 43124.701 296.290
Two-way cluster plant state-year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(b) Electricity prices and substitution: shares in fuel expenditure and ratio of electricity to coal consumption
Electricity share in fuel expenditure Other fuels’ share in output Ratio electricity to coal quantity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
log(PE)
0.0251*** 0.0144 -0.0233 0.00442*** 0.0135*** 0.0234*** -10.20*** -17.54*** -21.84*
(0.006) (0.013) (0.020) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (3.099) (5.790) (12.354)
OLS/IV OLS IV A IV B OLS IV A IV B OLS IV A IV B
Observations 485948 485948 485948 485948 485948 485948 48015 48015 48015
Ind-region-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First stage coef. - 0.97*** 0.06*** - 0.97*** 0.06*** - 0.96*** 0.05***
First stage SE - 0.005 0.003 - 0.005 0.003 - 0.016 0.004
F-stat (Kleib.-Paap) - 43147.813 296.255 - 43147.813 296.255 - 3705.137 157.253
Two-way cluster plant state-year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(c) Electricity prices, TFP, investment and markups
TFP (log) (Wooldridge, 2009) Investment in machinery (IHS) Price marginal cost markups log(µ)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
log(PE)
-0.00699*** -0.0156*** -0.0330*** 0.162 -0.846** -2.877*** -0.0184*** -0.0404*** -0.106***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.204) (0.390) (0.442) (0.006) (0.011) (0.019)
OLS/IV OLS IV A IV B OLS IV A IV B OLS IV A IV B
Observations 477697 477697 477697 476042 476042 476042 485548 485548 485548
Ind-region-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First stage coef. - 0.97*** 0.06*** - 0.97*** 0.06*** - 0.97*** 0.06***
First stage SE - 0.005 0.003 - 0.004 0.003 - 0.005 0.003
F-stat (Kleib.-Paap) - 44391.045 297.573 - 46975.370 309.613 - 43180.457 296.198
Two-way cluster plant state-year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression at the plant level. The dependent variables are indicated and described in Section III.2.2. In panel (a), the regressions are reported in levels
because profits can be negative. In panel (b), other fuels refer to gas, coal and oil. The ratio of electricity to coal is in quantity terms in MWh per tonne. In panel (c), the inverse hyperbolic
sine (IHS) of investment is taken to deal with zeros in investment. Regressions are weighted by the recorded sampling multiplier. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered at the
plant and the state by year level. The rest of the table layout follows the same structure as the main Table III.2.
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There is no prior evidence on how electricity prices affect price over marginal cost
markups µ ≡ P/MC in the Indian context. Table III.5c shows that markups decrease 0.04
percent with a one percent increase in electricity prices. The reduction in profitability
comes with a loss in market power. The adjustment of markups also suggests that there is
imperfect pass-through of costs to consumers. This raises the important question of the
incidence of electricity price changes which I examine next.
The incidence of electricity price changes
The degree to which firms can pass on increases or reductions in electricity prices to
consumers determines the incidence of the electricity price changes. As described in Section
III.3.5 I estimate pass-through elasticities by industry. The cumulative distribution function
of these pass-through elasticities, as well as two example regressions are presented in Figure
III.28 in Appendix III.L. The vast majority of pass-through elasticities is between 0.8 and
1.1. A pass-through elasticity of greater than one means that costs are disproportionately
passed through to consumers.57 This can be the case if producers fail to collude in an
oligopoly. An increase in costs can help to solve the coordination problem of raising prices,
which can explain pass-through rates greater than one.
The pass-through elasticities are combined with the plant level markups (µ̂) into the
pass-through rates ρ̂MC . The three components to calculate incidence Ishare, the Lerner
index L̂, the market demand elasticity η̂D and the marginal cost to price pass-through
rate ρ̂MC are reported in Table III.6. The estimates shown are the median, the 25th and
75th percentile of the distribution across plants, sectors and years.58 The estimates for
the Lerner index are in line with the descriptive statistics of markups reported in the
beginning.
Table III.6 reports the median of Ishare over all sectors and the whole sample period. The
incidence on consumer surplus is 63%. The decline of electricity prices not only improved
profits and electricity productivity, but also disproportionately affected consumer surplus.
This implies that electricity pricing for industry is important for industrial development
and consumer welfare alike. The reduction in the severe cross-subsidisation from industry
to agriculture (see Section III.2.1) may thus have also benefited non-industrial consumers.
There is some heterogeneity across industries and years. The 25th and 75th percentile
57While the pass-through elasticity is smaller than one for the five industries studied in Ganapati et al.
(2016), the pass-through rate ρMC is also greater than one for three of the five industries and in some of
the studies cited therein.
58L̂ and ρ̂MC vary at the plant-year level, and η̂D varies at the industry-state-year level.
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Table III.6: Electricity prices and the share of incidence on consumers
Incidence Oligopolistic competition Monopoly Perfect competition
Median 0.63 0.54 1.17
25th to 75th percentile [0.53 - 0.79] [0.50 - 0.59] [0.99 - 1.45]
Components L̂ η̂D ρ̂MC
Median 0.18 3.21 1.17
25th to 75th percentile [0.03 - 0.34] [2.48 - 4.34] [0.99 - 1.45]
Notes: The table shows the share of incidence on consumers from electricity price changes, according to
Ishare = I/(1 + I). The quantiles are across all plants and all periods, using the sampling multipliers
as frequency weights. The reported components (L̂jisrt, êD,isrt and ρ̂MC,jirst) for the calculation are
described in the text. The monopoly case corresponds to L̂jisrt = 1/êD,isrt, and the perfect competition
case to L̂jisrt = 0.
in Table III.6 are 53% and 79% respectively. Even at the 5th percentile, the share of
consumer incidence was a quarter of the total. Figure III.29 in Appendix III.L plots the
incidence share over time for six aggregate industries. There has been a few percentage
points decline of incidence over time. I also calculate the incidence under the extreme
conduct assumptions of monopolies and perfect competition, where L = 1/D and L = 0
respectively. As in Ganapati et al. (2016), the monopoly estimate is below the oligopolistic
estimate, and the perfect competition higher than the oligopoly counterpart.59
How large was the gain in producer surplus (profits) and consumer surplus in terms of
Rupees or USD? In a back of the envelope calculation, I start with the semi-elasticity of
profits to electricity prices of -21.53. This is the average of the causal estimates (-20.63
and -22.43) in Table III.5a. A 45% reduction of electricity prices over the sample period
corresponds to an increase of log((1− 0.45)−21.53) = 12.87 mil. | for the average plant. In
1998, there were 113065 plants in the manufacturing sector sampling frame.60 The gains in
profits for the entire manufacturing sector from the electricity price reduction were thus
1.46 trillion | (in constant 2004 terms). The halving of industrial electricity prices from
its comparatively high level had substantial effects on the Indian economy. According to
this simple calculation, it has contributed the equivalent of 32 billion USD to producer
surplus, equivalent to 2% of Indian real GDP in 2013. The gains in consumer surplus has
accordingly been 55 billion USD.
59For the perfect competition case, the incidence share is equivalent to the pass-through rate as L = 0
(see Equation (III.5)).
60Since not all plants are sampled every year, I recover the number of plants by summing over the
sampling multiplier within a year. The regression estimates are weighted by the sampling multiplier and
account for this. The number of plants in the analysis spanning 16 years is larger due to entry and exit.
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Table III.7: The contrary effects of coal prices on coal productivity and firm performance
(a) Coal prices and coal productivity, output, coal use and electricity use
Coal productivity (log) Output (log) Coal consumption (log) Electricity consumption (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
log(PC)
0.846*** 1.487*** 1.612*** 0.0899*** -0.300 -0.135 -0.756*** -1.843*** -1.796*** -0.0413 -0.426 0.734*
(0.025) (0.179) (0.213) (0.031) (0.248) (0.344) (0.036) (0.272) (0.384) (0.036) (0.269) (0.428)
OLS/IV OLS IV E IV F OLS IV E IV F OLS IV E IV F OLS IV E IV F
Observations 45009 45009 45009 45009 45009 45009 45009 45009 45009 45009 45009 45009
Ind-region-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First stage coef. - 0.57*** 0.01*** - 0.57*** 0.01*** - 0.57*** 0.01*** - 0.57*** 0.01***
First stage SE - 0.046 0.001 - 0.046 0.001 - 0.046 0.001 - 0.046 0.001
F-stat (Kleib.-Paap) - 155.090 86.217 - 155.090 86.217 - 155.090 86.217 - 155.090 86.217
SE clustered by Plant Plant Plant Plant Plant Plant Plant Plant Plant Plant Plant Plant
No. of first clusters 16277 16277 16277 16277 16277 16277 16277 16277 16277 16277 16277 16277
SE clustered by State-year State-year State-year State-year State-year State-year State-year State-year State-year State-year State-year State-year
No. of second clusters 426 426 426 426 426 426 426 426 426 426 426 426
(b) Coal prices and profits, revenues, costs and TFP
Profits (mil. |) Total revenues (mil. |) Avg. variable costs (AVC) (mil. |) TFP (log) (Wooldridge, 2009)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
log(PC)
-5.917*** -5.745 -7.108 -19.99** -18.74 -0.843 -14.36** -27.76 4.644 -0.000544 -0.0198 -0.0306
(1.624) (15.031) (25.898) (7.990) (85.440) (128.629) (6.583) (70.784) (103.547) (0.002) (0.013) (0.020)
OLS/IV OLS IV E IV F OLS IV E IV F OLS IV E IV F OLS IV E IV F
Observations 45006 45006 45006 45006 45006 45006 45006 45006 45006 44582 44582 44582
Ind-region-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First stage coef. - 0.57*** 0.01*** - 0.57*** 0.01*** - 0.57*** 0.01*** - 0.57*** 0.01***
First stage SE - 0.046 0.001 - 0.046 0.001 - 0.046 0.001 - 0.046 0.001
F-stat (Kleib.-Paap) - 155.060 86.214 - 155.060 86.214 - 155.060 86.214 - 153.047 88.672
Two-way cluster plant state-year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression at the plant level. Reported are results from OLS regression on logged coal prices, and IV regressions. The IV E is based on the coal
prices of similar plants. In the shift-share IV F , the share is the logged distance of a district to the nearest coal mine and the shift is the logged raw coal price for industry at a representative
mine. The dependent variables are indicated and described in Section III.2.2. In panel (a), coal productivity is the value of output divided by the quantity of coal used in tonnes. In panel
(b), the regressions are reported in levels except for TFP because profits can be negative. The first stage statistics are reported. All regressions contain industry by year by region fixed effects.
Regressions are weighted by the recorded sampling multiplier. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered at the plant and the state by year level. Plant output is deflated using
3-digit industry deflators and coal prices are deflated using a general fuel and electricity wholesale price deflator.
170
The contrary effects of coal prices and implications for climate policy
So far the analysis has been about electricity prices. The most plausible mechanism is
that electricity prices affect output in particular because higher electricity prices deter
from upgrading to more modern electricity using production processes. If this is the case,
then the effect of higher coal prices should be different, as coal (or oil and gas) fuel is not
generally associated with more modern productive production processes. To further test
this hypothesis, I run regressions where the main independent variable is plant level coal
prices for the roughly 45000 observations of plant-years that use coal. As these suffer from
similar endogeneity problems as electricity prices, I construct two instruments as described
in Section III.3.4.
In contrast to electricity, higher coal prices significantly improve coal productivity. In
the first three columns in Table III.7a, both the OLS and the IV estimates are significantly
positive, with the IV estimates being roughly double in magnitude.61 While coal prices
significantly reduce coal consumption, they only have a small and insignificant effect on
output in the IV specifications, also shown in Table III.7a. The impact on electricity use is
either insignificant or positive. There is a small insignificant effect on profits and revenues
and an ambiguous effect on costs (Table III.7b). There is no similar scaling down effect
with higher coal prices as there is with higher electricity prices. Contrary to electricity
prices, higher coal prices also have no effect on TFP (Table III.7b).
This is somewhat good news for climate policy in developing countries. In contrast
to electricity prices, the results suggest that taxing dirtier fuels has little effect on firm
performance. Of course, this also depends on the fuel mix in electricity generation. With
an increasing share of low carbon electricity generation from hydro, nuclear and renewables,
carbon pricing may have limited effect on firms when taking these results at face value. On
the other hand taxing electricity use may have perverse consequences in some circumstances,
as it may lower industrial electricity productivity through its adverse impact on output.
This is likely to be especially relevant in the context of developing industries in the process
of adopting modern electricity intensive production techniques, and in contexts with already
high electricity prices as in India in the late 90s and early 2000s.
61The first stage is reported and the F-stats sufficiently high.
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III.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I estimate the causal effect of industrial electricity prices on electricity
productivity using two alternative instruments and a large panel of Indian manufacturing
firms. The effects are negative, especially during the high price period in the late 1990s
and early 2000s. While higher electricity prices reduce electricity consumption, they also
decrease electricity productivity. This is driven by the significant negative effects on output.
The mechanisms that I explore support the hypothesis that electricity is a complementary
production input to modern high performance production techniques. Investment and
productivity are deterred by higher electricity prices, which may hold back industrial
development.
I document a secular increase in aggregate manufacturing electricity productivity. My
causal estimates of electricity prices can quantitatively explain this secular rise in electricity
productivity remarkably well. Decreasing electricity prices may thus have significantly
helped to improve efficiency through technology upgrading and performance improvements.
The main message of this chapter is that lower industrial electricity prices can actually
improve the electricity intensity of output. I argue and provide some evidence that negative
impacts of high electricity prices on firm performance are especially relevant in the context
of industrial development and when electricity prices are already high.
Markups decrease as a result of higher electricity prices. I estimate marginal cost to
price pass-through rates under imperfect competition and calculate the welfare incidence
on producers and consumers. The share of incidence of consumers is around two thirds on
average. The reduction in the severe cross-subsidisation from industry to agriculture and
residential electricity users may thus have also benefited non-industrial consumers.
I end the chapter by comparing the impacts of electricity prices to the impacts of coal
prices. Higher coal prices improve coal productivity and hardly affect output, profits and
productivity. This is consistent with the hypothesis that electricity is distinctive as a
complement to modern production techniques. This has important implications for climate
policy. Taxing electricity for industry harms firms and consumers, and may increase the
electricity intensity of output. Taxing carbon and coal, on the other hand, improves energy
efficiency and has limited impact on firm performance. Naturally, the fuel mix in electricity
generation, as well as the pass-through rates of power utilities, determines how much
electricity prices are affected by taxing carbon. Nevertheless, the relative price of coal to
electricity would increase in any case. In the described contexts, relatively lower electricity
prices for industry could deliver both: substitution from fossil fuels to electricity, and
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despite increasing electricity use, improving electricity productivity of output. Both are
essential components of reducing industrial carbon emissions.
One of the instruments that I develop can readily be calculated in other settings, which
I hope can foster more research on this important link. Future research aims to estimate
the relationship between electricity pricing and production in a structural model and
to explore the nuanced relationships in the context of other developing and developed
countries.
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Appendix to Chapter III
III.A Maps of coal reservoirs and power plants
Figure III.6: Maps of coalfields and powerplants by year
Coalfields
Power plants in 2013
Power plants in 1998
Power plants 2018 and under construction
Notes: The maps plot the coalfields (time invariant) and the stock of power plants in the corresponding
years. The size of the markers corresponds to installed capacity. Coal plants are built near coalfields.
Hydro plants near rivers especially in the mountainous region. Nuclear plants are typically built near the
sea or rivers. Gas plants are built near ports and the major gas pipelines (e.g. in the north east). Data
sources are described in Section III.2.2.
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III.B Electricity prices and privately owned share in installed ca-
pacity
Table III.8: Electricity prices and privately owned share in district installed capacity
Electricity price Priv. share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share private capacity 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.00
(0.96) (1.17) (0.63) (0.03)
Share private capacity x After 2003 -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.19** -0.19**
(-2.93) (-2.93) (-2.34) (-1.98)
Distance to coalfield (’00 km) x After 2003 -0.09*** -0.03***
(-3.15) (-2.85)
N 7994 7994 7994 7994 7994
Total capacity No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-year FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table shows estimates from OLS regressions at the district year level with the median electricity
price within a district as dependent variable in the first 4 columns. The Indian Electricity Act was
introduced in 2003. The share of privately owned capacity in district level installed capacity includes
private/state and private/central ownership categories. The total capacity covariate controls for total
installed capacity at the district year level. The distance to coalfields at the district level is in hundreds of
km. Column 5 has the share of privately owned capacity as dependent variable. Regressions are weighted
by the sampling multipliers and by the number of plants within a district year cluster. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the district level. The coefficients on the interaction in column (1) and (2)
correspond to a semi-elasticity of 0.03. Stars indicate p-values: * < 0.1, **< 0.05, ***< 0.01.
III.C No significant correlation between shortages and electricity
prices
Table III.9: Electricity prices and shortages
Plant level State level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Shortages 0.34 -0.02 0.12 1.08 -0.01 0.11
(1.58) (-0.20) (0.94) (1.02) (-0.01) (0.64)
N 475809 475809 475809 458 458 458
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
State FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region-year FE No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: The table shows estimates from OLS regressions of the logged electricity price on shortages. The
first three columns are using logged electricity prices at the plant level. The second three columns are
regressions at the state year level with logged median electricity prices. Regressions are weighted by the
sampling multipliers. The second three regressions are also weighted by the number of plants within a
state year cluster. Shortages are at the state year level. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at
the state year level. Stars indicate p-values: * < 0.1, **< 0.05, ***< 0.01.
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III.D State level trends
Figure III.7: Energy productivity (per | ) by state
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Notes: The figure plots the annual energy productivity ratios (value of output divided by the value of fuel
and electricity used). Sixteen of the largest states are displayed in this figure. Output is deflated at the
2-digit industry level using 2-digit industry deflators before aggregating over industries. Fuel and electricity
use is deflated using a general fuel and electricity wholesale price deflator. The ratio of aggregate output
to aggregate fuel and electricity consumption is displayed. The base year for deflation is 2004 throughout
this chapter. Wholesale price deflators are from the Office of the Economic Adviser from the Government
of India. From 1967 to 1997 the raw ASI data in pre-aggregated form is used (at industry state year
aggregation). From 1998 the raw plant level ASI data is used and aggregated with sampling multipliers.
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Figure III.8: Electricity productivity (per kWh) by state
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Notes: The figure plots the annual electricity productivity ratios by states (value of output divided by
the quantity of electricity used in kWh). Sixteen of the largest states are displayed in this figure. Plant
output is deflated using 3-digit industry deflators before aggregating over industries. The ratio of aggregate
output to aggregate electricity use is displayed. The base year for deflation is 2004 throughout this chapter.
Wholesale price deflators are from the Office of the Economic Adviser from the Government of India. All
data points come from the raw plant level ASI data and aggregated with sampling multipliers.
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Figure III.9: Electricity prices by state
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Notes: The figure plots the real average electricity prices by states. Sixteen of the largest states are
displayed in this figure. They are calculated by first aggregating the value of electricity bought by plants
and the quantity bought, and then taking the ratio of the aggregates. Electricity values are deflated using
a general fuel and electricity wholesale price deflator. The base year for deflation is 2004 throughout this
chapter. Wholesale price deflators are from the Office of the Economic Adviser from the Government of
India. All data points come from the raw plant level ASI data and aggregated with sampling multipliers.
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III.E Industry level trends
Figure III.10: Energy productivity (per | ) by industry
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Notes: The figure plots the annual energy productivity ratios by industry (value of output divided by
the value of fuel and electricity used). The industries are broad: chemicals includes rubber and plastics,
machinery includes metal products, and textiles includes leather. Output is deflated at the 2-digit industry
level using 2-digit industry deflators before aggregating over industries. Fuel and electricity use is deflated
using a general fuel and electricity wholesale price deflator. The ratio of aggregate output to aggregate
fuel and electricity consumption is displayed. The base year for deflation is 2004 throughout this chapter.
Wholesale price deflators are from the Office of the Economic Adviser from the Government of India. From
1967 to 1997 the raw ASI data in pre-aggregated form is used (at industry state year aggregation). From
1998 the raw plant level ASI data is used and aggregated with sampling multipliers.
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Figure III.11: Electricity productivity (per kWh) by industry
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Notes: The figure plots the annual electricity productivity ratios by industry (value of output divided by
the quantity of electricity used in kWh). The industries are broad: chemicals includes rubber and plastics,
machinery includes metal products, and textiles includes leather. Plant output is deflated using 3-digit
industry deflators before aggregating over industries. The ratio of aggregate output to aggregate electricity
use is displayed. The base year for deflation is 2004 throughout this chapter. Wholesale price deflators are
from the Office of the Economic Adviser from the Government of India. All data points come from the
raw plant level ASI data and aggregated with sampling multipliers.
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Figure III.12: Electricity prices by industry
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Notes: The figure plots the real average electricity prices by industry. The industries are broad: chemicals
includes rubber and plastics, machinery includes metal products, and textiles includes leather. They are
calculated by first aggregating the value of electricity bought by plants and the quantity bought, and
then taking the ratio of the aggregates. Electricity values are deflated using a general fuel and electricity
wholesale price deflator. The base year for deflation is 2004 throughout this chapter. Wholesale price
deflators are from the Office of the Economic Adviser from the Government of India. All data points come
from the raw plant level ASI data and aggregated with sampling multipliers.
181
III.F Additional figures for energy and electricity productivity
trends
Figure III.13: Electricity productivity (per | )
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Figure III.14: Other fuel productivity (per | )
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Notes: The figure plots the annual electricity productivity ratios (value of output divided by the value
of electricity used) and the other fuel productivity ratios (value of output divided by the value of fuel
other than electricity used). Plant output is deflated using 3-digit industry deflators before aggregating
over industries. Electricity and fuel values are deflated using a general fuel and electricity wholesale price
deflator. The base year for deflation is 2004 throughout this chapter. Wholesale price deflators are from
the Office of the Economic Adviser from the Government of India. All data points come from the raw
plant level ASI data and aggregated with sampling multipliers.
Figure III.15: Electricity productivity (per
kWh)
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Figure III.16: Share of electricity in fuel mix
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Notes: The left figure plots the annual electricity productivity ratios (value of output divided by the
quantity of electricity used (in kWh)). Both quantities are for manufacturing only. Output is from UNIDO
(2016a), deflated with GDP deflators from World Bank (2017), and electricity consumption from the IEA
(2016). The base year for deflation is 2004 throughout this chapter. Plotted are the values and kernel
smoother for India with the solid line, corresponding to the left axis. The values and kernel smoother for
OECD countries are the dashed lines, corresponding to the right axis. The right figure plots the share of
electricity consumption in total fuel consumption in India (both in ktoe) using data from IEA (2016).
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III.G Additional figures for electricity tariffs and price trends
Figure III.17: Reported industrial average tariff schedules in large states in 2007
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Notes: Plotted are the estimated average tariffs by state by size of industrial consumer. There are five
categories increasing in electricity consumption from small to heavy2. The reported average tariffs are
taken from the Indian Central Electricity Authority (2008). The tariffs are deflated with the general
fuel and electricity wholesale price deflator. The base year for deflation is 2004 throughout this chapter.
Wholesale price deflators are from the Office of the Economic Adviser from the Government of India.
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Figure III.18: Real electricity price index
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Notes: Plotted is the real electricity price index for industry. It is based on the wholesale price index for
electricity for industrial purposes. The wholesale price index for electricity is deflated with the general
fuel and electricity wholesale price deflator. The base year for deflation is 2004 throughout this chapter.
Wholesale price deflators are from the Office of the Economic Adviser from the Government of India.
Figure III.19: Average real state tariffs for heavy industry
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Notes: Plotted is the real electricity tariff for heavy industry. The tariffs are manually collected from
publications of the Indian Central Electricity Authority (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2015) and
from Indiastat (2019) through Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha questions. Individual data points correspond
to state level average tariffs for heavy industry. Tariffs are deflated using a general fuel and electricity
wholesale price deflator. The base year for deflation is 2004 throughout this chapter. Wholesale price
deflators are from the Office of the Economic Adviser from the Government of India.
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III.H International electricity price comparison
Figure III.20: Industrial electricity prices in an international context (USD and PPP)
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Notes: The figures plot real industrial electricity prices for six individual countries. The left figure is
based on market exchange rates, the right figure is based on PPP conversion factors. The shaded areas
correspond to the interquartile range and the 5th to 95th percentile of a given year. This is based on
a consistent set of 26 countries for which data for all years was available (see below). Raw price data
comes from IEA (2018), except for India, where the prices are based on the micro data in the main
text. For India, IEA (2018) data is only available from 2006, which is similar to the plotted data. Prices
are deflated with national GDP deflators and turned into USD or PPP-USD with exchange rates and
PPP conversion factors from World Bank (2017). For India, prices are deflated using a general fuel and
electricity wholesale price deflator as in the main text. The base year for deflation is 2004 throughout this
chapter. Wholesale price deflators are from the Office of the Economic Adviser from the Government of
India. The 26 countries used for the percentiles are: Algeria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France,
Germany, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand,
Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom,
United States.
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Table III.10: Industrial electricity prices in US-cents: India and G7 average (USD and PPP)
Market exchange rates PPP
India G7 OECD % of G7 % of OECD India G7 OECD % of G7 % of OECD
1998 15.69 8.91 8.96 176 175 62.25 8.24 10.40 756 598
1999 15.14 8.42 8.57 180 177 60.09 7.76 10.03 774 599
2000 12.64 8.36 8.43 151 150 50.16 7.75 9.94 648 504
2001 12.00 8.97 8.81 134 136 47.61 8.36 10.40 570 458
2002 11.62 8.68 8.89 134 131 46.13 8.08 10.49 571 440
2003 11.17 9.01 9.11 124 123 44.34 8.41 10.78 527 411
2004 10.28 9.00 9.07 114 113 40.82 8.38 10.77 487 379
2005 9.44 9.55 9.43 99 100 37.46 8.88 11.16 422 336
2006 8.90 10.58 10.03 84 89 35.33 9.79 11.77 361 300
2007 9.17 11.25 10.30 82 89 36.39 10.41 12.11 350 301
2008 8.42 10.88 11.02 77 76 33.43 9.98 13.05 335 256
2009 8.89 11.59 11.46 77 78 35.27 10.61 13.70 332 257
2010 8.28 11.42 11.11 72 74 32.86 10.50 13.24 313 248
2011 7.86 12.20 11.50 64 68 31.18 11.24 13.60 278 229
2012 7.90 12.79 12.18 62 65 31.36 11.77 14.38 266 218
2013 7.57 13.53 12.43 56 61 30.04 12.45 14.56 241 206
Notes: The table shows the real industrial electricity prices for India, the simple average of the G7 nations,
and the simple average of OECD countries, for which data in all years were available. The left part is based
on market exchange rates, the right part is based on PPP conversion factors. Raw price data comes from
IEA (2018), except for India, where the prices are based on the micro data in the main text. For India,
IEA (2018) data is only available from 2006, which is similar to the reported data. Prices are deflated
with national GDP deflators and turned into USD or PPP-USD with exchange rates and PPP conversion
factors from World Bank (2017). For India prices are deflated using a general fuel and electricity wholesale
price deflator as in the main text. The base year for deflation is 2004 throughout this chapter. Wholesale
price deflators are from the Office of the Economic Adviser from the Government of India. The included
OECD countries are: Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States.
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III.I Dispersion in electricity productivity and prices throughout
the years
Figure III.21: Heterogeneity in electricity productivity
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Notes: The figure plots the histograms of plant level logged electricity productivity by year. The left
kernel density plot shows the distribution of the residuals of logged electricity productivity after partialling
out state by 4-digit industry by year fixed effects. Electricity productivity ratios are the value of output
divided by the quantity of electricity used in kWh. Plant output is deflated using 3-digit industry deflators.
The base year for deflation is 2004 throughout this chapter. Wholesale price deflators are from the Office
of the Economic Adviser from the Government of India.
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Figure III.22: Heterogeneity in electricity prices
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Notes: The figure plots the histograms of plant level electricity prices by year. The left kernel density plot
shows the distribution of the residuals of electricity prices after partialling out state by 4-digit industry by
year fixed effects. Electricity prices are deflated using a general fuel and electricity wholesale price deflator.
The base year for deflation is 2004 throughout this chapter. Wholesale price deflators are from the Office
of the Economic Adviser from the Government of India.
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Figure III.23: Electricity productivity and price variance decomposition: percentage shares
Annual productivity variance decomposition
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Notes: The left panel plots the share of the annual total variance of logged electricity productivity explained
by specified groups. The right panel plots the same for logged electricity prices. The annual variance is
calculated as V =
∑
e se (pe − p)2 , where se are purchase weights multiplied by the sample multiplier, pe
are logged electricity productivity or prices, p the weighted average log productivity or price. I use the
decomposition of Davis et al. (2013) to decompose total variance into a within “group” component VW ,
and a component across “groups” V G:
V =
∑
e se
(
pe − pg
)2
+
∑
g sg
(
pg − p
)2
= VW + V G
where sg =
∑
e∈g se and pg the weighted average of log productivity or price within group g. I calculate
the decomposition separately five times for the five groups shown in the graph. The regions plot the share
of V G in V (V G/V ), where higher shares explain more of the variation. Groups are deciles of electricity
purchase quantity, 4-digit industries, states, and combinations. Plant output and electricity prices are
deflated.
Figure III.24: Convergence in electricity prices
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Notes: Plotted are the 5th, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th and 95th percentile of the annual plant level
electricity prices. Electricity prices are deflated using a general fuel and electricity wholesale price deflator.
The base year for deflation is 2004 throughout this chapter. Wholesale price deflators are from the Office
of the Economic Adviser from the Government of India.
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Figure III.25: CDFs of plant electricity productivity and prices in 2013 conditional on 2012
quartiles
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Notes: Plotted are the CDFs in 2013, separately for each quartile of the respective values in 2012. The
left panel shows the distribution of the logged electricity productivity (i.e. the value of output divided by
the electricity use in kWh ). The right panel shows the distribution of the electricity price. The CDFs
are empirical CDFs obtained through a Gaussian kernel smoother with bandwidth 0.1. The graphs show
that each higher quartile first order stochastically dominates the lower quartiles. The conditional CDF
of the plants that belong to the higher previous year quartile lies to the right of the CDF of the plants
belonging to the lower previous year quartile. While individual plants move up and down the ranking of
electricity productivity and energy prices from one year to the next, the probability of higher productivity
and prices increases in last periods productivity and prices. Plant output is deflated using 3-digit industry
deflators. Electricity prices are deflated using a general fuel and electricity wholesale price deflator. The
base year for deflation is 2004 throughout this chapter. Wholesale price deflators are from the Office of
the Economic Adviser from the Government of India.
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III.J Coal share in installed capacity and coal price for power
utilities and industry
Figure III.26: Share of coal power in total installed capacity
Notes: The shading indicates the share of coal fired thermal power generation capacity in total installed
capacity at the state level in March 1998. Data comes from Ministry of Power (1998a, 2003).
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Figure III.27: Coal price for power utilities and industry
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Notes: The solid line plots the coal prices for thermal power plants and are from Minsitry of Coal (2012,
2015) as described in Section III.2.2. Prices for coal used in manufacturing industries are plotted with the
dashed line. These are averages of the coal prices at the plant level in the ASI micro data (see Section
III.2.2). All coal prices are in real terms and deflated using a general fuel and electricity wholesale price
deflator. In nominal terms, coal prices have been mostly increasing. The base year for deflation is 2004
throughout this chapter. Wholesale price deflators are from the Office of the Economic Adviser from the
Government of India.
III.K Robustness checks and additional regressions
Table III.11: Electricity prices and electricity productivity with two alternative instruments
IV C and IV D
OLS IV C IV D
(1) (2) (3)
log(PE)
0.366*** -0.267*** -0.475
(0.044) (0.071) (0.679)
Distance to coalfield
(in ’00 km)
-0.0126
(0.009)
OLS/IV OLS IV C IV D
Observations 485948 444952 444952
Ind-region-year FE Yes Yes Yes
First stage coef. - 0.97*** 0.02***
First stage SE - 0.005 0.008
F-stat (Kleib.-Paap) - 37708.429 7.194
Two-way cluster plant state-year Yes Yes Yes
Notes: See Table III.2 for notes. The main difference in this table is the use of two alternative instruments,
IV C and IV D.
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Table III.12: Electricity prices and electricity productivity in electricity intensive sectors
OLS IV A IV B
(1) (2) (3)
log(PE)
0.323*** -0.208*** -0.582***
(0.047) (0.074) (0.102)
OLS/IV OLS IV A IV B
Observations 260900 260900 260900
Ind-region-year FE Yes Yes Yes
First stage coef. - 0.97*** 0.06***
First stage SE - 0.005 0.004
F-stat (Kleib.-Paap) - 32789.655 324.114
Two-way cluster plant state-year Yes Yes Yes
Notes: See Table III.2 for notes. The main difference is that the sample is restricted to electricity intensive
sectors only.
Table III.13: Electricity prices and electricity productivity: using both IVs
OLS IVA & IV B IV C & IV B
(1) (2) (3)
log(PE)
0.366*** -0.256*** -0.288***
(0.044) (0.068) (0.069)
IV 1 - IV A IV C
IV 2 - IV B IV B
Observations 485948 485948 444952
Ind by region by year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No No
Plant FE No No No
State trends No No No
State by year FE No No No
First stage coef. 1/1 - 0.94*** 0.94***
First stage SE 1/1 - 0.007 0.008
First stage coef. 1/2 - 0.00*** 0.00***
First stage SE 1/2 - 0.001 0.001
F-stat (Kleibergen-Paap) - 23320.712 20389.385
Anderson-Rubin F - 0.000 0.000
J-statistic - 26.12 28.81
Two-way cluster plant state-year Yes Yes Yes
Notes: See Table III.2 for notes. The main difference is that both instruments are used simultaneously. The
Sargan-Hansen J statistic is reported. The difference in the instrument is consistent with heterogeneous
LATEs.
Table III.14: Electricity prices and electricity productivity: additional fixed effects and trends
OLS IV A IV B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(PE)
0.708*** 0.684*** -0.545* 0.0229 -1.809*
(0.030) (0.018) (0.291) (0.056) (0.982)
OLS/IV OLS OLS IV A IV A IV B
Observations 485948 425794 485948 425794 425794
Ind-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind-region-year FE Yes No Yes No No
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant FE No Yes No Yes Yes
State trends Yes No Yes No No
First stage coef. - - 0.89*** 0.92*** 0.16**
First stage SE - - 0.015 0.009 0.069
F-stat (Kleib.-Paap) - - 3499.772 9379.183 5.204
SE clustered by Plant Plant Plant Plant Plant
No. of first clusters 160955 100418 160955 100418 100418
SE clustered by State-year State-year State-year State-year State-year
No. of second clusters 501 501 501 501 501
Notes: See Table III.2 for notes. The main difference is the inclusion of different fixed effects as indicated.
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Table III.16: Electricity prices and electricity productivity by industry groups
(a) Electricity prices and electricity productivity (Chemicals, food, machinery))
Chemicals Food Machinery
OLS IV A IV B OLS IV A IV B OLS IV A IV B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
log(PE)
0.178*** -0.389*** -0.765*** 0.572*** 0.0436 -1.546*** 0.217*** -0.629*** -1.250***
(0.064) (0.085) (0.106) (0.073) (0.162) (0.404) (0.066) (0.093) (0.133)
OLS/IV OLS IV A IV B OLS IV A IV B OLS IV A IV B
Observations 73838 73838 73838 96601 96601 96601 89944 89944 89944
Ind-region-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First stage coef. - 0.98*** 0.08*** - 0.91*** 0.04*** - 1.01*** 0.07***
First stage SE - 0.007 0.003 - 0.014 0.003 - 0.007 0.004
F-stat (Kleib.-Paap) - 17799.309 533.240 - 4339.858 115.564 - 23887.783 337.618
SE clustered by Plant Plant Plant Plant Plant Plant Plant Plant Plant
No. of first clusters 26826 26826 26826 33492 33492 33492 29046 29046 29046
SE clustered by State-year State-year State-year State-year State-year State-year State-year State-year State-year
No. of second clusters 472 472 472 500 500 500 440 440 440
(b) Electricity prices and electricity productivity (Metals and minerals, textiles, wood and paper)
Metals and minerals Textiles Wood and Paper
OLS IV A IV B OLS IV A IV B OLS IV A IV B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
log(PE)
0.476*** 0.0885 0.210 0.410*** -0.177 -0.949*** 0.342*** -0.227** -0.733***
(0.053) (0.102) (0.191) (0.078) (0.156) (0.257) (0.067) (0.096) (0.138)
OLS/IV OLS IV A IV B OLS IV A IV B OLS IV A IV B
Observations 104738 104738 104738 71166 71166 71166 36352 36352 36352
Ind-region-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First stage coef. - 0.96*** 0.05*** - 0.99*** 0.07*** - 0.99*** 0.06***
First stage SE - 0.009 0.003 - 0.012 0.005 - 0.009 0.004
F-stat (Kleib.-Paap) - 11445.114 181.778 - 6266.604 196.845 - 11169.861 273.140
SE clustered by Plant Plant Plant Plant Plant Plant Plant Plant Plant
No. of first clusters 40261 40261 40261 23117 23117 23117 13346 13346 13346
SE clustered by State-year State-year State-year State-year State-year State-year State-year State-year State-year
No. of second clusters 486 486 486 443 443 443 499 499 499
Notes: See Table III.2 for notes. The main difference is that regressions are run individually by industry groups.
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Table III.15: Electricity prices and electricity productivity: clustering at district and region
year
OLS IVA IV B
(1) (2) (3)
log(PE)
0.340*** -0.264* -0.818***
(0.117) (0.154) (0.218)
OLS/IV OLS IV A IV B
Observations 444952 444952 444952
Ind-region-year FE Yes Yes Yes
First stage coef. - 0.98*** 0.06***
First stage SE - 0.018 0.010
F-stat (Kleib.-Paap) - 3057.138 38.818
SE clustered by District District District
No. of first clusters 541 541 541
SE clustered by Region-year Region-year Region-year
No. of second clusters 96 96 96
Notes: See Table III.2 for notes. The main difference is that the standard errors are clustered at a higher
level, at the district level and the region-year level.
Table III.17: Electricity prices and electricity productivity interacted with three periods
OLS IV A IV B
(1) (2) (3)
log(PE)
0.506*** 0.0573 -0.719***
(0.067) (0.111) (0.200)
log(PE) · 1(year < 2003) -0.275*** -0.729*** -0.124(0.098) (0.163) (0.234)
log(PE) · 1(year ≥ 2003 or year ≤ 2007) -0.177* -0.272* -0.0682(0.104) (0.147) (0.247)
OLS/IV OLS IV A IV B
Observations 485948 485948 485948
Ind by region by year FE Yes Yes Yes
First stage coef. 1/1 - 0.95*** 0.05***
First stage SE 1/1 - 0.007 0.005
First stage coef. 1/2 - 0.04*** 0.01
First stage SE 1/2 - 0.012 0.008
First stage coef. 1/3 - 0.03*** 0.01
First stage SE 1/3 - 0.010 0.008
First stage coef. 2/1 - 0.00 0.00
First stage SE 2/1 - 0.000 0.000
First stage coef. 2/2 - 0.99*** 0.06***
First stage SE 2/2 - 0.009 0.006
First stage coef. 2/3 - 0.00 -0.00
First stage SE 2/3 - 0.000 0.000
First stage coef. 3/1 - -0.00*** 0.00
First stage SE 3/1 - . 0.000
First stage coef. 3/2 - 0.00*** -0.00
First stage SE 3/2 - . 0.000
First stage coef. 3/3 - 0.98*** 0.06***
First stage SE 3/3 - 0.007 0.007
F-stat (Kleibergen-Paap) - 3875.232 35.761
Two-way cluster plant state-year Yes Yes Yes
Notes: See Table III.4 for notes. The main difference is that prices are interacted with three different
periods (one baseline omitted).
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Table III.18: Electricity prices and electricity productivity: controlling for distance to coalfields and shortages
OLS IV A IV B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
log(PE)
0.343*** 0.472*** 0.459*** -0.255*** -0.130 -0.121 -0.827*** -0.938*** -0.980***
(0.045) (0.043) (0.044) (0.070) (0.085) (0.088) (0.101) (0.149) (0.148)
Distance to coalfield
(in ’00 km)
-0.0181*** -0.0192*** -0.0141** -0.0178** -0.0102 -0.0157*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Shortage 0.397* 0.282 0.644*** 0.515*** 0.976*** 0.860***(0.226) (0.239) (0.187) (0.192) (0.198) (0.201)
OLS/IV OLS OLS OLS IV A IV A IV A IV B IV B IV B
Observations 444952 474029 433262 444952 474029 433262 444952 474029 433262
Ind-region-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First stage coef. - - - 0.98*** 0.97*** 0.98*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05***
First stage SE - - - 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.004
F-stat (Kleib.-Paap) - - - 41022.067 25440.719 26150.603 307.715 173.552 176.792
Two-way cluster plant state-year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: See Table III.2 for notes. The main difference is that control variables are added as indicated.
Table III.19: Electricity prices, employment, machine labour ratio and product scope
Employees (log) Ratio machinery to employees (log) Number of products (log)
OLS IV A IV B OLS IV A IV B OLS IV A IV B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
log(PE)
0.0119 -0.339*** -0.518*** -0.160** -0.627*** -1.517*** 0.0456*** -0.00288 -0.0960***
(0.041) (0.076) (0.079) (0.065) (0.114) (0.151) (0.012) (0.023) (0.036)
OLS/IV OLS IV A IV B OLS IV A IV B OLS IV A IV B
Observations 485342 485342 485342 467686 467686 467686 485067 485067 485067
Ind-region-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First stage coef. - 0.97*** 0.06*** - 0.97*** 0.06*** - 0.97*** 0.06***
First stage SE - 0.005 0.003 - 0.005 0.003 - 0.005 0.003
F-stat (Kleib.-Paap) - 43194.635 296.507 - 46754.073 308.855 - 43038.018 296.577
Two-way cluster plant state-year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: See Table III.2 for notes. The main difference is that the dependent variables are different as indicated.
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Table III.20: Electricity prices and productivity (TFP): alternative methodologies
log(TFP) (Olley and Pakes, 1996) log(TFP) (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) log(TFP) (Ackerberg et al., 2015)
OLS IV A IV B OLS IV A IV B OLS IV A IV B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
log(PE)
-0.00735*** -0.0273*** -0.0387*** -0.000566 -0.0168*** -0.0321*** -0.00414** -0.00761*** -0.0233***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
OLS/IV OLS IV A IV B OLS IV A IV B OLS IV A IV B
Observations 378824 378824 378824 477697 477697 477697 477697 477697 477697
Ind-region-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First stage coef. - 0.98*** 0.06*** - 0.97*** 0.06*** - 0.97*** 0.06***
First stage SE - 0.004 0.003 - 0.005 0.003 - 0.005 0.003
F-stat (Kleib.-Paap) - 51023.623 390.549 - 44391.045 297.573 - 44391.045 297.573
Two-way cluster plant state-year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: See Table III.2 for notes. The main difference is that different methods to recover TFP are used, and TFP used as dependent variable.
197
III.L Pass-through elasticities and incidence on consumers over
time for aggregated industries
Figure III.28: The distribution of pass-through elasticities
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Notes: The figure plots the cumulative distribution function of the pass-through elasticities
(d log(P )/d log(MC)). The pass-through elasticities vary at the 4-digit industry level: there are 121
different pass-through elasticities. The pass-through elasticities are the coefficient on a regression of log
prices on log marginal costs at the plant level for each 4-digit industry separately. Prices are calculated
as average prices for the different products sold at the firm level, weighted by the quantity sold of each
product. Marginal costs are recovered from the estimated markups and the average prices. The marginal
costs in the regressions are instrumented with IV A and IV B , and regressions are weighted by the sampling
weights. Therefore, there are two coefficients per pass-through elasticity per industry. The reported
pass-through elasticities are weighted averages, for each pair of coefficients, where the weights are the
t-statistics from the IV regression. Here are two example regressions for two different 4-digit industries of
log prices on log marginal costs with different IVs:
Manufacture of:
Grain mill products Structural non-refractory clay
and ceramic products
log(MC) 0.997*** 0.730***
(0.0130) (0.0555)
OLS/IV IV A IV B
Observations 21812 6208
Region-year FE Yes Yes
F-stat (Kleib.-Paap) 35.65 28.98
SE clustered by Plant Plant
No. of first clusters 11707 3577
SE clustered by State-year State-year
No. of second clusters 435 220
Notes above table.
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Figure III.29: Share of incidence on consumers from electricity price changes
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
199
8
200
0
200
2
200
4
200
6
200
8
201
0
201
2
199
8
200
0
200
2
200
4
200
6
200
8
201
0
201
2
199
8
200
0
200
2
200
4
200
6
200
8
201
0
201
2
Chemicals Food Machinery
Metals and minerals Textiles Wood and Paper
25th to 75th percentile Median
In
cid
en
ce
 o
n 
co
ns
um
er
s (
sh
ar
e 
of
 to
ta
l in
cid
en
ce
)
Notes: The figure plots the median share of incidence on consumers Ishare from electricity price changes
for each year within each industry. The 25th and 75th percentiles are plotted as well. The industries are
broad: chemicals includes rubber and plastics, machinery includes metal products, and textiles includes
leather.
III.M Holm-Bonferroni q-values for multiple hypothesis testing
Table III.21 applies the Holm (1979) Bonferroni correction to the p-values to adjust for
multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table III.21: Holm (1979) Bonferroni correction for multiple hypotheses testing
OLS IV A IV B
Coef. p-value q-value Coef. p-value q-value Coef. p-value q-value
(adj. pval) (adj. pval) (adj. pval)
Independent variable: log(electricity price)
Electricity productivity (log) 0.366 8.5e-16*** 1.8e-14*** -0.239 6.9e-04*** 0.0041*** -0.776 5.3e-13*** 6.4e-12***
Output (log) -0.027 0.718 1 -0.743 2.7e-07*** 2.7e-06*** -1.597 3.7e-23*** 5.6e-22***
Electricity consumption (log) -0.385 3.1e-09*** 6.2e-08*** -0.479 0.0021*** 0.0103** -0.797 1.2e-07*** 6.1e-07***
Profits -4.952 0.0012*** 0.0153** -20.634 5.3e-10*** 6.4e-09*** -22.429 4.7e-08*** 2.8e-07***
Total revenues -30.182 7.1e-04*** 0.0113** -132.586 5.2e-11*** 7.2e-10*** -139.858 1.1e-10*** 1.3e-09***
Avg. variable costs (AVC) -24.118 0.0012*** 0.0153** -109.134 1.1e-10*** 1.4e-09*** -114.291 1.5e-10*** 1.4e-09***
Electricity share in fuel expenditure 0.025 7.0e-05*** 0.0013*** 0.014 0.265 0.53 -0.023 0.241 0.241
Other fuels’ share in output 0.004 8.6e-04*** 0.013** 0.014 1.2e-11*** 1.7e-10*** 0.023 6.3e-16*** 8.2e-15***
Ratio electricity to coal quantity -10.203 0.0011*** 0.015** -17.542 0.0026*** 0.0103** -21.836 0.0778* 0.156
TFP (log) -0.007 0.0031*** 0.0339** -0.016 5.0e-06*** 4.5e-05*** -0.033 2.9e-07*** 1.1e-06***
Investment in machinery (IHS) 0.162 0.428 1 -0.846 0.0305** 0.0916* -2.877 1.8e-10*** 1.4e-09***
Price marginal cost markup log(µ) -0.018 0.0035*** 0.035** -0.040 3.9e-04*** 0.0028*** -0.106 3.4e-08*** 2.4e-07***
Employees (log) 0.012 0.771 1 -0.339 1.1e-05*** 8.7e-05*** -0.518 1.3e-10*** 1.3e-09***
Ratio machinery to employees (log) -0.160 0.0138** 0.102 -0.627 5.3e-08*** 5.9e-07*** -1.517 8.3e-22*** 1.2e-20***
Number of products (log) 0.046 1.8e-04*** 0.0032*** -0.003 0.9 0.9 -0.096 0.0078*** 0.0234**
Independent variable: log(coal price)
Coal productivity (log) 0.846 0*** 0*** 1.487 1.5e-15*** 1.2e-14*** 1.612 2.1e-13*** 1.7e-12***
Output (log) 0.090 0.0036*** 0.035** -0.300 0.226 0.903 -0.135 0.694 1
Coal consumption (log) -0.756 0*** 0*** -1.843 4.2e-11*** 3.0e-10*** -1.796 3.9e-06*** 2.7e-05***
Electricity consumption (log) -0.041 0.246 1 -0.426 0.114 0.685 0.734 0.0873* 0.524
Profits -5.917 3.0e-04*** 0.0051*** -5.745 0.703 1 -7.108 0.784 1
Total revenues -19.988 0.0127** 0.102 -18.739 0.827 1 -0.843 0.995 1
Avg. variable costs (AVC) -14.357 0.0297** 0.178 -27.758 0.695 1 4.644 0.964 1
TFP (log) -0.001 0.764 1 -0.020 0.124 0.685 -0.031 0.128 0.642
Notes: The table contains the coefficients and p-values from the original regressions in the main text. The q-values are the adjusted p-values for multiple hypothesis
testing using the procedure outlined in Holm (1979). The correction procedures are separetly applied by model (OLS, IV A, IV B) and by independent variable
log(electricity price) and log(coal price).
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